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 ABSTRACT 
The Government of Ghana has made a declaration through the National Energy Policy to 
attain 5000MW of electricity generation by the end of 2015 in order to meet the 10% annual 
growth rate of electricity demand. The policy statement emphasised the significant role of the 
private sector in achieving this objective due to government’s inability to solely finance 
electricity generation infrastructure. Currently, there are three operational Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) who are generating a considerable percentage of electricity being 
supplied in the country. Of these three, two (Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) do not have 
financial guarantees from the government and have been confronted with the challenge of fuel 
unavailability and non-payment by their public partner (Electricity Company of Ghana). 
Since government is unable to solely finance electricity generation infrastructure and because 
the influx of IPPs has not occurred as envisaged, it becomes imperative that the existing PPPs 
be effectively managed to ensure further expansion of resources while government continues 
to seek additional private investment. The main objective of the research was thus to examine 
the type of working processes between public and private partners and to what extent it 
influences their effort at attaining the goal of 5000MW power generation capacity. The 
Theory of Collaborative Advantage by Vangen and Huxham was adopted in the study to 
examine whether the public and private actors within the present partnership engage in a 
‘collaborative’ or ‘exchange’ partnership, which would subsequently determine additional 
investment in expanding electricity generation facilities in the face of the prevailing 
challenges. The study adopted a qualitative approach within which there were in-depth 
discussions with both public and private actors engaged in the PPP projects, which included 
the primary partners (ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) and the public actors in other 
governmental institutions who interact with these IPPs and also influence the operations of 
the partnership.  
Findings from the study revealed that the integration of private actors in decision making 
bodies at the national level and the active involvement of governmental actors in addressing 
challenges of the partnership ensures familiarity with the sector goal and enhances 
commitment towards its achievement. Irrespective of the commitment demonstrated, the poor 
relational quality that exists between IPPs actors and their partners at ECG due to ECG’s 
noncompliance with contractual obligations and exploitation of monopolistic advantage in 
electricity distribution severs trust and limits the extent to which these IPPs are willing to 
invest more resources. The goal of attaining 5000MW by 2015 remains overly ambitious 
because the inflow of private capital has not materialised as anticipated and the current PPPs 
do not exhibit the collaborative tendencies to guarantee further resource expansion to meet 
the sector goal.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) spearheaded the discussion of 
private sector participation in the economic development of Ghana. Private sector 
participation has ranged from total divestiture of state enterprises to partnerships which have 
been argued to improve the performance of public enterprises. As stated by Tangri 
(1991:524), “espousal of the need for public enterprise reform and divestiture was based on 
the poor performance of the state-owned sector”. Government’s primary mandate of 
providing infrastructure has over the years been met with severe budget constraints. The use 
of private finance through Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has therefore become a 
paramount feature in the expansion and provision of public services such as sanitation, water, 
health, and electricity. 
With a fast growing population and buoying economy, Ghana currently has an electricity 
consumption that increases at about 10% per annum. Electricity generation and supply since 
the inception of the Akosombo Dam (Ghana’s largest hydro-electric station) in 1965 has been 
the sole responsibility of government. However, with deteriorating machineries, increased 
urbanisation, population growth and natural factors (inadequate rainfall) confronted by the 
national electricity utilities without a concomitant expansion in power generation facilities, 
power supply has become erratic leading to the persistent load shedding (cut in electricity 
supply) in the country. After almost two decades of initiating power sector reforms to improve 
on the quality of service, the Government of Ghana is still faced with considerable challenges 
in the provision of electricity to citizens. Without adequate investment to expand power 
generation stations, the Government of Ghana has recognised the need to tap into the 
resources and expertise of private investors to build and operate additional electricity 
generation plants to augment the production by the state power generator. One of the strategy 
goals of the Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan (2010) is to increase financing for 
electricity supply from government sources, development partners and the private sector. 
Thus, in effect, to open up the power sub-sector to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and 
private sector participation especially in electricity generation. 
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1.1 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The Ghana Energy Policy has stipulated that “the first step towards the delivery of reliable 
power supply services…will be to increase power supply infrastructure” (GoG, 2010:11). In 
line with this objective, the policy has the goal of expanding electricity generation capacity 
from about 2000 Megawatts to 5000MW by 2015 but as it stands, the country is yet to meet 
this target with current generation capacity at 2589MW. Due to the huge investment 
commitment needed for the expansion of electricity generation which is beyond the financial 
capacity of government, one major policy response to the electricity generation deficit in the 
country has been the introduction of IPPs who generate additional megawatts of electricity to 
augment the supply by the government’s agency (the Volta River Authority) in charge of the 
country’s largest generation facilities. However, because of the unreliable electricity market 
and unpredictable economic conditions of Ghana, IPPs would only operate through 
partnership with government agencies that guarantee them ready market for their services and 
this they do by signing the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Thus currently there are three 
operating IPPs in Ghana who have PPAs with the Volta River Authority (VRA) and the 
Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG). 
Indeed the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in a report (UNECA, 2011:43) 
has reasoned that “the benefits of public private partnerships in Ghana include the increase in 
generation capacity and capacity utilisation and hence increased supply of electricity”. With a 
current national electricity demand of about 2300MW, attainment of the 5000MW set by the 
government to be achieved by 2015 would have solved the severe generation deficit. 
However, the country presently has a generation capacity of 2589MW which falls below the 
5000MW target consequently leading to regular power outages in the country. The Energy 
Commission (2014) in outlining causes of unreliable electricity explained that due to such 
factors as the refurbishment and maintenance of some generation stations, the high cost of 
Light Crude Oil (LCO) and the inconsistency in the supply of gas for electricity generation, 
the capacity at which generation stations may be able to produce would not meet demand. 
Interestingly IPPs in Ghana have mainly invested in thermal generation that requires either 
LCO or natural gas, hence the high prices and unavailability of these fuels affect them largely. 
It was however the promise of government to make gas especially available to potential IPPs, 
in a sense creating security of fuel supply to facilitate stable power generation. Another 
challenge to IPPs in Ghana currently is that ECG has often defaulted in payments and 
according to the World Bank (2013), it is its financial untrustworthiness that has kept most 
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IPPs from venturing into the power sector of Ghana. How does this then affect those already 
in contract with ECG? How do partners manage to work along these challenges? What type of 
working relationship have they developed in their operations and how has it affected the 
attainment of the 5000MW set by government? Central to these questions is thus the issue of 
partnership agreement and collaborative practices, that is, how government actors and their 
private counterparts engage with each other aside the formal dictates of their contracts and 
how this impacts on their effort at improving electricity delivery.  
Indeed, there is a National Policy on Public Private Partnership and the National Energy 
Policy which places much emphasis on private finance in expanding power infrastructure. To 
this end, there is a PPP advisory unit at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, a 
Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of PPPs, and various regulatory bodies to ensure 
the implementation of such PPP projects. However, are these measures enough to ensure 
effective and successful partnerships? What happens after partnership agreements have been 
signed? How committed are the actors to achieving partnership goals? Do they have enough 
trust to enhance resource expansion? Is there mutual relational power to enable partnership 
stability? To quote Weihe (2008:154) “indeed, operational practice has been more or less 
black-boxed. So we do not know very much about how the public and private actors in PPPs 
co-operate in practice and how this affects performance” Moving beyond the macro-structure 
of a PPP policy and its institutional frameworks, there are rudiments of routine partnership 
functioning such as resource contribution, trust, and common goals, that if effectively 
managed create that special effect of ‘synergy’ which is the unique phenomenon of 
partnership that gives it the ‘collaborative advantage’ over single agents operations. Is this the 
case in the partnership between the IPPs and government agencies in Ghana? 
It is in this light that this study seeks to examine the type of working processes that exists 
between public and private actors and how it affects their efforts in reaching the 5000MW 
postulated by the government of Ghana. In analysing the relationship, emphasis is given to the 
partnership traits, thus whether it is that of mere ‘exchange’ where the goal is for individual or 
private gains, or conversely if the partnership is ‘collaborative’ in the true sense where all 
parties in an agreement join efforts with mutual risks and benefits. 
1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study focuses primarily on the actors and institutions involved in PPP in the power sector 
of Ghana. Even though the study is basically exploratory, it endeavours to give explanations 
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to how such factors as; mutual goals, trust and resource contribution impacts on the 
partnerships success. It seeks to identify and explain how the presence or absence of these 
factors account for the underlying relationship between the primary partners; the Electricity 
Company of Ghana (ECG) and two major IPPs (Sunon Asogli Power Ghana Limited and 
CENIT Energy) and its associated impact on electricity generation expansion. With the 
signing of the PPA, ECG which is the government agency responsible for electricity 
distribution to about 72% of the Ghanaian population remains the single purchaser of power 
generated by these IPPs. The focus of the study thus is to examine if ECG and IPPs engage in 
more than just buying and selling of power by incorporating such collaborative practices as; 
agreement and working on mutual goals, exhibition of trusting attitudes as well as efficiency 
in making resources available to ensure effective partnership functioning. Because there are 
other government agencies that also play various roles to ensure the overall functioning of the 
partnership, they are included in this study. These institutions include; The Ghana Grid 
Company Limited (GRIDCo) which plays a third party role in transmitting generated 
electricity from IPPs to ECG, the Ministry of Energy acting as the main monitoring institution 
in the power sector and finally the two regulatory agencies (Energy Commission and Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission). The activities of these latter institutions have an overall 
effect on the attainment of government’s objectives, thus their significance to this study. 
1.3 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The PPP Policy of Ghana has stipulated that partnerships between government and the private 
sector would generally improve the quality of service provided, thus in the case of the power 
sector to expand electricity generation to meet growing demand. According to the Theory of 
Collaborative Advantage (discussed thoroughly in the literature review) however, there 
should be more than mere exchange within partnerships to achieve such success. The main 
objective of the research is thus to examine the type of working processes between public and 
private actors from the IPPs and government agencies and to what extent it influences their 
effort in attaining the goal of 5000MW generation capacity. In this regard, the specific 
objectives of the study would be; 
a) To examine the managerial strategies adopted by public and private actors in working 
towards stated goals 
b) To examine the factors that account for the level of trust in the partnership and its 
consequent effect on attainment of partnership goals  
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c) To examine the level of resource dependence of partners and its resultant effect on 
power relations and partnership stability  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central question this research seeks to answer is; what kind of working processes do 
partners engage in and how does it impact on their effort to attain the goal of expanding 
electricity generation infrastructure?  
Specifically, the study would aim at finding answers to the following strategic questions: 
a) How do partners formulate and work towards partnership goals? 
b) How do partners build and maintain trust in working towards partnership goals?  
c) How efficiently do partners make their complementary resources available to meet 
partnership goal? 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY   
The phenomenon of IPPs is quite recent in Ghana thus not much academic research has been 
done to ascertain how in practice actors of existing IPPs and government agencies work 
together in achieving improved electricity delivery. In existence however are a few research 
articles (Ashong, 2010; Malgas, 2008) discussing the presence and operations of IPPs in terms 
of economic viability of such projects without much attention to how actors of these IPPs 
collaborate with their public partners. There is therefore gap in existing literature with regards 
to core issues such as formulation and working toward mutual goals; existence of trust and 
efficiency in resource contribution that characterise routine operations of the partnership in 
the power sector.  
The current state of electricity deficit (challenges) in Ghana creates an opportune time for 
rigorous research to identify relevant policy areas that need to be given attention, thus in the 
case of this research, a theoretically focused study into the working processes between IPPs in 
their partnership with the government. Unlike other researches that focus on economic facets 
of PPP in power sector, this research is distinct because it endeavours to analyse the core 
working relationship between public and private actors and how this affects their objective of 
improving electricity delivery. This is what has been overlooked by other researches in the 
power sector. Since there has been less focus on this particular topic in Ghana, this research 
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intends to fill the current gap in literature. Another importance of this study is that PPP has 
become a new trend not only in the developed world but also in developing countries as there 
is a shift in service delivery mode and development process from being state driven (top down 
and hierarchic basis) to a network mode comprising different actors (private and the civil 
society). In this regard it is interesting to follow this process in the context of the developing 
world, specifically Ghana. The findings of this study may accordingly inspire more academic 
research on the subject of PPP with regards to working relationship between public and 
private actors generally and its implication for improved public service delivery.   
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
Chapter one has served as an introduction to the research and has presented an overview of 
the research problem and study objectives. It has also delineated the scope of the study by 
identifying actors and organisations that are relevant to answering the research questions. 
In chapter two, there will be a review of literature on the general practice of PPP in the 
provision of public service and also an attempt to establish the difference between PPP and 
other forms of private sector participation. The chapter goes on to ascertain the type of PPP 
that is typically practised in electricity provision. A conceptual framework is then developed 
from the Theory of Collaborative Advantage by Vangen and Huxham (2010) and Resource 
Dependence Theory as reviewed by Hillman, Withers, and Collins (2009) within which 
variables are derived for the analysis of the partnership between ECG and its partner IPPs 
(Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy).  
Chapter three will present the methodology adopted in the conduct of the study. It gives 
justification for the selection of a qualitative approach as well as the use of the case study 
strategy. The chapter describes the area of study, units of analysis, the significance of multiple 
sources of data, and the use of qualitative strategies for data analysis. Standards for ensuring 
quality research (validity and reliability) as well as strategies to ensure adherence to ethical 
concerns will also be indicated. 
Chapter four will describe the background to the introduction of PPP in public service 
provision in Ghana. It then outlines the objectives of the Public Private Partnership Policy of 
Ghana and the institutional frameworks established for its implementation. The chapter 
proceeds to explain the state of electricity provision, reasons given by government for the 
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engagement of PPP in the power sector and the structure of PPP arrangement between the 
government agency (Electricity Company of Ghana) and Independent Power Producers. 
Chapters five and six will present findings and discussions of the study. Chapter five will 
analyse the managerial strategies adopted by partners in working towards congruent goals. 
Chapter six will then analyse factors that account for the level of trust between partners and 
how strategic resource contribution influence power relations and its resultant effect on 
partnership success.  
Chapter seven will serve as a recap of the preceding chapters. It will provide summary of the 
research findings in relation to the theoretical discussions advanced in the study. The chapter 
will also assess the implication of this study to policy discussions and future studies on PPP in 
the power sector of Ghana. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops an analytical framework by reviewing various literatures and 
theoretical arguments on the practice of PPPs. According to Layder (1998:10), ‘‘if social 
research is about the systematic gathering of evidence and data, then theorising represents the 
attempt to order this information into some kind of explanatory framework’’. The succeeding 
sections thus discuss: a) the evolution of PPP in the provision of public service; b) the unique 
characteristic of PPP that distinguishes it from other forms of private participation and why 
PPP is increasingly being used in the delivery of public services; c) the various arguments 
advanced by scholars to explain the associated benefits and risks of PPP (Bayliss, 2009; 
Bovaird, 2004; Coghill & Woodward, 2005; Hodge & Greve, 2007); and d) the case of PPP in 
electricity delivery to enable a clear understanding of the phenomenon across various contexts 
including Europe, Africa and particularly Ghana. 
The chapter also reviews theoretical perspectives put forward by Vangen and Huxham (2010) 
who describe the Theory of Collaborative Advantage. The study specifically adapts their 
section on partnership goals and partnership trust and their influence on partnership 
effectiveness. The Resource Dependence Theory reviewed by Hillman et al. (2009) is also 
used to explain the level of interdependence of partners and its consequent impact on 
partnership success. An empirical study by Weihe (2008) on the functioning of some 
partnerships in the United Kingdom (UK) and factors that impact on their effectiveness would 
also be reviewed in this chapter. By relying on these theoretical perspectives, the study 
develops a major argument that PPP is a tool for achieving stated goals mostly set by 
government. Therefore, variables are derived from the above theories and synthesized into a 
conceptual framework that would be used in analysing the effectiveness of partners in their 
bid to improve electricity delivery. 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION: PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC 
SERVICE 
Private participation in governance is not a very new phenomenon (Greve, 2008; Wettenhall, 
2010). The private sector for centuries has played numerous roles in assisting governments in 
the provision of public goods and services. For instance, Linder (1999:36) argues that the idea 
of private participation could be traced as far back as the wartime in America where there was 
communal solidarity between business and local government. It is therefore very important to 
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consider the historical antecedent of PPP in the discussions of the concept. Indeed Wettenhall 
(2005:23) has stated that “if we simply assume that PPP is a new social movement without 
antecedents, we deprive ourselves of the possibility of benefiting from an understanding of 
strengths and weaknesses in older mixing/partnering that might emerge from historical 
inquiry”.  It thus becomes necessary to understand the preceding models of public service 
delivery prior to PPP to be able to appreciate what is new and what is not and why PPP is the 
new buzzword in the New Public Management (NPM) literature.  
To begin with, the main argument for the expansion of private sector participation in the 
provision of public service stems from the perspective of ‘the growth of government’ (Savas, 
1982). Savas (1982:11) discusses three main causes of growth of government; “(1) a demand 
for more government services, by recipients of the services; (2) a desire to supply more 
government services by the producers of the services; (3) increased inefficiency, which results 
in more government spending to provide same services”. Traditionally however, government 
is thought to be the provider of those amenities that are considered essential for the general 
welfare of society which therefore cannot be left in the hands of private individuals. In 
describing the role of the state in society, the renowned political economist, Adam Smith 
(1776) in his book ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ 
identifies three key functions that government ought to perform; a) the duty of defence, that is 
the protection of the sovereign territory from violence and invasion; b) discharge of justice in 
an impartial manner and assurance of equal rights to every member of the society and; c)  
provision of essential services such as education, roads, bridges and water that if provided to 
citizens would be of enormous benefit to the social and economic progress of society itself. 
Smith (1776) contends that ‘public institutions’ and ‘public works’ ought be established and 
maintained by the state for discharging these duties and that it would be cheaper (for citizens) 
if the state provided these essentials. Thus, such services as mentioned above are 
conventionally considered the key function of government to be delivered through its 
administrative machinery of publicly appointed officials.  
However, times and situations have changed since Adam Smith. Governance has now become 
more complex and multiple, which is allowing actors to participate hence, the increasing 
involvement of other actors in the process of governance and delivery of public services. For 
instance as Savas (1982) pointed out, the demand for more of such services puts enormous 
strain on the coffers of government hence, the need to diversify the resource base of some of 
these services. In the face of such growing responsibilities of governments, strict centralised 
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control has been argued to create inefficiencies and huge public debt in the provision of public 
services. Consequently, even though such services ought to be enjoyed by all, strict 
centralised control has made their provision rather inaccessible to the larger part of society. 
One key antagonist of the welfare state, Palmer (2012:1) has strongly argued that such a 
governance system has created two current crises: “the financial crisis that has slowed down 
or even reversed growth and stalled economies around the world, and the debt crisis that is 
gripping Europe, the United States, and other countries ”. Such oppositions have called the 
state to step aside and assume its core role of citizen protection and defence instead of 
attempting to take control of every sector of the economy. The role of the state as the 
dominant actor in planning and controlling the welfare of citizens therefore continues to 
diminish in recent times with the introduction of the market allowing for private participation 
in the provision of services such as healthcare, education, sanitation, electricity and water 
traditionally thought to be the responsibility of government. Motives for the use of private 
finance however differ across various regions of the world. In one perspective, developed 
countries often use private finance to expand their infrastructure to reduce the incidence of 
taxation and government’s expenditure (Greve, 2008). On the other hand, dissatisfaction over 
under performance of the public sector has been the main factor contributing to the growth of 
the private sector in the governance of developing countries (Abubakari, Buabeng, & 
Ahenkan, 2013; Van de Walle, 1989). 
The dawn of NPM significantly transformed the role of government in the provision of public 
services. Drawbacks such as inflexibility and inefficiency that have been associated with the 
traditional Weberian model of public administration have necessitated the shift in the method 
of public service delivery. Nasrullah (2005:197) characterises the traditional form of public 
administration as “an administration under formal control of political leadership, based on a 
strictly hierarchical model of bureaucracy, staffed by permanent, neutral officials, motivated 
only by public interest serving any governing party equally and not contributing to policy but 
merely administering policies decided by the politicians”. It is these characteristics of public 
administration that scholars have continually argued to create inefficiencies in the public 
sector. NPM belongs to a cluster of Public Management Reforms that seek to modify the 
organisation of public institutions and methods of public service delivery to be more 
responsive to the needs of citizens. According to C. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:2), public 
management reforms are “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector 
organisations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better”. Larbi (1999:2) 
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also states that “the central objective of change was improvement in the ways in which 
government is managed and services delivered, with emphasis on efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness”. A fundamental principle of NPM thus is to get government to run like a 
business entity with such elements of the private sector as efficiency, competition and 
profitability. The role of the state in providing public service in a manner which is impartial, 
open, and equal has therefore been replaced by market oriented principles. As Haque 
(2001:68) emphasizes, “the primary objectives of public service has changed from the 
realisation of citizen’s rights or entitlements to the accomplishment of economic goals based 
on efficiency and competition”. Arguing further, Haque (2001) asserts that this shift in 
objectives has consequently altered the focus of government from ‘citizen-centred’ to 
‘efficiency-oriented’ (ibid).  
The increasing calls for private sector participation in the provision of public service over the 
years have also generated the debate on what best form participation should take, raising such 
questions as; which sectors should have private involvement? What should be the role of both 
private and public entities in such arrangements? How can the private sector provide these 
services without citizens being overly charged? How efficiently does the private sector 
provide services better than government? A search for an answer to these queries has seen the 
evolution of private sector participation, from initial contracting-out to outright privatisation 
and now Public Private Partnership. In such discussions of private sector participation 
however, the distinction between these various forms are often blurred as academics and 
practitioners use them interchangeably. It thus becomes very important in this research to 
point out the salient ways by which these terms differ. 
a) Contracting-Out is an agreement between the government and a private entity in which 
the private party assumes the responsibility of supplying goods and services on behalf of 
government, where services provided is either paid by the government or by individual 
consumers (user charges). In most cases of contracting out, while ownership of the facility 
still remains public, the function of management or operation or both is contracted to a 
private entity. The role of the contracted firm in a management contract thus becomes that 
of overseeing to the daily operations of the facility and taking strategic decisions to meet 
the organisation’s objectives. One such case in Ghana was the contract between the 
government owned water utility and Aqua Vitens Rand Limited. In 2005, the Ghana 
Water Company Limited contracted a five year management service of Aqua Vitens Rand 
Limited to manage its operations with the objective of improving its performance, 
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especially in the area of efficient water supply in the country. While still maintaining its 
staff, the Ghana Water Company Limited handed over the core function of management to 
Aqua Vitens Rand Limited. The performance of the contracted company was however 
considered unsatisfactory thus, after the five year agreement, the contract was not 
extended instead, operations were handed back to the Ghana Water Company Limited 
(Abubakari et al., 2013). 
b) Privatisation is “a transfer of ownership and control from the public to the private sector, 
with particular reference to asset sales” (Van de Walle, 1989:601). In cases of 
privatisation, the private entity assumes ownership of the organisation and responsibility 
for the provision of services as operating in the market. Regulatory agencies are however 
often set up to regulate the operations of private entities delivery such services because of 
their perceived social and economic importance. An instance of a huge privatisation move 
in Ghana was the sale of Ghana Telecommunication Company Limited to Vodafone 
International Holdings B.V in 2008, where the government sold 70% of its shares to 
Vodafone International Holdings B.V, making the private firm the majority owner of the 
hitherto public telecommunications service provider. With this sale, key assets of Ghana 
Telecom were transferred to Vodafone with which the latter assumed full responsibility of 
providing communication services. With a liberalisation policy in place, the 
telecommunication industry in Ghana has for over two decades seen an upsurge of private 
investment and the expansion of telecommunication networks and allied activities. The 
activities of telecommunication service providers are however monitored and regulated by 
the National Communications Authority (NCA).  
c) Public Private Partnership is an agreement between a private entity - whether for profit 
or not - and a public sector to jointly produce public goods and services in which accrued 
benefits and costs are shared according to consented agreements. In PPPs, while 
government retains responsibility and accountability for providing services, financing of 
projects mostly remains with the private party and in some cases shared between both 
parties (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). To quote Talus (2009:43), “although PPPs are used 
widely in various sectors, they have certain common features regardless of the sector: 
long-term nature, the role of the private sector and the fundamental importance of the 
contract as a risk division mechanism”.  An instance of a PPP arrangement could be where 
a private entity is contracted for a period of usually 20 to 25 years to design, build, finance 
and operate a project (such as water provision or electricity generation) and delivers the 
service in collaboration with a government agency in the particular sector of operation. In 
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such contracts, risks, responsibilities and rewards are specified and accordingly shared to 
consented agreement.  
 The Concept and Peculiarity of Public Private Partnership 2.1.1
Just as strict government control faced critical opposition, exclusive private participation has 
been cited as a major cause of social inequality. The profit orientation of the private sector in 
the provision of public goods and services are skewed towards those who can afford (Kwak, 
Chih, & Ibbs, 2009; Larbi, 1999). Kwak et al. (2009:52) have thus argued that, PPP has the 
potential of overcoming the pitfalls of these two approaches to governance by incorporating 
the strengths of both sectors. Deliberating on the demise of contracting-out and privatisation 
and the ascendency of PPP in current governments’ policies, Greve (2008:122) simply puts; 
As contracting out policies became exhausted, policy-makers, providers and 
purchasers began to look for a new label that could reinvigorate the contracting 
phenomenon. ‘Privatisation’ was also an exhausted concept. Increasingly, the 
partnership idea began to create excitement in policy-making circles in 
governments around the world, in consultancy firms, and with purchasers and 
providers.  
What intrigues academics and practitioners alike is what makes PPP different from other 
forms of private participation, and why it has become the sudden preferred choice of policy 
instrument for the provision of essential public services. According to Greve (2008:118) 
“what is new about PPP is that coherent policies are beginning to be designed and 
implemented on public-private interaction”. Thus, in contrast to other forms of private 
participation which shift responsibilities, risks and rewards to mainly one party, particular 
attention is now being paid to how to combine the strengths of both public and private 
agencies to improve on service delivery. Again, what has changed is its transformation from 
‘privatisation’ and ‘outsourcing’ which had elements of competitive market to ‘cooperation’ 
which is intended to spread cost and benefit between the private and public sectors (Greve, 
2008; Linder, 1999). Consequently, the type of relationship that exists in traditional 
contracting is the principal-agent relationship where the role of government and the private 
party are ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’ respectively while their new roles in PPP define them 
as ‘partners’ Greve (2008:118).  
Proponents of PPP have often argued that public service does not necessarily mean 
government ought to be the provider of service (Espigares & Torres, 2009; Liese, Blanchet, & 
Dussault, 2004). Liese et al. (2004) emphasize that public service could be delivered not only 
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through direct provision by government but also through government sponsorship and 
partnership with other entities. Highlighting reasons for the expansion in the use of PPPs, 
Flinders (2010:118) has argued that, the private sector has ceased to be seen as a competitor 
but rather “a potential partner of the state with the capacity to reduce inefficiencies and 
increase performance while also injecting much-needed dynamism and cultural change within 
the public sector”. Engaging in such ventures however stresses mutual dependence for 
partnership success (improved service delivery). While the private party introduces its market 
oriented mechanisms, the public sector plays its core role of formulation and implementation 
of policy frameworks to facilitate the process of service delivery. Haque (2001:70) asserts that 
such relationship thus alters government responsibility from active provision of services to a 
supportive function of facilitating private sector initiative. With several empirical examples 
pointing to the UK as the pioneer of PPP in the early 1990s (J. Hall, 1998; Wettenhall, 2010), 
PPP has over the years been established as a more favourable consideration for governments 
seeking to improve their infrastructure with less public expenditure and added efficiency of 
the private sector. Emphasising this point, Hodge and Greve (2005:2) have stated that “PPPs 
are hailed as the main alternative to contracting-out and privatisation and thereby seen as a 
qualitative jump ahead in  the effort to combine the strong sides of both the public sector and 
the private sector”. Arguments in line with this assertion opine that while the private sector 
injects finances and efficiency, the government formulates various policies and regulations 
(such as tax incentives) to facilitate service delivery. This argument has however generated 
various debates on the benefits and dangers of PPP. While some scholars (Kwak et al., 2009) 
appreciate it as a genuinely new form private participation, others (Hodge & Greve, 2007; 
Linder, 1999) are sceptical and believe it is just an extension of the old forms of private 
participation with just a new name.  
Owing to this dichotomy, the concept of PPP has been highly contested in both definition and 
classification. Kwak et al. (2009:52) assert that even though there has been an expansive use 
of PPPs in the delivery of public services, the term has not been clearly defined.  According to 
Klijn (2010:68) there are at least three areas that confusion is evident; the meaning of PPP, the 
arguments and rationality of PPP and about what best form PPP should take. Drawing on the 
literature, there are however common themes that feature in the definition of PPP which also 
makes it distinct from other forms of private participation. These include; cooperation, risk 
and reward sharing, mutual objective and contribution of resources. Some notable definitions 
from the literatures are given below: 
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Public–Private Partnerships is “co-operation of some durability between public and private 
actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources 
which are connected with these products or services” (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001:598). 
A PPP is “a cooperative arrangement between the public and private sectors that involves the 
sharing of resources, risks, responsibilities, and rewards with others for the achievement of 
joint objectives” (Kwak et al., 2009:52) 
“A PPP is a contractual agreement between a public entity and a private sector party, with 
clear agreement on the shared objectives for the provision of public infrastructure and services 
traditionally provided by the public sector” (Government of Ghana, 2011:2) 
The above definitions portray the basic notion of any PPP agreement as that of a win-win 
situation between the government and the private entity where they both contribute resources 
to an enterprise and accrued benefits and costs are shared. These themes are also the main 
attribution of PPP that makes it distinct from privatisation and contracting-out. It is worthy of 
note however that these different forms of private participation ought not be seen in isolation 
but as a continuum of methods of public service delivery by the private sector, as some of 
their features overlap.  The table below presents some themes of private participation and 
attempts to clarify the differences and to delineate the classification of PPP for the purpose of 
this research. 
TABLE 1: CATEGORISING THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF PRIVATE 
PARTICIPATION 
     Features              Privatisation                            Contracting-out                                PPP 
Relationship 
 
Buyer-Seller relationship 
where government sells its 
assets to the  private entity 
and  the latter becomes the 
majority stakeholder or sole 
owner of the asset and 
exclusively responsible for 
service delivery 
Principal-Agent relationship 
where the private entity is the 
provider (as agent) of service 
and government is the 
purchaser (as principal) 
Government and private 
entity act as partners and 
cooperate in the delivery of 
service 
Objectives/Goals 
 
Solely private entity’s 
decision on organisational 
goals 
Government’s goals are 
specified to the private entity 
and becomes the benchmark 
for which the private entity 
operates 
Shared goals through 
negotiation where there is 
joint effort to accomplish 
stated goals 
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     Features              Privatisation                            Contracting-out                                PPP 
Resource Contribution Resources are provided solely 
by the private entity 
Resources are either wholly 
contributed by the 
government or by the private 
entity and government pays 
for services rendered in both 
cases 
Either; 
There is pooling of resources 
by both parties into a mutual 
venture (e.g., Joint Venture), 
Or 
The private party finances the 
project and the government 
facilitates the delivery of 
service through regulatory 
frameworks and long term 
periodic payment, usually 
over 20 years  (e.g. Private 
Finance Initiative)  
Risk Allocation 
 
Risk is borne wholly by the 
private entity 
Risk is borne either by the 
government (where it 
provides the resources and 
contracts the private party for 
service delivery) or by the 
private party (where it 
provides its own resources for 
service delivery) 
Risk is shared and allocated 
to the party that can best 
manage it 
Coordination 
 
The private entity is 
autonomous and solely 
decides which organisational 
practices to adopt which 
typically is to enhance its 
performance to enable it 
thrive in a competitive market  
Decision making is done in a 
hierarchical structure where 
the contracting public entity 
decides performance output 
and the contracted private 
entity acts as directed 
Decision making involves a 
network of inter-dependent 
public and private actors who 
share information for the 
achievement of partnership 
goals  
Ownership Private entity could be  either 
the majority stakeholder or 
sole owner of the enterprise  
On one hand, the private 
party could be the sole owner 
of the enterprise and provide 
services on behalf of 
government. On the other 
hand, government could own 
the facility and contracts the 
private party to deliver 
services 
Both private and public 
parties could invest and 
become joint owners of  a 
venture or they could own 
separate organisations and 
through partnering contract 
they work together to deliver 
a joint service 
Source: (Greve, 2008) and researcher’s own development 
 Classification of PPP 2.1.2
To assess the benefits or dangers of partnerships, there is the need to identify the roles and 
contribution of the public and private parties in such arrangements. Unfortunately, there has 
not been a clear categorisation of the types of PPP to enable comparative analysis across 
various regions and sectors. Scholars and practitioners have advanced different types of PPP 
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without any particular methodology thus, creating confusion on the differences, benefits and 
limitations of each type. As stressed by Delmon (2010:5) “lack of an agreed categorisation 
methodology has created confusion and limited the ability to cross-fertilise, learning lessons 
from different regions and sectors who use different terminology, making it difficult to know, 
without in-depth analysis, if the structures being used are similar or not”. From review of 
literature, scholars have mostly categorised PPP along two main lines; those who categorise it 
according to the relationship between partners and others who categorise according to 
ownership, financing, and maintenance of the project. The definition of these types of PPP 
however still overlap and distinctions are not made very clear. 
An example of the typology of PPP according to the relationship between partners is given by 
Jeffares, Sullivan, and Bovaird (2009:5) as:  
a) Joint Venture: “A newly established company owned by both the public authority and 
private company”  
b) Public Private Partnering Contracts: “Public authority selecting a partner to assist them 
in improving service delivery and contributing strategically”   
c) Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Capital Investment Strategic Partnerships: “A form 
of capital outsourcing but with partnering contract. Public authority procures 
investment and services in relation to an asset with a design, build, finance and operate 
contract with a private provider”. 
The second type of categorisation of PPP according to who builds, owns and finances the 
project has been given by Kwak et al. (2009:54). Such as:  
a) Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): The private partner designs, builds, finances 
and operates the project but with government maintaining full ownership.  
b) Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): The project is built and operated by the private partner 
and by some consented agreement, the asset is reverted to the state at a specified 
period.  
c) Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The private partner builds, owns and operates the project 
without an obligation to revert it to the state. The private partner owns the project in 
perpetuity.  
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By this categorisation, the partnership between ECG and IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy) takes the form of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) where IPPs solely invest in their 
generations stations and by singing of the Power Purchase Agreement (partnering contract), 
partners consent to an objective and depend on each other’s resources to attain individual 
organisational objectives as well as partnership goals (between a stipulated time of usually 20-
25 years). Since the partnership is a high economic venture, the presence of trust to allay fears 
of vulnerability cannot be overemphasised. There are also considerable risks shared between 
IPPs and ECG. IPPs bear financial risks resulting from their sole investment in power 
generation stations and ECG bears a risk of non-production by IPPs to meet consumers’ 
electricity demand. A common risk shared by both IPPs and ECG is fuel unavailability in 
which case IPPs become redundant which affects their profit margin and shareholders 
expectation, and ECG faces the risk of an inability to provide reliable electricity services to 
consumers. Again, as with most PPPs, the Government of Ghana has set up institutional 
frameworks for the operations of IPPs, such as the creation of two regulatory bodies (PURC 
and Energy Commission) to monitor the performance of the partnering institutions and the 
initiation of some incentive packages to ensure effective operations by IPPs.      
 Optimistic and Pessimistic Frontiers of PPP  2.1.3
In the face of many developmental challenges confronted by governments particularly in 
developing countries the evolution of PPP has created an opportune time for governments to 
scoop the perceived benefits that are traditionally associated with the private sector. One 
major argument for the use of PPP is that it introduces efficiency in the delivery of public 
services. This argument is founded on the basis of managerial skills that private sector 
introduces in its partnership with the public sector. Challenges of the public sector which 
include large size of government, multiple objectives of government, rent seeking activities, 
and corruption have been argued to result in resource waste which leads to inefficiency in 
service delivery. Thus, the provision of public service becomes more expensive than it should 
be. Conversely, since the private sector has a drive to increase its profitability, it focuses on 
minimising cost while increasing productivity. Khan (2006:4) believes that efficiency is 
perceived to be low in the public sector because bureaucrats and politicians do not have any 
stake in their organisation and do not have strict obligation to meet performance targets. Their 
counterparts in the private sector are on the other hand constantly under checks to perform 
efficiently or face sanctions. PPP is therefore rooted in the ideology that the engagement of 
the private sector would inherently transform the approach used in the delivery of public 
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service. Focus on performance or results would ensure practices that guarantee efficient 
service delivery. 
Another argument for the increase use of PPP has been to reduce the burden on government 
expenditure on huge infrastructure projects. As asserted by the World Bank in its “Public-
Private Partnership Reference Guide (2012:19), “many governments turn to PPPs because 
they recognize that more investment in infrastructure is needed, but the government cannot 
“afford” to undertake infrastructure projects through traditional public procurement”. The 
National PPP Policy of Ghana has also emphasised that even though provision of public 
infrastructure is a principal responsibility of government, severe fiscal constraint has 
presented the need to seek private finance for infrastructural development (GoG, 2011:1). PPP 
is therefore the new financial method of providing public services without much cost to the 
government. Coghill and Woodward (2005:82) have argued that PPP as an alternative to 
direct government expenditure benefits the government particularly in some important ways 
which would minimise public debt; that government avoids the need to raise additional taxes 
or to borrow, and it also avoids long term debt financing as a consequence of borrowing to 
finance infrastructural projects. 
Hodge and Greve (2007) have also projected some benefits that have been espoused by 
various governments and scholars as reasons why partnership is important. Specifically they 
outlined risk sharing and shared knowledge that enhances the capacity of both sectors to 
produce something unique. Consequently, collaboration between the public and private 
sectors is deemed to yield superior output that none could achieve individually. They argued 
that “cooperation may entail some new product or service that no one would have thought of 
if the public organisations and private organisations had kept to themselves” (ibid, 546). One 
characteristic of a well-functioning partnership is that risks are shared according to whom best 
can manage them. With this, a party is not overburdened with risks which could affect its 
operations. Partners also share knowledge to allow for continued learning and innovation.   
However, while some scholars and practitioners appreciate the bright side of PPPs, others 
envisage the potential dangers of such contacts or agreements. These pessimists often argue 
that the perceived benefits of PPP ought not be accepted gullibly. A foremost criticism that 
has been raised in the practice of PPP is that, PPP is no different from the other forms of 
private participation (privatisation and contracting-out). This is particularly because PPP has 
increasingly become a generic term in describing other forms of private participation which 
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do not necessarily have the collaborative component of partnerships. This phenomenon 
termed ‘grammar of multiple meaning’ (Linder, 1999) and ‘language game’ (Hodge & Greve, 
2007) argue that PPP has become a favourable term especially for politicians who pursue less 
popular forms of private participation. A practical example of the use of language is 
elaborated by Wettenhall (2010) who discussed the introduction of the Public Finance 
Initiative in the UK, which according to him was initially not regarded as a PPP. Conservative 
government in 1992 introduced the scheme which was initially opposed by the Labour party 
who saw it as replica of privatisation. However, Labour party later endorsed the scheme and 
when they came into government, changed and adopted the more pleasant term PPP, which 
according to Wettenhall (2010:24) was “to play down the Conservative origins” through some 
rebranding. He consequently argued that a closer look at most PFIs do not exhibit any traits of 
partnerships (ibid, 25).  
Hodge and Greve (2007:547) have also argued that governments are increasingly using PPP 
as a language game to cover up ‘contracting out’ and ‘privatisation’ (which most citizens are 
not in favour of) to win policy votes and supporters thus, researchers have to be cautious 
when analysing partnerships. They contend that “the language of PPPs is a game designed to 
“cloud” other strategies and purposes [and] one such purpose is privatisation and the 
encouragement of private providers to supply public services at the expense of public 
organisations themselves” (ibid, 547). D. Hall, de la Motte, and Davies (2003) also argue that 
the term PPP is vague as it is used to cover the less favoured privatisation. The ‘language 
game’ according to Hodge and Greve (2007) has created some confusion in the use of the PPP 
term as it is viewed differently by various governments. They indicate that PFI in Australia 
has been disassociated from privatisation by the government, while in the UK it is viewed as 
‘equivalent’ to privatisation. In their words, “the same PPP phenomenon is thus being framed 
in two opposite ways for local political gain” (ibid, 548). D. Hall et al. (2003:2) have in this 
vein also emphasised that “the different words, and the different perceptions of them, have 
made a common understanding more difficult”. 
Another challenge that has risen over time to counter the argument of reduced government’s 
expenditure is that, PPP does not entirely relieve government of its fiscal responsibility. 
Government in one way or other still pays the private party for services provided, sometimes 
through subsidies and tax holidays. The view that government avoids raising excess tax to 
fund infrastructure has also been debunked with the argument that citizens tend to pay more 
for PPP services especially if service delivery is inefficient. Government is able to borrow at a 
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cheaper rate than private entities thus, services provided by government would relatively be 
cheaper to services delivered through PPP. Coghill and Woodward (2005:83) have 
emphasised that the motive of private entities to remain profitable also makes the cost of 
service delivery higher than that of government.   
Furthermore, Grimsey and Lewis (2002) argue that, there is sometimes conflict between the 
partners with the issue of risk sharing. Achieving even-handed risk sharing becomes a major 
source of conflict because while the public partner seeks to achieve value-for-money, the 
private entity seeks to recoup its investment. Specifically, they state that “the emphasis on risk 
transfer can be misleading as the value-for-money requires equitable allocation of risk 
between the public and private sector partners, and there maybe inherent conflict between the 
public sector’s need to demonstrate the value-for-money versus the private sector’s need for 
robust revenue streams to support the financing arrangement” (ibid, 109). Similarly, the 
desperate quest of many African governments to attract foreign investors to revamp their 
ailing infrastructure has led most of them to harbour majority of the risk involved in PPPs. 
Bayliss (2009) has asserted that, in contrast with industrialised economies, where one 
important reason for partnerships is to transfer a greater risk to the private partner to gain the 
utmost efficiency, the case is very different in the developing world. The argument here is 
that, in Sub Saharan Africa, the consideration is rather to reduce the risk for the private 
partner, but even in doing so, the risk is rather transferred to the government which results in 
higher risk burden to taxpayers, end-users and the government itself at the advantage of the 
private partner (ibid, 1).  
2.2 PRACTICING RHETORIC: THE CASE OF PPP IN ELECTRICITY 
PROVISION 
Electricity belongs to a group of public utilities (including water, natural gas and rail) referred 
to as Network Utilities that “require fixed network to deliver their services” (Newberry, 
2002:1). In other words, production and delivery of such utilities entail setting up of extensive 
infrastructure over a wide geographical area, where production is done at one point and 
delivery is through an interconnected system to various end-users (Geddes, 1998). It is this 
feature of network utilities that makes them natural monopolies, where ideally a sole producer 
is economically viable (to avoid duplication of infrastructure) and politically significant (for 
public interest). Governments have therefore typically provided such services either through 
direct ownership or by regulation of privately owned utilities. However, as criticisms of state 
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inefficiencies in providing public services continue to dominate public policy discussions, 
governments are gradually moving away from pure public ownership of such utilities by 
liberalising the sectors for competition and private sector involvement. Chile, even though a 
developing country has been cited as a classical example of the first country (in 1978) to 
spearhead competition and privatisation of state owned electricity utilities with impressive 
results so far, and serves as a model for both developed and developing countries (M. Pollitt, 
2004). Developed countries that followed suit include the UK, Norway, Australia, USA and 
Germany with varying cases of success (Domah & Pollitt, 2000; Magnus, 1997; Woodhouse, 
2005). It is worthy of note however that, because of its social and political significance, full 
privatisation of the electricity sector has not been an option for many governments, hence 
most turn to PPP (Gassner, Popov, & Pushak, 2009). 
PPP as practised in different sectors of the economy differs in models and application thus, it 
becomes imperative to describe how it is typically practised in the electricity sector. First and 
foremost, defining PPP in the power sector is particularly difficult because authors of such 
publications have often referred to any private involvement as privatisation (such as the study 
by Dagdeviren, 2009). Succinctly argued by Török (2013:178), some authors consider the 
broader view of privatisation where “they consider every form as privatisation which moves 
from public production towards private production, irrespectively of the dimension of 
financing and consumer decision”. However, other authors also consider these forms of 
private participation as PPP (as presented by Talus (2009) who studied such contracts around 
the European Union Countries). Consequently, as cited by D. Hall et al. (2003:7) from Bank 
Gesellschaft Berlin (2000), “it is of little use to try to summarise what a PPP is or should be. 
There is no binding definition, nor can one be found. And it is hardly helpful to fiddle around 
with unclear words of often Anglophone origin. What is sensible or not must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.” Accordingly, a search for a one size fit all definition for PPP is 
cumbersome. With this said, studying PPP in electricity provision does not have a clear 
debate as authors continue to use different terminologies to refer to similar phenomena thus, 
lessons and insights are difficult to draw from existing cases. What can be done at best is to 
define the characteristics of each case and determine which best term to ascribe it. For 
instance, the UK and Norway are two cases widely studied for their active private sector 
participation in the power sector. They however differ in terms of the models being applied.  
In the UK’s electricity sector, a case that has popularly been studied as electricity 
privatisation, almost every major publicly owned electricity utility has been sold off to private 
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entities, with some new entrants in the industry. Private companies are engaged in all stages 
of electricity production and supply (generation, transmission, distribution and retail) with 
very minimal ownership by the state. The role of the state now remains that of supervision 
where it has created a sector regulator to issue licenses and to ensure quality of service and 
consumer protection (Pond, 2006). Norway on the other hand has a system of ‘competition 
without privatisation’ as termed by Magnus (1997), where the state (central and local 
authorities) still retains control of transmission and distribution and integrates the private 
sector typically in power generation and retail which are by nature competitive.  
The electricity sector in Norway has been liberalised but not necessarily privatised. The sector 
has been opened for private sector involvement without essentially selling off government 
utilities. Magnus (1997) asserts that, private entities that wish to own electricity utilities in 
Norway have to do so by a concession agreement (either from existing state utility or an 
entirely new project) with the government. With this type of agreement, the private party is 
given the responsibility of financing and operating the utility for a number of years (stipulated 
by the concession contract), within which it recuperates its investments and reverts the utility 
back to the state after the agreed concessionary period. Aside being the owner of the utility, 
the contracting authority (central or local) also sets performance standards to be met by the 
private party thus, still retains control over electricity provision. Even though both countries 
have private sector participation in electricity provision, the models they have chosen vary 
significantly. Whereas the government of UK has handed over almost every part of the sector 
to private entities, thus with minimal state control (reason why it has been termed 
privatisation), the government of Norway retains significant control by owning and 
controlling its major electricity utilities even with private sector participation. 
In any case, Talus (2009:45), would describe UK’s kind of private sector participation as a 
unilateral PPP where the state transfers its responsibility of providing services to the private 
sector but retains some control over quality of service delivery through a licensing scheme, 
“where the revenue of the licensee comes from the exploitation of a license”. He however still 
holds that, concession (such as the case of Norway) is the more internationally recognised 
form of PPP that most countries adopt. He went on further to outline similarities between the 
unilateral (licensing) and contractual (concession) types of PPP; 
a) Both types require long term commitment from the private party within which it 
makes profit while the public sector benefits from efficient service delivery 
 24 
 
b) The private party has the sole responsibility of financing and managing the project 
c) They both “require a stable and clear foundation, including allocation of risk, to 
make the economic foundations of cooperation mutually beneficial” (ibid, 46). 
To this end, aiming to achieve a clean categorisation of PPP especially in electricity provision 
becomes a wild goose chase as authors in the field tend to give different interpretations to 
similar phenomena. Following these European experiences, how have developing countries 
responded to the need for private sector participation in electricity provision? Unlike the 
European cases where there is active private sector participation in almost every aspect of the 
electricity supply chain, developing countries have encountered limited participation by 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) who typically engage in electricity generation 
(Dagdeviren, 2009). Transmission and distribution which are natural monopolies have not 
seen much private involvement, therefore remain largely owned and controlled by 
government.  
 Independent Power Producers in Developing Countries 2.2.1
Woodhouse (2005:23) has argued that an electricity sector without strong financial capacity is 
most often “the catalyst that delivers other problems”. Jamasb (2006:15) in the same vein has 
emphasised that, “lack of access to and shortage of electricity supplies results in significant 
economic and social costs”. Faced with rapid population growth, buoying economies and 
deterioration of existing infrastructure, the challenge of developing countries has been the 
ability to mobilise sufficient investment to revamp their ailing electricity sector at the 
backdrop of severe financial constraints. According to Jamasb (2006:15), there was private 
participation in the electricity sectors of over 75 developing countries between 1990 and 
1999. Woodhouse (2005:33) has stressed that, “indeed, demand for private investment in 
infrastructure, particularly electricity generation, remains strong, and with the passage of time 
activity is likely to grow”. Governments of developing countries have therefore responded to 
this need by integrating IPPs in their electricity sectors. IPPs are private entities that own and 
operate electricity generation facilities and sell end products to end users, mostly governments 
and large industrial consumers. However, because of the economic uncertainties of 
developing countries, IPPs would usually require governments to act as guarantors for their 
loans or be the principal purchaser of electricity through the government’s electricity utilities 
(with the Power Purchase Agreement) (Dagdeviren, 2009). Thus, “increasingly, the public 
sector is involved in private projects to undertake or share the risks that the private sector is 
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unwilling to take on” (ibid, 655). This situation between governments and IPPs therefore 
creates a PPP model of private sector participation in the developing countries’ context.  
To attract IPPs, governments have followed the path of developed countries and have initiated 
power sector reforms and policies that focus on creating an enabling environment for potential 
investors. In Ghana for instance, two regulatory bodies (Energy Commission and Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission) were set up by Acts of Parliament in 1997. These two 
independent agencies are to serve as supervisory bodies of the power sector, to issue licenses 
to electricity providers and set tariffs for utility consumption (Malgas, 2008:11). Their 
creation initiated the introduction of private sector participation, as part of their 
responsibilities is to create an open access for all industry players (both public and private 
utilities). Eberhard and Gratwick (2013:4) have stated that, “the presence of a regulator is not 
itself a defining factor in attracting IPPs but helps ensure positive outcomes for host country 
and investor alike”. Parker and Figueira (2010:538) have also indicated that, “the existence of 
a solid regulatory environment is of vital importance for these projects to be carried out 
effectively”.  
Bayliss and Hall (2000) discuss that, the increase use of IPPs stems from the notion of being 
able to finance projects that is beyond the financial capability of state agencies. However, as 
stated earlier, the benefits of private sector participation in the provision of electricity are not 
conclusive as experiences from different countries vary to a large extent. Individual country 
analysis thus would be prudent in examining the impact of private sector participation 
(Besant-Jones, 2006). Nonetheless, stating some benefits of IPPs in developing countries, 
Besant-Jones (2006:33) has indicated that the introduction of IPPs helped countries such as 
Chile and Argentina to achieve better service quality for electricity consumers, such that, 
there was efficiency and wide coverage of services. Another benefit espoused showed that, 
private management of electricity provision reduces system loses such as payment delays, 
theft, and unpaid bills that public entities had difficulty in managing (ibid, 34). This approach 
subsequently reduces the fiscal burden on government to cover such operational costs (ibid).  
Bayliss and Hall (2000:10) are however of the view that, such benefits of private sector 
participation in electricity delivery have been over exaggerated and misleading. They contend 
that, IPPs in reality are not an alternative source of funds for governments to finance their 
electricity sectors. Rather, IPPs are repaid by government for all services rendered, thus in 
practical terms, there is still fiscal burden on government (ibid, 3). Bayliss and Hall (2000:6) 
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have further argued that, the services provided by IPPs are rather expensive and that, prices of 
electricity services are mostly inflated. Since IPPs are private entities and have a motive for 
making profit, they pass all production costs onto the consumer which results in higher tariffs. 
Consequently, private participation in electricity delivery could be rather an extravagant 
venture for developing countries that still need to invest in other sectors of the economy. They 
are therefore of the view that, governments should strengthen the capacity of state agencies 
instead of replacing them with private entities (ibid). 
2.3 DEVELOPING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Discussions on PPP in most literatures as observed in the preceding sections have often 
centred on its growth, institutional frameworks, as well as associated benefits and dangers. 
There is however growing concern to also identify how partnerships operate in practice to 
enable the examination of the various factors that contribute to their success or failure. As 
asserted by  Weihe (2008:4), “there has been a predominant focus on economic and legal 
aspects of cooperation, while behavioural and operational issues have been downplayed…this 
is rather unfortunate, since related research on inter-firm collaboration has produced 
convincing evidence that operational and behavioural issues do have a significant impact 
upon overall partnership performance”. One major rationale for the growth of PPP is that, by 
coming together of the public and private sectors, they are able to achieve superior 
performance than either of them acting on their own. There is the need therefore to identify 
the components of partnership functioning that gives it the perceived advantages over single 
agent operations.  
One significant feature of a well-functioning partnership is the extent to which actors involved 
are able to collaborate to achieve stated goals. It is worthy here to point out that not all 
partnerships have the unique collaborative feature and not all collaborations are partnerships. 
Carnwell and Carson (2009:4) have argued that, “sometimes partnership may be nothing more 
than rhetoric or an end in itself, with little evidence that partners are genuinely working 
together. Equally, it is possible for different agencies to work collaboratively together without 
any formal partnerships being in place”. With this said, it becomes imperative to analyse 
partnerships that pursue the interest of working collaboratively to assess whether indeed there 
is any element of collaboration in their relationship.  
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 Partnership Agreement and Collaborative Processes  2.3.1
The best way to appreciate the interconnectedness of partnerships and collaborations is by 
comprehending that, partnerships are agreements between two or more individuals or 
organisations to work together for a common purpose whereas collaboration is the process by 
which individuals within these organisations achieve the objectives of the partnership 
(Carnwell & Carson, 2009; Gray & Wood, 1991; Henneman, Lee, & Cohen, 1995). In 
essence, Carnwell and Carson (2009:11) have differentiated between these two concepts by 
stressing that, partnership is 'what we are' whereas collaboration is 'what we do'. As 
Henneman et al. (1995:108) put it, “collaboration is in fact a process which occurs between 
individuals, not institutions”. In this sense, as public and private entities enter into a 
partnership agreement, it remains the responsibility of the actors within these organisations to 
collaborate to meet the objective of the partnership. To quote Carnwell and Carson (2009:16), 
“it seems that collaboration is a means of making ‘partnership’ work. That is, 
‘collaboration’…is what we do when we engage successfully in a ‘partnership’”. 
Collaboration therefore becomes an inherent part of successful partnerships.  
Carnwell and Carson (2009:11) have identified among others, some attributes of partnership 
to include; trust, similar vested interest, respect, common goals and agreed objectives, 
reciprocity, empathy and teamwork. In the same way, they also identified some attributes of 
collaboration to include; teamwork, participation in planning and decision making, 
willingness to work together towards an agreed purpose, trust, respect and inter-dependency 
(ibid, 15). These attributes of partnership and collaboration make them intertwined and 
becomes ideal to practise them together. An important question to ask here is; what becomes 
of a partnership if actors involved do not collaborate? Consequently, as partners sign 
agreements to achieve a stated objective, there should be the willingness of actors to work 
together for the attainment of these objectives. To relate this assertion to the practice of PPP, 
where it has been argued that, public and private actors engage in partnerships because of the 
need to tap into each other’s diversity to achieve a goal (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Khan, 2006), 
it is this special process of collaboration (recognition of shared goals, awareness of resource 
need, trust, respect, empathy, reciprocity) that facilitates the combination of these diverse 
capacities (finances, expertise, policy instruments) to achieve stated goals.  
As this study seeks to examine the kind of relationship between partners that affects their 
overall effectiveness, it becomes prudent to use a kind of theory that examines the processes 
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that actors within a partnership engage in. These processes would be the defining character of 
partners’ relationship as ‘collaborative’ or mere ‘exchange’, and how either of these impacts 
on their ability to meet mutual objective. The theory of Collaborative Advantage (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2004; Vangen & Huxham, 2010) which explicitly outlines some elements of 
partnership functioning (processes) and how they affect partnership outcome is thus applied in 
this research. The theory is used to analyse the type of partnership processes between actors 
from IPPs and their public partners and how this in turn affects their ability to attain their 
objective of expanding electricity supply. As stated before, government alone has been unable 
to meet the need to expand electricity generation to meet growing demand thus, has invited 
IPPs to assist in this end. It is true that technological advancement could contribute to 
partners’ success, but then again, what would be the use of technologies if partners do not 
collaborate? An important component of the success of partnerships therefore lies in the 
behavioural traits (what partners do) that impact on their abilities and inabilities to meet their 
stated objectives. As already indicated by Weihe (2008), too many researches have focused on 
legal and economic aspects of partnerships without much attention to behavioural 
components. However, the attitude of actors involved in partnerships also influences the 
outcome of partnerships, which could result in ‘collaborative advantage’ (success) or 
‘collaborative inertia’ (failure) (Vangen & Huxham, 2010).  
 The Theory of Collaborative Advantage 2.3.2
Vangen and Huxham in a series of related articles and books developed from years of 
research in collaborative partnerships have identified several themes (elements) in the practice 
of collaborations that influence the achievement of the advantage partners seek. Some of the 
recurring themes they have identified include; common aims, communication, compromise, 
appropriate working processes, resources, and trust, which they contend, are sometimes 
overlapped. Vangen and Huxham’s (2010) first line of argument in describing the theory of 
collaboration centres on the perception that, the actions and inactions of partners could either 
result in ‘collaborative advantage’ or ‘collaborative inertia’. They indicate that, “the theory of 
collaboration has two organising principles. First, it is structured around a tension between 
Collaborative Advantage - the synergy that can be created through joint working and 
Collaborative Inertia - the tendency for collaborative activities to be frustratingly slow to 
produce output or uncomfortably conflict-ridden” (ibid, 163).  They further discuss that, the 
way in which partners are able to effectively manage the various elements of collaboration 
would determine if they would be successful at achieving an advantage. Collaborative 
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advantage could be defined simply as, the exclusive outcome of a partnership that 
organisations acting on their own cannot achieve efficiently. Or in other words, as given by 
Lank (2005:7), collaborative advantage “are the benefits achieved when an organisation 
accomplishes more than it would have independently, by developing effective working 
relationships with other organisations”. Thus, by combining resources, sharing risk, merging 
perceptives and skills, gaining trust and respect, showing empathy and reciprocity, partners 
are able to achieve superior performance together. But is this always the case? Does 
collaboration support partnerships to perform better than single agents? What are the factors 
that account for a successful collaboration which in turn impacts on partnership performance?  
Huxham and Vangen (2004) have in this line argued that even though the purpose of most 
collaboration is to achieve collaborative advantage, the end result of such collaboration is 
often collaborative inertia - where partnership is often conflict-ridden and output is relatively 
lower than expected. One key question they posed in this regard is that; “If achievement of 
collaborative advantage is the goal for those who initiate collaborative arrangements, why is 
collaborative inertia so often the outcome?” (ibid, 53) 
To answer the above questions, Huxham and Vangen (2004) have presented some elements of 
collaborative practices and explained how the management of each element affects the 
functioning of partnerships. Briefly explained below are two of the elements (common goals 
and trust) that are closely related to the purpose of this research:  
Common aims: Organisations have different objectives, thus, their coming together would 
require some form of merging of different goals. This is a particularly important feature since 
collaborations deal with different organisations and individuals. Huxham and Vangen (2004) 
have however argued that due to the varied interests in practice, achieving common purpose 
in collaboration is often a challenging task. They explained that, such challenges are as a 
result of the different reasons individuals and organisations have for entering into partnerships 
(ibid). Owing to this, Vangen and Huxham (2012) have clarified in a later article ‘The 
Tangled Web: Unravelling the Principles of Common Goals in Collaboration’, that, there are 
paradoxes that arise in setting and working towards joint goals in collaborations. They 
conceptualised these paradoxes at two levels; the principle-level (hypothetical) paradox and 
the enactment-level (practical) paradox. They argue that in principle, achieving common goals 
is necessary for partners to stay committed in the partnership however, a paradox arises 
because different organisational expertise and resources of partners cause them to have 
different goals, leading to diverse interests in the attainment of the collaborative advantage 
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they seek (Vangen & Huxham, 2012:732). They hence hold that, congruence and diversity of 
goals could both promote and hinder the achievement of collaborative advantage. Vangen and 
Huxham (2012:732) in this sense contend that, “too much homogeneity in goals can make 
organisations reluctant to cooperate and share information; too much heterogeneity leads 
organisations to seek different and sometimes conflicting outcomes”. They represent their 
assertion of the principle-level paradox in a diagram as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Principle-level goal paradox 
Adapted from Vangen and Huxham (2012:753) 
Key: 
+: stands for positive influence on collaboration 
- : stands for negative influence on collaboration 
At the enactment-level paradox, Vangen and Huxham (2012) argue that for collaborations to 
be successful, it is not only important for partners to have joint goals, but also the need for 
goals to be clearly agreed by all actors involved. However in practice, it is often difficult for 
partners to agree to joint goals. Hence, they assert that, “in practical situations, managing 
goals in collaboration is therefore not so much concerned with a tension between congruent 
and diverse goals as with working with a combination of them” (ibid, 756). In essence, 
partners ought to realise that, there are those goals that they have in common and those that 
differ, but endeavour to work along these differences regardless. Vangen and Huxham (2012) 
have not explicitly described managerial practices for developing and working towards joint 
goals, rather, they contend that partners can often commence without agreeing on specific 
aims and through constant and open communication partners would be able to reach some 
form of agreement. They state that, “a broad managerial choice may be between proceeding 
on the basis of gaining just enough agreement to make progress, or addressing, and so hoping 
to understand and modify, any importantly inhibiting areas of congruence or diversity” 
(Vangen & Huxham, 2012:757). Managing goals in collaborations requires partners to accept 
the tensions that arise from the combination of similar and diverse goals instead of seeking to 
Goal congruence: 
+ Partners’ and collaboration goals aligned  
-Competitive conflicts of interest 
(Reluctance to share information) 
Goal diversity: 
+ Synergy from diversity of resource 
-Incompatible conflicts of interest  
(Seeking different outcomes) 
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quash these tensions to achieve a balance or equilibrium of goals (ibid). In practice therefore, 
partners need to recognise, accept and understand that each party has a distinct goal for 
joining the collaboration, and as Vangen and Huxham (2012:757) put it, this could be “a basis 
for collaborative planning”. 
Trust: Since collaborations involve bringing together of resources, the presence of trust 
among partners cannot be overstated. The coming together of two or more individuals to work 
together means there should be some form of confidence by each party that it would not be 
taken for granted. The establishment and maintenance of trust in collaborations is particularly 
important because of the concerns of expectations, risks and vulnerability that are inherent in 
the practice of partnerships (Huxham & Vangen, 2004). Theoretically therefore, actors in 
collaborations have expectations they anticipate to be met, they face risks they believe would 
be mitigated and they accept vulnerability because they expect support from other 
collaborators. Huxham and Vangen (2004:139) have defined trust to mean “the anticipation 
that something will be forthcoming in return for the efforts that are put into the 
collaboration— a faith in the partners’ will and ability to help materialise the sought after 
collaborative advantage”. They however hold the view that, even though trust is a prerequisite 
for successful collaborations, they are often marred with doubt and suspicion (ibid). How then 
do partners establish and maintain trust in their relationships, and how does the presence or 
absence of trust affect the success of the collaboration? Huxham and Vangen (2004) are of the 
conviction that, trust can be formed and managed through a cyclical process where trust is 
built over time. They argue that, there are two very important factors for commencing a 
‘trusting relationship’, these they gave as;  
a) Formation of expectation about the future of the collaboration: The argument here is 
that, actors could initiate trust based on contractual expectations and reputation of 
partners in previous collaborations (ibid, 61). Thus, organisations consider the 
credibility of their potential partners, which first informs the level of trust to be present 
in the partnership. Such queries organisations would examine before developing some 
level of trust may include; consistency in meeting contractual obligations, such as 
consistent production and payment schedules. Hence, how well an organisation is 
known for keeping to its part of negotiations in past collaborations would inform the 
level of trust in the potential or present partnerships.  
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b) Risk involved in the partnership: Huxham and Vangen (2004:61) have argued here 
that “partners need to trust each other enough to allow them to take a risk to initiate the 
collaboration”. This goes to show that, because risks are inherent in partnerships, some 
level of trust is needed even before actors decide to collaborate. 
Huxham and Vangen (2004) conclude that, when these initiating factors are met, trust can 
built incrementally (‘the small-wins approach’) where actors commence collaboration with 
very modest goals and risks, and as trust grows, partners would engage in more ambitious and 
riskier ventures. Thus, as partners build and attain trust over time, they are able to take greater 
risks and consequently higher gains for the collaboration. They emphasize this point by 
stating that, “each time an outcome meets expectations, trusting attitudes are reinforced. The 
outcome becomes part of the history of the relationship, so increasing the chance that partners 
will have positive expectations about joint actions in the future. The increased trust reduces 
the sense of risk for these future actions” (ibid, 139). 
Similarly, Kim (2005:621) in conceptualising trust defined it as “the willingness of a trustor to 
be vulnerable based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectations of the trustor, 
even in situations where the trustor cannot monitor or control the trustee”. The willingness of 
the trustor to be vulnerable as further explained by Kim (2005) is initiated by the trustee’s 
consistent commitment to expected obligation, benevolence, honesty, competency and 
fairness, in which case the trustor does not need a control mechanism to ensure conformity 
because the trustee has demonstrated an attitude of trustworthiness. A demonstration of 
trustworthiness by partners especially in high stake economic ventures such as the partnership 
between ECG and IPPs tends to reduce transaction costs, as there would not be the need to 
devote extra resources into guarding against vulnerability.  
As argued by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998:396), “transaction cost economists 
view trust as a cause of reduced opportunism among transacting parties, which results in 
lower transaction costs”. Transaction cost here would be used to refer to all the costs 
associated with resource exchanges between organisations. An example of transaction cost 
given by Dyer and Chu (2003:59) is ‘monitoring and enforcement costs’, which they define as 
“costs associated with monitoring the agreement and then taking actions necessary to ensure 
that each party fulfils the predetermined set of obligations”. In this instance therefore, trust 
enables partners to allay fears of being taken advantage of, and would tend to invest more 
resources in the venture and to collaborate better, rather than exerting energies and resources 
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into avoiding perceived opportunistic behaviour which could be an additional cost to the 
organisation. Rousseau et al. (1998:399) likewise have identified in their ‘relational trust’ 
model that, repeated interaction and consistent meeting of expectations between partners 
reinforces trusting attitude in their relationship where there would be the willingness to be 
vulnerable by committing additional resources into the exchange to attain higher gains.  
Accordingly, Huxham and Vangen (2004) advocate strongly for trust building and sustenance 
as a way of managing risks in collaborations and therefore do not subscribe very much to 
sanctions as risks management approach. Rousseau et al. (1998:399) also believe that 
deterrence-based trust such as sanctions is more of a control mechanism that could actually 
come in the way of effective collaboration because agreements that are signed in this manner 
are formal and very detailed hence, relationships are formally structured and easily monitored, 
making partners not develop trust. Thus, even if the ‘small-wins’ approach is not feasible 
especially in high stake ventures where there is the need for huge upfront investment, partners 
can opt for the ‘comprehensive trust management’. Huxham and Vangen (2004:147) argue 
here that, “if the aim to build trust is taken seriously…then risk management…cannot be 
concerned with guarding against opportunistic behaviour and vulnerability e.g. via sanctions 
set out in contractual agreements”. Comprehensive trust management therefore means that, 
“risks associated with the collaboration has to be managed as an integral part of trust 
building” and not necessarily for partners to guard themselves (ibid, 147). Thus, collaborators 
ought to be concerned with developing lasting risk management measures that would 
genuinely build trust leading to the realisation of the collaborative advantage that they seek. 
To initiate trust building, Huxham and Vangen (2004) argue that partners should assess if 
indeed the expected venture can produce any collaborative advantage at all, and if the risk 
involved is worth taking. If partners decide to collaborate, then there must be thorough 
negotiation of agreement and expectation and the willingness of each partner made explicit. 
Thus from on the onset, partners know what is required or expected of them, act accordingly 
and also accept the willingness to bear the risks.   
To sum up their theoretical framework, Vangen and Huxham (2010) outlined some success 
indicators that well managed partnerships should be able to achieve. These they gave as;  
a) Substantive outcomes: They explained that, substantive outcomes of collaboration are the 
gains that accrue from the collaboration that each partner could not have achieved alone. 
Substantive outcomes could be in terms of financial or resource gains, such as “better use 
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of public funds - improvement in service provision” (ibid, 181). These substantive 
outcomes they further explained could be benefits to either the organisations involved in 
the collaboration, individuals within the organisations or targeted consumers of the service 
(ibid).   
b) The process of collaborating: Vangen and Huxham (2010) assert that, the process of 
collaboration could also serve as a measure of success by how well partners are able to 
engage in joint activities. That is, how partners interrelate in the process of collaboration. 
Instances they give include the use of respectful language by partners, making good 
decisions and partners being able to take joint actions (ibid, 181). 
c) Emergent milestones: These as discussed by Vangen and Huxham (2010), are not planned 
objectives but are achieved during the operations of the partnership. They stated that, 
“emergent milestones are important success-indicators partly because achieving major 
final targets can take a very long time, and partly because they often indicate something 
that turned out to be more significant than would have been expected in advance” (ibid, 
181). Emergent milestones in collaboration thus include activities that partners tend to 
engage in while they work together such as organising joint events and producing joint 
reports (ibid).  
 The Need to Integrate Related Theories (Resource Dependence) 2.3.3
Huxham and Vangen (2004) have emphasized that, organisations collaborate in order to have 
access to resources originally unavailable to them, thus, there is reliance on others to gain 
resources to meet organisational objectives. Even though they make this claim in their series 
of publications, they do not explicitly demonstrate how resources influence the functioning of 
partnerships. Resource contribution remains at the centre of discussions of PPP and has been 
argued to play a vital role in the success or failure of partnerships. In addition to the theory of 
collaborative advantage therefore, the theory of resource dependence is integrated to fill the 
gap that has not been addressed by Vangen and Huxham. 
Hillman et al. (2009) reviewing the classical theory of resource dependence by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) observed that, organisations depend on their environments to survive, 
however, these environments are characterised by numerous uncertainties. Uncertainties 
posed by the environment could be due to competition and control of resources by other 
organisations. Thus constantly, organisations are in search of measures to reduce such 
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dependence and uncertainties (ibid, 1). Joint Ventures (and other inter-organisational 
relationships) and Mergers are two of such measures as described by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) that organisations undertake to reduce their dependence on their environment and the 
uncertainties it poses. To reduce uncertainties due to competition from other organisations or 
the dependence on them for resources, organisations would acquire or join forces with others. 
Especially with joint venture and other inter-organisational relationships, Hillman et al. 
(2009:4) have argued based on empirical researches that, such alliances are due to the 
interdependence of organisations involved and that, “joint dependence can be a  means of 
reducing uncertainty and enhancing firm’s performance”. Returning to the theory of 
collaborative advantage, Lasker, Weiss, and Miller (2001:189) have emphasized that, “it is by 
combining these resources in various ways that partners create something new and valuable 
that transcends what they can accomplish alone”. Hillman et al. (2009) have however 
gathered from the empirical works of other researchers (Yan and Gray, 1994; 2001; Inkpen 
and Beamish, 1997) that, within such inter-organisational relationships requiring resource 
exchanges, there is power play between organisations. Citing that there is strategic control by 
the partner that contributes crucial resources, and also that as one partner acquires more 
resources from the other, the alliance becomes less stable (ibid, 4).  
Gulati and Sytch (2007) are however of the opinion that, such studies have solely 
concentrated on power asymmetry without realising that there could be situations where there 
is equal or joint dependence by partners. That is, actors engaged in a partnership could depend 
equally on each other to attain their goals. They argue that, “by grounding itself primarily in a 
logic of power, research on interdependence has omitted other possible logics that may also 
affect action. In particular, it has ignored the logic of embeddedness, which arises from joint 
dependence and which can also operate in exchange relationships” (ibid, 32-33). Joint 
(balanced) independence in their opinion results in better relational quality (joint action, trust 
and information exchange) which in turns impacts positively on the performance of partners.         
 An Empirical Study 2.3.4
Much of the empirical work in collaborative advantage has been done in the supply chain 
management with very little focus on its application in PPP. This particularly poses a great 
challenge to researchers seeking to study the workings of collaborative partnership in public 
management. This challenge however offers the opportunity to further develop this 
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framework to serve as a guide for future studies in this regard. The closest empirical research 
this study could relate to is the study by Weihe (2008).  
Weihe (2008) in his article ‘Public-Private Partnerships and Public Value Trade-offs’, sought 
to examine how the interaction between actors engaged in partnerships affects their 
performance. He distinguished between ‘Collaborative Partnership’ and ‘Exchange 
Partnership’ based on key features of each type of partnership like trust, empathy, reciprocity, 
shared purpose and closeness of relationships, and how these practised over time affect the 
functioning of the partnership. He argues that, “the extent to which real synergy is achieved is 
partly contingent on behavioural and operational aspects of cooperation” (ibid, 153). Synergy 
in this context is the phenomenon of merging the abilities of individuals and capacities of 
organisations in the partnership which gives them an advantage over single agents operations. 
Weihe (2008) however contends that, not every partnership produces this desired 
phenomenon of synergy. He based his findings on case studies of co-operative practice in five 
different PPPs in three different policy sectors in the UK based on some selected criteria. He 
interviewed some key actors in the said partnerships, where they were asked “to describe the 
partnership relationship, the characteristics of cooperation, and the pattern of interaction in the 
partnership projects in which they were involved” (ibid, 154). He centred his study on 
‘alliance research’ which has principally argued that partnerships that maintain a collaborative 
tendency are likely to achieve better alliance performance that those that operated within an 
exchange partnership. His key findings were:  
a. Intensity of interaction and interaction patterns varied greatly from case to case.  
b. Relational quality varied considerably across the investigated cases.  
c. Institutional context influenced the way that PPPs unfolded. (Weihe, 2008:155)   
Out of the cases he studied, Weihe (2008) concluded that one case resembled the 
collaborative partnership, two cases came closer to the exchange partnership, and the last two 
cases were in between (ibid). Partnerships that exhibit advanced level of cooperation through 
closer working relationships are better placed to achieve collaborative advantage than 
exchange partnerships where working relations are distant and based mostly on transactions. 
He argued however that, the manner in which most partnership agreements are designed does 
not give room for possibility of collaborative work because most are purely contractual. 
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that, PPPs that have functioned and survived over a long 
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period of time gradually tend to become what he termed ‘genuinely collaborative’. In his 
conclusion, his findings suggests that, “material value [which he initially defined as tangible 
substance values like those justification for employing PPPs] is not achieved in the majority 
of the analysed cases because the cooperation is transactional [and] actual collaboration is 
limited” (ibid, 157).  
2.4 EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PARTNERSHIP  
In the light of the above reviewed literature and theoretical frameworks, this section seeks to 
develop a conceptual framework to discuss the main variables used in the conduct of the 
research. As discussed thoroughly in the preceding section, the Theory of Collaborative 
Advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Vangen & Huxham, 2010, 2012) as well as the 
Resource Dependence Theory (Hillman et al., 2009) are used to explain the partnership 
processes engaged in by partners and how it affects the achievement of their goal. It has 
generally been argued by writers of collaboration that, the performance of any partnership 
essentially depends on the extent to which partners are able to relate and work closely 
together thus, there should more than mere exchange of resources (Lasker et al., 2001; Weihe, 
2008). The study would in this sense seek to examine the relationship between Independent 
and Dependent Variables developed from the theories and to deduce if there is indeed a cause 
and effect between them. The Dependent Variable is set as ‘effectiveness of the partnership’ 
which is defined in terms of the collaborative characteristics (show of commitment, 
demonstration of trusting attitudes, and existence of mutual relational power) of the 
partnership which would facilitate the expansion of partnership resources to attain the goal of 
5000MW by government. Independent Variables are set as; Formulation and Working 
Towards Mutual Goals, Existence of Partnership Trust, and Mutual Resource Contribution, 
which as practised by partners would define them either ‘exchange’ or ‘collaborative’ 
partners. Below is a conceptual framework used in the study, followed by detailed 
operationalisation of the study variables.   
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Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variables 
Source: Researcher’s development from literature review 
 Dependent Variable (Effectiveness of the Partnership)  2.4.1
Effectiveness is used here to measure the extent to which partners demonstrate collaborative 
tendencies in working towards government’s goal of achieving 5000MW of electricity 
generation. The study however maintains that, the target year (2015) set by the government 
for the achievement of this goal was too ambitious owing that the first IPP (TICO) started 
operations in 2000 with a generation capacity of 220MW, followed by Sunon Asogli and 
CENIT Energy with a total of 326MW in 2010 and 2012 respectively. Since current 
generation capacity stands at 2589MW and government is unable to further finance 
Expanding Electricity Generation to 
5000MW 
 Commitment to attain goal 
 Demonstration of 
trustworthiness to enhance 
resource expansion 
 Mutual relational power to 
maintain partnership stability 
to achieve goal 
(Effectiveness of the partnership) 
Formulation and Working Towards 
Mutual Goals 
 Managerial strategies for developing and 
working towards goals 
1. Communication and Interaction  
o Frequency and Levels of Interaction  
2. Relational Quality 
o Structure of Relationship  
(Rigidity and Flexibility) 
o Empathy and Reciprocity 
Existence of Partnership Trust 
1. Formation and Meeting of Expectations  
2. Risk Taking and Risk Management  
Mutual Resource Contribution  
1. Unique Resource Available to Each Partner 
2. Efficiency in Resource Contribution  
(Elements of partnership functioning) 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable 
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generation infrastructure, and also because the anticipated flow of private investment has not 
occurred, further expansion of generation facilities to attain the goal of government eventually 
would be determined by the level of partners’ perception of being a team with a common 
goal, where they jointly decide and work towards expanding electricity generation to mitigate 
the challenges of electricity delivery. The study in this sense would measure such 
collaborative tendencies by partners’ commitment to attain partnership goal, demonstration of 
trustworthiness to enhance resource expansion to meet partnership goal and existence of 
mutual power relations to ensure stability of the partnership to achieve stated goals. As noted 
in the success indicators by Vangen and Huxham (2010), such collaborative practices should 
be regarded as an achievement because it is this special phenomenon of collaboration that 
enables partners to move from lower endeavours to higher ones with greater benefits. 
Indicators of Effective Partnership 
a. Commitment to attain partnership goals: This is operationalised in the study to mean 
partners’ awareness of partnership goal, their identification with the goal and agreement to 
work towards it. 
b. Demonstration of trustworthiness: Defined to mean actors (both public and private) 
positive expectations of partner’s performance and optimism of further resource expansion to 
meet partnership goal.  
c. Existence of mutual power relations: This is used to refer to the ability of partners to hold 
each other accountable or answerable to partnership commitment.  
 Independent Variables (Elements of Partnership Functioning)  2.4.2
Formulation and Working Towards Mutual Goals: Effective partnership functioning 
requires partners to have goals that are mutually understood, formulated and supported 
(Lasker et al., 2001). Even though this is true in principle, achieving this in the practice of 
partnership is difficult. As already argued by Vangen and Huxham (2012:732), in principle, 
achieving common goals is necessary for partners to stay committed in the partnership 
however, a paradox arises because different organisational expertise and resources of partners 
cause them to have different goals leading to diverse goals in the attainment of the 
collaborative advantage they seek. They are therefore of the opinion that, partnerships ought 
to develop some managerial techniques to continuously and openly discuss their objectives 
while still appreciating their individual goals. In this study therefore, formulation and working 
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towards mutual goals is used to mean the managerial strategies adopted by partners for 
developing mutual objectives to be achieved. The two managerial strategies adopted in this 
study are: 
a. Communication and Interaction which is defined in terms of the Level and Frequency 
with which communication occurs between partners as well as other stakeholders in the power 
sector. Communication and interaction in this study would be used to refer to the 
communication pattern in the partnership with regards to; a. actors involved in decision 
making both at the partnership and national levels; b. the channel through which primary 
partners communicate their expectations and grievances; and c. the regularity of meetings 
aimed at deliberating emerging issues that facilitate or impede on the attainment of stated 
goals. In discussing how partners could build better working relationship to attain their goals, 
Lasker et al. (2001:192) have indicated that, “it is only possible for the group to think in new 
ways if partners are able to talk to each other and are influenced by what they hear”. Huxham 
and Vangen (2004:60) also argue that, “keeping up the communication between organisations 
and the core group is likely to be highly time-consuming but seen as essential in terms of 
spotting early signs of disagreements and to gain trust, commitment, support and resources 
from each organisation” 
b. Relational Quality which is used to refer to the rigidity or flexibility of relational structure 
of partners and the extent to which they are willing to compromise to achieve goals of the 
partnership. The study defines this in terms of a. the significance attached to partnership 
contract by partners in their operations; b. the willingness to go beyond each party’s specific 
interest to reach the overall objective of the partnership; and c. organisation of joint events 
aimed at enhancing staff and management capacities to attain mutual goals. Relational quality 
in this study is used to illustrate the general atmosphere within which partners work. Lasker et 
al. (2001:194) are of the opinion that “unlike bureaucratic forms of management, which are 
often rigid and structured to control what people do, partnerships that seek high levels of 
synergy require approaches that are more flexible and supportive”. With such flexible 
structure, partners are able to go out of their way to support each other when the need arises. 
Huxham and Vangen (2004:58) here again argue that, “being willing to compromise on 
different agenda is essential to making progress in collaborations”. Since partnerships involve 
different individuals and organisations with differing interests, it is essential that partners are 
willing to support each other in attaining their individual goals as well as the goal of the 
partnership. This, partners can achieve in an atmosphere of flexible working relationship 
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where they perceive themselves as a team with a common broad objective and willing to put 
aside strict contract rules to support each other, ultimately to achieve their mutual objectives. 
The related hypothesis in this circumstance would be, frequent communication and flexible 
relationship between partners may clarify individual differences and may enhance the 
achievement of mutual goals.  
Existence of Partnership Trust: The presence of trust in a partnership means various actors 
are confident of their partners to perform as expected, hence, accept vulnerability without 
resort to control measures. This is essentially because partners consistently commit to each 
other’s expectation and their mutual agreement. According to Huxham and Vangen (2004), 
there are two important factors for starting a trusting relationship; formation of expectation 
about the future of the collaboration and mitigation of risk involved in the partnership, and 
that when these are met, partners can commence operations with very modest goals and move 
on to more ambitious goals as trust is built. Therefore the trust indicators used in the study 
are; 
a. Formation and meeting of expectations: This is used to refer to those obligations primary 
partners (ECG and IPPs) expect to be met, such as IPPs’ expectation of ECG to provide a 
ready market for them and pay them adequately for their services, and ECG’s expectation of 
IPPs to generate the pledged megawatts of electricity to meet growing demand at a reasonable 
rate. Meeting of expectation thus is indicated by the expression of confidence by partners of 
other parties’ commitment and trustworthiness to perform expected obligations. As argued by 
Kim (2005:624), “trust can be facilitated if people recognise the consistency between what the 
trustee says he or she will do and what he or she actually does”, hence, trust is enhanced when 
partners respect commitment and perform according to mutual agreements. 
b. Risk taking and risk management: Risk taking is defined to mean those risks partners 
currently bear in the partnership and the willingness of partners to take on extra risks based on 
their level of trust in the partnership. Risk management is used to refer to the strategies 
adopted by partners to mitigate potential risks they face in the partnership, thus, whether they 
subscribe to punitive measures (sanctions) or have faith in others not to be opportunistic. 
Huxham and Vangen (2004:19) are of the opinion that if partners’ aim is to build trust, then 
they cannot be concerned with such punitive measures as sanctions instead, partners would 
adopt a more comprehensive risk management approach through “upfront negotiation of 
 42 
 
collaborative aims, to clarify potential partners’ expectations as well as their willingness and 
ability to enact the agreed collaborative agenda”. The associated assumption here is that, 
consistent meeting of expectations reinforces trusting attitudes and enables partners to move 
from low risk ventures to more ambitious ones.  
Mutual Resource Contribution: Resources are a very crucial element of an effective 
partnership. Each partner possesses an essential resource that is needed by others to ensure the 
overall success of the partnership. It has been argued in the literature that it is this 
combination of different resources that gives partnerships their unique advantage over ‘single 
agents’ operations (Lasker et al., 2001). The theory of Resource Dependence also holds that 
organisations either acquire other organisations or join forces (through joint ventures and 
other inter-organisational relationships) to reduce uncertainties that their environments pose. 
Thus, each organisation possesses a unique resource that is unavailable to others unless they 
work together. Mutual resource contribution in this study is used to refer to the contribution of 
unique resource that is available to each partner and the efficiency with which partners make 
these resources available.  
a. Unique resource available to partners: This is used in the study to mean the ownership 
of electricity generation stations by IPPs and the ownership of distribution network by ECG, 
where electricity generated by IPPs is distributed through ECG’s network. Since ECG owns 
the largest electricity market in Ghana, IPPs are better placed if they signed on to ECG’s 
network to sell their services. ECG on the other hand needs electricity from IPPs to meet 
growing demand. Partners are thus interdependent in meeting each other’s needs. That is, 
whereas ECG needs IPPs to generate the agreed megawatts of electricity, IPPs in turn need to 
be remunerated accordingly by ECG to enable continuous exchange of partnership resources 
and possible resource expansion. However, the mere availability of these resources by 
partners is not a guarantee for successful partnership but rather how effectively they make 
them available to meet their objectives. 
b. Efficiency in resource contribution: Defined to mean the ability of IPPs to make their 
generation facilities ready at all times to generate electricity to meet ECG’s demand and the 
readiness of ECG to evacuate electricity and accordingly make prompt payments to IPPs to 
facilitate continuous electricity generation. Lasker et al. (2001:195) would argue here that “a 
partnership’s efficiency connotes how well it optimizes the involvement of its partners…in 
other words, in addition to ensuring that the thinking and actions of the group benefit from the 
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contributions of different partners, the collaboration process must also make the best use of 
what each partners has to offer”. Another factor influencing promptness in making resources 
available is partners’ control of strategic resource in the partnership. With this, the partner 
with a more strategic resource tends to accumulate more resource from other parties which 
consequently affects stability and success of the partnership. In this sense, the study examines 
the level of dependence by partners, that is whether there is joint (mutual) dependence or 
dependence asymmetry (power advantage) with regards to ownership of strategic resource, by 
which a partner hoards more resources than contributed in the partnership, hence, jeopardising 
partnership stability to meet stated goal. This occurrence is interpreted in the study to mean 
partners’ inclination (preparedness) towards making needed resources available due to 
perceived power position in the partnership. The corresponding assumption here is that, 
strategic resource contribution influences the level of interdependence between partners 
which in turn influences power relations and its impact on partnership stability and success.   
TABLE 2: SUMMARY ON DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 
INDICATORS AND HYPOTHESES 
Independent Variables Indicators Hypotheses Dependent Variable  
Formulation and 
Working Towards 
mutual Goals 
 Communication and 
Interaction 
 Relational Quality 
Frequent communication and 
flexible relationship between 
partners may clarify individual 
differences and then may enhance 
the achievement of mutual goals 
Effectiveness of the 
Partnership 
(Expanding electricity 
generation to 
5000MW) 
 Commitment and 
motivation to meet 
goal 
 Demonstration of 
trustworthiness to 
enhance resource 
expansion 
 Mutual relational 
power to maintain 
partnership 
stability to achieve 
goal 
Existence of 
Partnership Trust 
 Formation and Meeting of 
Expectations 
 Risk taking and Risks 
Management  
Consistent meeting of 
expectations reinforces trusting 
attitudes and enables partners to 
move from low risk ventures to 
more ambitious ones 
Mutual Resource 
Contribution 
 Unique Resource 
Available to Each Partner  
 Efficiency in Resource 
Contribution 
Strategic resource contribution 
influences the level of 
interdependence between partners 
which in turn influences power 
relations and its impact on 
partnership stability and success’ 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings 
of PPP. It has in the preceding sections defined PPP and elaborated the contention around it. 
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Reasons for its continued growth and benefits as well as risks associated with the practice of 
PPPs have been stated. As this study focuses on PPP in the power sector of Ghana, the chapter 
also discussed the general practice of PPP in electricity delivery across the European and 
African contexts. What is missing from most literatures however is the discussion on the 
factors of routine partnership functioning and their influences on partnership effectiveness. 
The theory of Collaborative Advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Vangen & Huxham, 
2010) and the theory of Resource Dependence (Hillman et al., 2009) expounded in this 
chapter have however elaborated on how these fundamental elements of partnership 
functioning affect the success level of partners. Thus, it has been the aim of this chapter to 
place the practice of PPP between IPPs and ECG in these theoretical frameworks to examine 
how the existence or absence of factors such as working towards common goals, partnership 
trust and mutual resource contribution impact on their effort to meet the goal of expanding 
generation infrastructure by government.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY  
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the various research strategies that were adopted in the conduct of the 
study. The rationales behind the selection of particular strategies are outlined and explanation 
given as to how each strategy aids in answering the research questions.  
3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH  
This study adopted the qualitative research approach primarily because of its exploratory 
characteristic, which allows for detailed enquiry into less researched cases but of significant 
importance. As emphasised by Creswell (2014:29), “one chief reason for conducting a 
qualitative study is that the study is exploratory. This usually means that not much has been 
written about the topic or the population being studied, and the researcher seeks to listen to 
participants and build an understanding based on what is heard”. Relating this assertion by 
Creswell to an earlier account of limited empirical studies in examining the partnership 
processes between public and private actors in the PPPs in Ghana, the use of qualitative 
approach is of an immense significance to uncover these fundamental tenets of effective 
partnership functioning that have not been given much attention. Past researches (Ashong, 
2010; Malgas, 2008) in the power sector of Ghana have focused on institutional frameworks 
and economic viability of such PPP projects with less attention to the how the routine working 
relationship between public and private partners actually influence their performance. To this 
end, the qualitative method adopted in the conduct of this research facilitated the unique 
opportunity to examine in detail what these various elements of routine partnership are and to 
analyse the extent to which they influence the success of the partnership under study.  
Furthermore, related studies on partnership relationship and its influence on partnership 
success have commonly used the qualitative approach (Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Weihe, 
2008). Since such studies basically focus on relationships between individuals in 
organisations, previous researchers have engaged in in-depth discussion (interviews) with 
respondents to understand how such behavioural patterns affect their partnership. Weihe 
(2008:154) for instance maintained that, the qualitative case study he selected was to allow for 
“detailed knowledge about the operational practice of PPPs” and by this, his approach “goes 
beyond the formal PPP contract and investigates what happens at the micro-level processes”. 
In building their theory, Huxham and Vangen (2004:39) also adopted what they termed 
‘action research’ which they argue is closer to case study, where they situated themselves at 
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the study locations and derived insights inductively through natural occurring data. One 
advantage they realised from this type of research was that, “rich data about what people do 
and say— and what theories are used and usable— when they are faced with a genuine need 
to take action can be gathered and this has potential to lead to deep conceptualisations about 
what can happen in practice and the reasons for it” (ibid, 39). Thus, by relying on these 
researches, adopting a qualitative approach is a practical option to bring to light the feelings 
and views of actors involved in the partnership which certainly cannot be analysed 
statistically. This is particularly significant because researches on PPP in the power sector of 
Ghana have often focused on statistical evaluation of the economic benefits of such ventures 
without much attention to the behavioural characteristics of partners and its influence on 
partnership success. Using a qualitative approach therefore enabled situation of the researcher 
at the study location to collect first-hand information on how public and private actors engage 
with each other in their routine operations, such as how they make decisions, which actors are 
involved in the process, how they communicate matters concerning their expectations and 
grievances and how they get emerging challenges resolved.   
The use of the qualitative approach was also to allow for the use of multiple sources of 
evidence in the study. This strategy was applied to strengthen the validity and reliability of 
study findings. The general assertion is that, researchers ought to prove their arguments from 
more than just one source of information which invariably strengthens their perspective and 
stance on their research topics. By adopting the qualitative approach, this study made use of 
both primary and secondary data (data triangulation) including interviews, written documents 
and observation to facilitate the corroboration of information in making consistent arguments 
of study findings. Owing to this, the study interviewed primary partners at ECG, Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy on their roles and interests in the partnerships and how they would 
describe their working relationship and prospects for further resource expansion in attaining 
the goal of government. Public actors at GRIDCo, the Ministry of Energy, PURC and Energy 
Commission were also interviewed to ascertain their role in facilitating an effective 
partnership operation and how they engage with the private actors particularly. Documentary 
sources generally describing the Ghanaian power sector challenges and opportunities for 
success with particular emphasis on private sector investment were obtained during such 
interviews and from various online databases. The study was then able to corroborate such 
information with the advanced theoretical arguments to substantiate the claim of achieving 
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partnership success not just by the exchange of resources but by partners genuinely 
collaborating and supporting each other in achieving a mutual goal.      
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Research design can simply be defined as a strategy of interrelated procedures used in the 
conduct of a research that establishes a relationship between the purpose of the study and 
conclusions reached. Yin (2014:28) asserts that, “in the most elementary sense, the design is 
the logical sequence that connects a study’s initial research questions and ultimately, to its 
conclusions”. This study consequently adopted a case study strategy one basic reason being 
the contemporary (on-going) nature of the phenomenon under study. The case study strategy 
therefore enabled an on-site interaction with respondents to allow for their reactions (answers 
and justification) to queries. This accordingly provided detailed information on not just why 
they behave the way they do but also how this impacts on their partnership. This reason has 
been buttressed by Yin (2014) who contends that case studies often aim to answer ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions.  
Specifically, the study adopted the single-embedded case design to enable the analysis of a 
single phenomenon (public private partnership) by evaluating the conducts of the various 
units (public and private actors) that collaborate to ensure the success of the partnership. The 
use of the single-embedded case study is appropriate because the research topic focuses on a 
policy initiative (single case) through the activities of various actors (sub-units) involved. This 
thus enabled the analyses of these different sub-units and how their actions affect the overall 
functioning of the policy. One advantage of an embedded case study advanced by Yin 
(2014:56) is that, “the subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, 
enhancing the insights into the single case”. Since these subunits work together on regular 
bases their opinions and insights are very important for shaping our understanding of the 
success factors of the partnership. Thus, divergent and similar views and perspectives by the 
various actors involved in the partnership enriched data that were collected and subsequently 
served as one of the significant basis on which conclusion on the effectiveness of the 
partnership was drawn.  
Furthermore, the use of case study was appropriate because this study relied essentially on 
theoretical foundations and empirical works of other researches (Hillman et al., 2009; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Lasker et al., 2001; Vangen & Huxham, 2010; Weihe, 2008), by 
which some assumptions were formulated to guide the research process. An argument has 
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been made by Yin (2014:17) in this regard that, “a case study benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”. Thus, the use 
of case study enabled the deduction of hypotheses (assumptions) in relation to the elements of 
partnership functioning (mutual goals, trust and resource contribution), and this guided the 
study from introduction to conclusion.  
3.3 AREA OF STUDY 
The study was conducted in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The Greater Accra Region, 
although the smallest of the ten regions is the most densely populated and contains the capital 
city, Accra. The region is the hub of government administration as the presidential palace and 
all ministries are located there. The study was specifically conducted in two Metropolitan 
Assemblies of the region; the Accra and Tema Metropolitan Assemblies. The purpose for the 
selection of these two metropolitan assemblies is because the head offices of the organisations 
under study are situated there and most of the activities of the partnering institutions such as 
scheduled meetings also take place in the region. Even though their operation has an impact in 
almost all the regions of Ghana, the Greater Accra Region is where most of their activities 
take place thus the reason for its selection.      
3.4 UNIT OF ANALYSIS  
The units of analysis in the study are the organisations that partner in the generation and 
supply of electricity. At one level, the study focused on the main contracting organisations 
that is, ECG and the two IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy). At another level, the study 
sought to examine the role of other government agencies whose activities directly affect the 
overall success of the partnership, thus, GRIDCo the transmitter of power from IPPs to ECG 
as well as the Ministry of Energy and the two regulatory agencies (Energy Commission and 
PURC). Since the phenomenon of IPPs is quite recent in Ghana, hence the inadequate 
information on their operations, the study made use of energy consultants from the Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) since they have researched and possess requisite 
information on the operations of IPPs in Ghana. 
Initially, the study sought to focus solely on the working relationship between two 
government agencies (ECG and GRIDCo) and two major IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy). However, information gathered during preliminary interviews with these 
organisations revealed that the role of other government institutions is very important in 
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discussions of the partnership in the power sector of Ghana. Hence, the Ministry of Energy, 
the Energy Commission and the PURC whose activities directly affect the work of the 
partnering organisations were included. The VRA, another government agency which owns 
the country’s largest generation stations and consequently contributes the largest percentage 
of the total megawatts of electricity supplied was also included in the study to facilitate a 
complete illustration of the state of electricity provision in the country and the contribution of 
the partnership to this end.  
3.5 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE  
Within the organisations mentioned above, there was purposeful selection of individuals who 
play key role in the routine operation of the partnership, those who constantly monitor the 
performance of the partnership and individuals who possess requisite knowledge on IPPs 
operations in Ghana. Purposive selection was done to strategically choose respondents whose 
views and perspectives could aid in answering the research questions.  According to Creswell 
(2014:189), “the idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites 
(or documents or visual material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem 
and the research questions”. As already stated, the subject of IPPs is quite new in Ghana thus, 
just a few individuals have the requisite knowledge on their operations and their partnership 
with government agencies. Therefore, even within the chosen units of analysis, there are 
specific individuals who possess knowledge on IPPs’ partnership with government and its 
emerging issues. For instance, with the main partnering organisations, there was selection of 
respondents who participate in the day-to-day interactions (daily communication and 
meetings) with other actors with respect to their organisation's role in the partnership. The 
Ministry and Regulatory Agencies also had special offices that dealt with the operations of 
IPPs, thus respondents were chosen from these offices.  
Initial information that was derived from key respondents from the partnering institutions 
informed further specific individuals that were included in the study. Thus, snow-balling as a 
technique of selecting respondents was applied. The main goal here was to first select certain 
key individuals of the partnering institutions who would then suggest others that they had 
constant interaction with, within and outside the partnership whose views could also be of 
immense significance to the final analysis of the study.  
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3.6 DATA COLLECTION  
Data collection is the process of gathering various information to analyse the research 
questions and study assumptions. At this stage, there is a systematic effort by the researcher to 
assemble evidence to scrutinise the research questions and to either prove or disprove 
theoretical propositions. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:51) refer to data collection as, “a 
wide range of methods, including observation, participant observation, intensive interviews, 
large scale sample surveys…and any other method of collecting reliable evidence”. The study 
made use of the two main sources of data; the primary and secondary sources of data. Within 
these sources, the study used three major data collection tool in qualitative research namely; 
interview and observation (primary data) and written documents (secondary data). Collecting 
multiple forms of data (data triangulation) in qualitative research is crucial in reaching valid 
and reliable conclusions. As already mentioned in a preceding section, there is a general 
assertion that researchers should be able to substantiate their arguments from more than just 
one data source which would strengthen their perspective and stance on their research topics.  
 Interview 3.6.1
There were guided face-to-face discussions with identified respondents. The interviews were 
conducted with the aid of an interview protocol. The interview protocol contained a brief 
overview of the study, purpose of the study, the research questions, and definition of key 
concepts and variables. In the conduct of interviews, there were general questions for all 
respondents as well as strategic questions for specific respondents, as the selected 
organisations had different and unique roles. Hence, there were specific questions for 
respondents from the IPPs, GRIDCo, ECG, PURC, Energy Commission, the Ministry of 
Energy, VRA and ACEP.   
Prior to the conduct of interviews, a preliminary visit was made to the organisations to explain 
the purpose of the research and to seek permission to conduct the interviews. The appropriate 
offices were then contacted to schedule interview dates. A second or in some cases third visits 
were made for the conduct of the interview. The interview entailed an in-depth enquiry where 
respondents’ opinions and personal reflections on the topic were sought for. Open-ended 
questions were asked and respondents took time to explain each question in detail, some with 
illustrations. Information that was sought from respondents first and foremost concerned the 
challenges of the power sector and its associated solutions. At the partnership level 
respondents were asked questions on; the role of their organisations and the resources they 
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contribute to the partnership, the channel of communication between partners, meeting of 
expectations by partners and its effect on their relationship, the emphasis given to contractual 
agreements in their working relationship, and overall queries were also made on the prospects 
of partnership.  
Documentation of interviews involved audio recording as well as note taking. All interviews 
were conducted at the offices of respondents and lasted an average of one hour. In all, there 
were a total of 10 interviews from nine organisations. The sample size was not predetermined 
but developed as the study progressed, and as already stated the snow balling technique 
facilitated the selection of appropriate respondents. The sample thus comprised a satisfactory 
representation of the various organisations by respondents who provided requisite information 
for the conduct of this research.   
TABLE 3: SAMPLE SIZE OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED 
Organisation Ownership Number of 
Respondents 
Role in the Power 
Sector 
Information Provided 
Electricity 
Company of Ghana 
(ECG) 
 
 
Public 
 
2 
 
Major electricity 
distributor 
 
The role and interest of ECG 
in the partnership and the 
pattern of interaction with 
other partners 
Sunon Asogli 
Power Limited 
 
Private 
 
1 
 
Independent 
Power Producer 
The role and interest of Sunon 
Asogli in the partnership and 
the pattern of interaction with 
other partners 
 
CENIT Energy 
 
Private 
 
1 
 
Independent 
Power Producer 
The role and interest of CENIT 
in the partnership and the 
pattern of interaction with 
other partners 
Ghana Grid 
Company Limited 
(GRIDCo) 
 
Public  
 
1 
 
Sole Electricity 
Transmitter 
The role of GRIDCo in 
facilitating the operations of 
the partnership and the pattern 
of interaction with partners 
(particularly IPPs) 
 
Ministry of Energy 
 
Public 
 
1 
 
Policy Director 
The supportive role in 
facilitating the operations of 
the partnership and the nature 
of interactions with partners 
(particularly IPPs) 
 52 
 
Organisation Ownership Number of 
Respondents 
Role in the Power 
Sector 
Information Provided 
Energy 
Commission 
 
Public 
 
1 
Technical 
Regulator 
The role of the Energy 
Commission in the operations 
of partnering institutions 
Public Utilities  
Regulatory 
Commission 
(PURC) 
 
 
Public 
 
1 
 
Economic 
Regulator 
The role of the PURC in the 
operations of partnering 
institutions 
Volta River 
Authority (VRA) 
 
Public 
 
1 
Major Electricity 
Generator 
The contribution of VRA to 
electricity provision in the 
country 
Africa Centre for 
Energy Policy 
(ACEP) 
 
 
Civil Society  
 
1 
 
Research and 
Advocacy 
The relevance of PPP in the 
power sector, prospects of 
IPPs in Ghana and 
recommendations to the 
electricity challenges 
Total Sample size: 10 
Source: Researcher’s Design (2015) 
 Observation 3.6.2
It was the aim of the study to conduct both formal and casual observation as prescribed by 
Yin (2014:113). The study was however only able to observe casually during interviews, most 
notably the institutional logic that was characterised by the responses from partners. The 
particular observation made in this regard concerned the social responsibility of public 
organisations on the one hand and the profit orientation of private organisations on the other. 
This was a recurring theme throughout the conduct of the interviews and basically portrays 
the diverse interests of partners. Another key observation made was that, some officers were 
uninformed of the fact that the contracts that their organisations had signed were PPPs, thus 
were reluctant to use the word ‘partners’. As argued in the literature review, the categorisation 
of PPP can be confusing and this was witnessed on the field. The officers had the impression 
that in a PPP, the government ought to have some shares or equity in the IPPs' organisations 
before the relationship could be termed a partnership. This was witnessed during interviews 
with the main partnering organisations (ECG and IPPs) and portrayed to some extent how 
partners perceive themselves as ‘exchange’ parties and not partners. 
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The study was not however able to conduct a formal witnessing of activities such as meetings 
that feature actors from the various (both partnering and monitoring) organisations. It was the 
aim of the study to witness the atmosphere within which such meetings took place and the 
form of interaction that transpired. Attention was to be given to how discussions in such 
meetings suggested whether the various actors interact as partners or as individuals 
representing different interests as well as the prevailing atmosphere of hierarchy and power 
distance among different actors.  
 Written Documents 3.6.3
The study made extensive use of documented records of the Ghanaian power sector and 
literature on PPP in the delivery of public services both within and outside the Ghanaian 
context. Written documents were basically sought to corroborate information obtained from 
interviews and observation. Some documents obtained were solicited during interviews and 
others were obtained on the internet. Documents that were obtained during interviews 
included; Ghana Energy Sector Report, Energy (supply and demand) Outlook, Reliability 
Assessment Report, and Increasing Private Sector Investment through Power Sector Reform. 
Others included the PPP Policy of Ghana, regulatory benchmarks for electricity utilities, press 
releases, academic articles, journals, and previous empirical studies. Thus, in addition to the 
interviews, written documents provided information on the institutional frameworks for 
implementing PPP projects in the power sector, challenges of the Ghanaian power sector and 
strategies for attaining them (mostly through private investment), the role of both government 
and private sectors in attaining these objectives, and the effectiveness of the various 
organisations (generators, transmitter and distributor) in attaining the goal of the sector. Since 
information on the nature of working relationship between public and private actors is 
generally lacking, the above mentioned document merely provided a general description of 
the state of electricity delivery in Ghana. One important document that could not be reviewed 
was the Power Purchase Agreement basically because of its confidentiality clauses. This 
document could have however disclosed the type of contractual arrangements that underlie 
the present relationship between the partners at ECG and IPPs. 
Aside the Ghanaian context, information that were sought from other written documents 
(Bayliss & Hall, 2000; Dagdeviren, 2009; Jamasb, 2006; Magnus, 1997; M. Pollitt, 2004; 
Woodhouse, 2005) included the type of private sector participation in electricity provision, 
especially in European countries and how similar or different it is from what is being 
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practised in developing contexts like Ghana. Theoretically, the study also made use of 
literatures with conceptual frameworks that focus on the process of collaboration and its 
impact on partnership success (Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Lasker et al., 2001; Vangen & 
Huxham, 2010; Weihe, 2008). These written documents served as an alternative source of 
information to corroborate responses from interview as well as bases on which findings from 
the study were related. 
3.7 DATA TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS  
Data analysis was a continuous process in the course of the research. As Creswell (2014:195) 
puts it, ‘‘data analysis in qualitative research will proceed hand-in-hand with other parts of 
developing the qualitative study, namely the data collection and the write-up of findings’’. 
Thus, the analysis process in this research involved using strategies of interpretation such as, 
taking reflective notes of emerging arguments to make meaning out of the vast information 
garnered. There was a conscious effort to synchronise information from the literature and data 
from the field to enable comparison between the research topic and related studies. 
Audio recordings of the interview were later transcribed and thoroughly read through. Themes 
were developed from reviewing respondents’ answers to interview questions. This enabled a 
clear representation of the frequency with which certain key words and expressions emerged 
from the data (Yin, 2014). During this coding process, there was also a search for the 
relationship between the research variables by virtue of the responses from respondents. By 
relying on these responses as well as discussions from the literature, this study also developed 
diagrams to illustrate the PPP arrangement, as well as tables to show deductions (findings) 
made from the data collected. 
Overall, interpretation of data was based on “pattern matching” and “explanation building” as 
described by Yin (2014). In pattern matching, information derived from the data analysed was 
correlated with evidence produced from previous related studies. The study relied on Weihe’s 
(2008) empirical research on how the relationship between actors engaged in partnerships 
defined them as ‘Exchange Partners’ or ‘Collaborative Partners’ and its consequent effect on 
the partnership. Again, there was “explanation building” (Yin, 2014), where findings from the 
field were explained based on the theoretical and conceptual models advanced in the study. 
Theoretical explanations established the extent to which propositions developed from the 
theory of Collaborative Advantage applied to the study context.      
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3.8 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF STUDY 
There is a general assertion by researchers that any empirical study ought to ensure the 
highest level of accuracy (validity and reliability) of the research design. In the conduct of this 
research, right from stating the problem to deducing findings, there were some logically 
established methods that were applied to achieve utmost accuracy. Issues pertaining to 
generating correct operational measures, drawing accurate causal relationship, qualitative 
generalisation, and authentication of research findings were addressed through strategies such 
as triangulation of data, extensive use of theoretical underpinnings, relating study to previous 
empirical researches, and documentation of research data and procedure.  
 Construct Validity  3.8.1
Ensuring construct validity in the study involved developing specific working definitions that 
fitted the context of the study. It was important to develop clear meanings and measurement 
of concepts because of the different meanings individuals apply to similar concepts. As 
clearly stated in a previous section, the classification of key concepts such as PPP is highly 
contested and this was witnessed on the field. The study made use of various literatures and 
previous studies on PPP to make clear meanings of key concepts under study. This made 
possible the differentiation between PPP and other related concepts like privatisation and 
contracting-out. The study also distinguished between partnerships and collaborations which 
are very similar concepts and tend to be used interchangeably. By this, the study used 
‘partnership’ as the formal agreement between two or more parties to work together and 
‘collaboration’ to mean the processes that parties engage in to achieve their partnership goal. 
Thus, by corroborating these different sources of evidence in the data collection process, 
clearer meaning and understanding was made of similar concepts used in related studies and 
literatures (Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Lasker et al., 2001; Weihe, 2008) and how they applied 
to the research topic.  
 Internal Validity  3.8.2
Internal validity deals with how accurately researchers are able to establish causal relations in 
their study. Realising internal validity in the proposed study is particularly important because 
of the underlying notion of a causal relationship between collaborative process and attainment 
of partnership goals. Causal language according to King et al. (1994) is useful in a research if 
‘cause and effect’ is the main focus of analysis. In their words, ‘‘avoiding causal language 
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when causality is the real subject of investigation either renders the research irrelevant or 
permits it to remain undisciplined by the rules of scientific inference’’ (ibid, 76). Thus, even 
though the study was exploratory, there was a fundamental element of implication to be made 
from how the independent variables affected the dependent variable.  
To ensure internal validity, the study made use of data triangulation and drew interpretation 
from the different sources of data to demonstrate how the elements of partnership functioning 
influenced the kind of relationship between partners and its subsequent effects on partnership 
success. As discussed by Creswell and Miller (2000:126), triangulation is one of the methods 
of ensuring validity in qualitative study, where they defined triangulation as, “a validity 
procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of 
information to form themes or categories in a study”. Thus, by drawing themes and categories 
from the different sources of data, causal mechanisms were derived to explain the 
relationships between elements of partnership functioning (independent variable) and 
effectiveness of partnership (dependent variable). 
One extraneous variable identified in the course of the study that could influence partnership 
effectiveness is technology. However, an argument is made here that the use of technology 
itself depends on how successful partners are able to relate and work. Therefore, having the 
appropriate technology without the correlating collaborative relationship to make use of the 
technology could have no impact on the partnership. This extraneous variable (technology) is 
thus imbued as part of the collaborative processes and not as a variable able to influence the 
success of the partnership on its own.  
 External Validity  3.8.3
External validity or qualitative generalisation deals with the extent to which a study’s findings 
could be generalised either in relation to other studies or other cases. While most quantitative 
studies seek statistical or numerical generalisation, qualitative studies mostly strive to attain 
analytic generalisation. Yin (2003:37) asserts that, ‘‘in analytic generalisation, the investigator 
is striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory’’. Thus, external 
validity in the study demonstrates the extent to which the study’s findings could be correlated 
with other studies on relationship between actors in PPP and its resultant effect on public 
service delivery. Because such studies are generally lacking in Ghana, this study relied 
primarily on case studies by Weihe (2008) who examined how the interaction between actors 
in some PPPs in the UK influenced their performance. His final argument in the study was 
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that, partnerships that maintain a collaborative tendency are likely to achieve better alliance 
performance than those that operated within an exchange partnership. This study adopted 
some research questions by Weihe (2008) and explained how the relationship between public 
and private actors make them ‘collaborative’ or ‘exchange’ partners.  
Whilst establishing some similarities such as the nature of partnership contract getting in the 
way of effective collaboration, findings of this study also revealed that public actors 
especially from the ministry and regulatory agencies engage actively with private actors 
contrary to findings by Weihe (2008). Thus, using this research as a stepping stone, other 
potential studies on PPP could focus on how a type of partnership contract influences 
partners’ perception of being ‘collaborative’ or ‘exchange’ partners. For instance, as 
previously revealed, actors from ECG, CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli do not regard 
themselves as partners essentially because of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) type of 
contract that exists, in which IPPs solely invest in their generation stations. It would therefore 
be of an interest to study the other type of PPP in the power sector which is a Joint Venture 
(JV) between VRA and the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company to ascertain if actors 
identify themselves as partners particularly because of existence of equity in a common 
project (TICO). Consequently, the design of this study could be used further to compare the 
collaborative practices by the JV partners and that of PFI partners to ascertain if each 
partnership unfolds differently and if at all there is a difference in their performance.      
 Reliability  3.8.4
Reliability in research requires that all the strategies adopted in the study be documented to 
inform others of how results were reached. This strategy deals with the extent to which a 
study’s strategy could be replicated in the same cases to produce similar results (Yin, 2014). 
The study made use of case study protocol to document the various procedures that were 
applied in collecting, analysing and interpreting data. A computerised case study data base 
was developed from field notes to contain information on participants, their responses from 
interviews and also to document detailed description of events and places. Another reliability 
strategy adopted in the conduct of this study was the design of a coding method that 
categorised themes from interviews. In this way, responses by respondents were grouped 
according to questions that were asked and the coding method took note of the recurring 
themes.  
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Themes that were derived from coding included; social responsibility and profitability that 
portrayed the different interests of partners, expression of commitment to partnership goals by 
actors as a result of being involved in decision making process, emphasis given to contractual 
obligations that showed the rigidity of relationship between primary partners (ECG and IPPs), 
and the constant default of ECG in making payments to IPPs which demonstrated a strain on 
trusting attitudes. These themes developed from the interview responses are in line with the 
themes outlined by Huxham and Vangen (2004) such as pattern of communication, relational 
quality, power relations and trust, which define a partnership’s level of collaboration or 
synergy and its resultant effect on partnership success. The study thus strengthens its 
reliability by developing such themes from interview responses and correlating them with 
those in the literature.    
3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
In the conduct of the study, certain strategies were adopted especially during the field work to 
address ethical concerns to safeguard the rights of all participants. First, a recommendation 
letter from the Department of Administration and Organisation Theory of the University of 
Bergen signed by a supervisor was used as the official document to introduce the researcher 
and the purpose of research to the respondents of the study. Detailed explanation of the 
purpose of the research was done again by the researcher to seek the approval and willingness 
of participants to contribute. Secondly, an official letter of consent prepared by the researcher 
was presented to be signed by participants to acknowledge their permission to grant 
interviews. Participation in the study was voluntary and all respondents who showed 
willingness to participate endorsed the letter by appending their signatures. Finally, in 
analysing data received from participants, directs names and private information were not 
disclosed other than the organisational (hierarchical) position of the respondents. Thus 
respondents were assured anonymity and confidentiality.  
3.10 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
As stated much earlier, there is inadequate research on the working relationship between 
public and private partners and its influence on their success particularly in Ghana. This poses 
a unique challenge of limited literature which restricts the extent to which findings are related 
with other studies to make meaningful relationships and to discuss trends in the performance 
of the partnership between the public and private sectors. This challenge however offers the 
opportunity to establish a new form of enquiry by verifying the validity of the theory of 
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Collaborative Advantage in the practice of PPP in the power sector of Ghana, which would 
subsequently serve as a guide for future studies in this regard. The works of Weihe (2008), 
Lasker et al. (2001), and Vangen and Huxham (2010) which are the closest theoretical 
perspectives and empirical studies to this thesis were thus the main reference points.  
One major challenge of this study was time constraints which particularly limited the number 
of actors in the partnership interviewed. Selection of participants was thus based on their 
importance to the study which also allowed for efficient collection of data within the allotted 
time of about three months. On the field, an interesting revelation was the case of the 
Takoradi International Company (TICO), an IPP which is a Joint Venture between the 
government's generator of electricity (VRA) and Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, thus, 
creates a different model from the other PPP being examined in this research. This made it 
necessary for some comparative analysis of how these two partnerships differed and which 
model may produce better partnership performance. However, three months allotted for 
collection of data did not allow for an extensive coverage of the other type of PPP.  
Yet another setback faced on the field was the inability to witness the meeting between the 
various stakeholders in the power sector. Information obtained from the Ministry of Energy 
indicated that there were scheduled meetings that involved the ministry, power generators, 
transmitters, distributors and the regulatory agencies. A request sent to the ministry to allow 
for observation of one of such meetings was turned down because it was considered 
inappropriate for third parties to partake or observe. It would have however been very useful 
to witness how interactions took place among the representatives of the various entities. Two 
reports of previous meetings were instead forwarded to relay any information that was needed 
from such meetings. 
Finally, there was the unwillingness of some respondents to allow access to some of their 
documents. A request to have access to the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was denied 
because it contained clauses that were not to be known by third parties. This document could 
have however disclosed the type of contractual arrangements that underlie the present 
relationship between partners. A few documents that were however obtained comprised 
electricity demand and supply plan, benchmark set for the partners by the regulators, some 
weekly reports on the state of electricity provision and the performance of public electricity 
utilities and IPPs. Some respondents also refused the use of an audio recorder. In some cases, 
thorough explanation had to be made and consent sought from the head of department before 
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audio recording was allowed. One respondent however refused to be recorded hence a hand 
written note was taken. Some respondents were constantly withholding very relevant 
information. In one case, a respondent asked the audio recorder to be put off before he could 
reveal crucial information which he did not want on record. He was particularly resistant in 
the initial stages to grant the interview, however thorough explanation was done to make him 
aware the research was for purely academic purposes.  
3.11 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has served as the research methodology on which this thesis was guided. It has 
sought to delineate the various procedures adopted in the course of the research and outlined 
reasons for the selection of each strategy. A qualitative research approach was espoused as the 
appropriate method adopted in the conduct of the research, with purposive selection of 
sample, multiple sources of data, and qualitative strategies of data analysis. Standards for 
ensuring quality research (validity and reliability) as well as strategies to ensure adherence to 
ethical concerns were also indicated.              
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CHAPTER FOUR: GHANA’S POLICY ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: AN 
EXTENSION TO THE POWER SECTOR 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a description of the Public Private Partnership Policy in Ghana and how 
it extends to the power sector. It identifies some of the objectives the policy has sought to 
achieve and institutional frameworks put in place for its implementation. The state of 
electricity provision would also be described and reasons given by government to engage the 
private sector. The chapter also outlines the various institutions in the power sector as well as 
their functions. Finally, it focuses on explaining how Independent Power Producers are 
integrated in the power sector of Ghana.   
4.1 BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY 
IN GHANA 
The beginning of the 1980s in Ghana marked a significant transformation in the orientation of 
state provision of public services (Adams, 2010; Ayee & Crook, 2003; Tangri, 1991). This 
period in Ghana’s history was marked by severe public sector challenges (such as over-sized 
sector) coupled with falling standards of public service delivery. Public enterprises thus 
became a financial burden on government as they continued to incur significant debt (Tangri, 
1991). The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the military government that took 
over reigns in 1981 even though proclaimed socialist ideals succumbed to the demands of the 
Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and the World Bank) to implement the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs). According to Tangri (1991:524), “when elements within the 
military overthrew the civilian government of Ghana on 31 December, 1981, they inherited an 
economy in crisis. By any conceivable yardstick, Ghana’s economy verged on disaster”. It is 
thus not surprising that the government regardless of its political inclinations accepted the 
conditionality that came with financial assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions and 
consequently instituted the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983. As asserted by 
Brown, Milward, Mohan, and Zack-Williams (2013:83), “it was the objective economic 
conditions and not so much the avowed political leanings of the government which were 
crucial”. The implementation of the ERP therefore meant drastic cut in public sector 
employment while setting the pace for private sector participation in the delivery of services 
that the government thought were not so strategic particularly in the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors and held on to the ‘more strategic’ areas of the economy (such as mining 
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and utilities) (Tangri, 1991). This however has changed over the years with the private sector 
getting more involved in these ‘strategic’ economic areas including water and electricity.  
Government’s objective of downsizing the public sector as part of the ERP led to the launch 
of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Reform in 1988 which consisted of measures to 
improve the performance of some public institutions and to privatise those that were not so 
profitable to government. Consistent with the launch of the Reform was the formation of the 
Divestiture Implementation Committee (DIC) under the Divestiture of the State Interests 
(Implementation) Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 326), with the function of among others to plan and 
monitor the implementation of the reform, make recommendations to government as to which 
state enterprise to divest as well as the preferred mode of divestiture (Dzakpasu, 1998). 
Divestiture in the Ghanaian and other African contexts according to Dzakpasu (1998:1) 
corresponds to privatisation which he defined as, “a process by which the state sells all or part 
of its ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors, local and 
foreign…[It] is also the major mechanism by which an “overextended” state reduces its direct 
involvement in the economy”. This policy initiative by governments therefore recognises 
various private sector participation (and not solely change of state ownership) which 
ultimately aim to introduce efficiency in the provision of services (ibid). 
The urge by subsequent governments after the PNDC to further enhance the integration of the 
private sector has culminated in a number of government strategies and policy initiatives 
which recognise and advocate the significance of private sector participation in the 
development agenda of Ghana. The Private Sector Development Strategy I and II, Medium-
Term National Development Policy Framework and the National Policy on PPP have all 
acknowledged that the introduction of private finance in the provision of essential public 
infrastructure is essential if the country aims at attaining a sustainable economic growth. The 
PPP Policy of Ghana for instance has identified that Ghana needs at least 1.5 billion dollars a 
year over the next decade to be able to solve its infrastructural deficit which government 
cannot achieve alone. It goes ahead to state that, “it is Government policy, therefore, to 
encourage the use of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) as a means of leveraging public 
resources with private sector resources and expertise in order to close the infrastructure gap 
and deliver efficient public infrastructure and services” (GoG, 2011: i).  
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4.2 OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP POLICY IN GHANA 
An initial effort by the government in 2004 to standardise the implementation of PPP projects 
resulted in the preparation of a PPP Policy Guidelines. This document was to serve as the 
general specification and prescription for the processes of public and private sectors working 
together. However, it failed to come into effect primarily because it lacked the necessary legal 
support and the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDGs) were ignorant of its existence 
(Apenteng, 2011). A National Policy on PPP was subsequently launched in 2011 and 
currently serves as the formal document guiding the implementation of PPP projects. 
According to the policy document, “a PPP is a contractual arrangement between a public 
entity and a private sector party, with clear agreement on shared objectives for the provision 
of public infrastructure and services traditionally provided by the public sector” (GoG, 
2011:2). It also goes on to add that in such agreements, the private party assumes part of the 
risks involved in the venture and receives remuneration according to some consented criteria 
(ibid). 
The National Policy on PPP, dubbed “Private Partnership in Infrastructure and Services for 
Better Public Service Delivery”, has outlined various objectives to be achieved under this 
initiative. It is worthy of note however, that this document acknowledges that PPP is not a 
panacea for public infrastructure investment needs, therefore, should be viewed as a 
complement and not a substitute to government’s effort to introduce the private sector into the 
key sectors of the economy (GoG, 2011:1). Some key objectives that have been outlined in 
the policy among others are;  
a. “Leverage public assets and funds with private sector resources from local and 
international markets to accelerate needed investments in infrastructure and services” 
(ibid, 3). 
b. “Encourage and facilitate investment by the private sector by creating an enabling 
environment for PPPs where value for money for government can be clearly 
demonstrated” (ibid, 3). 
c. “Increase the availability of public infrastructure and services and improve service 
quality and efficiency of projects” (ibid, 3).  
In addition to these objectives, the policy spells out certain key guiding principles that should 
serve as a backbone in the formulation and implementation of PPP projects. Among these 
principles are; Value-for-Money (“the major driver for adopting the PPP approach rather that 
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capital scarcity or the balance sheet treatment”), efficient risk allocation, ability of the end 
user to pay, and clear objectives and output requirement (ibid, 4-5). The policy also identifies 
key institutions that would aid the general implementation of such projects as well as those 
agencies that would oversee the work of the partnering organisations within specific sectors. 
Sampson (2009:3) opines that, “institutions are the agencies that support PPP through project 
cycle” and that, the work of these institutions could either strengthen or obstruct the 
development and implementation of PPP projects. The policy identified such institutions to 
include among others; the various Ministries under which the project or program is being 
implemented, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Parliament and Regulatory 
Bodies that have been established to perform oversight functions in specific service sectors 
(GoG, 2011). For instance, in the water sector, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission 
(PURC) and the Water Resources Commission (WRC) are the main regulatory bodies. The 
electricity sector also has the PURC and the Energy Commission as the two main regulatory 
bodies charged with monitoring the activities of organisations in the electricity industry. 
Another significant landmark worth mentioning in government’s quest to create an enabling 
environment for PPP ventures is the existence of a PPP Bill that is currently in parliament 
waiting to be passed into law to make PPP agreements legally binding to parties involved, 
thus, would serve as the legal support for the implementation of PPP projects. 
As government continues to design initiatives and institutional frameworks to support the 
implementation of PPPs, there has also been a simultaneous expansion in the number of such 
ventures across various sectors of the economy. Most notably, the practice of PPP in Ghana 
that has engaged the attention of scholars is in water provision and sanitation. Unfortunately, 
such assessments of PPP schemes in Ghana have not been success stories. For instance, 
Awortwi (2004) writes on “Getting the Fundamentals Wrong: Woes of Public–Private 
Partnerships in Solid Waste Collection in Three Ghanaian Cities”, where he argues that 
without the appropriate foundations to implementing PPPs (competitive bidding, strict 
monitoring and tracking results, and sanctions), such ventures are worse off in contrast to 
those benefits argued for. In his article he concludes that, in implementing PPP policy in 
sanitation, the “Local Government rushed to implement PPPs without making sure that the 
fundamentals were first put in place, hence they produced disappointing results” (ibid, 223). 
Ayee and Crook (2003:iii) on the other hand titled their publication “Toilet Wars”: Urban 
Sanitation Services and the Politics of Public-Private Partnerships in Ghana”. In this article, 
they discuss that, PPP in urban sanitation has failed to produce results due to the politics of 
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patronage and the failure of regulations and believe sanitation facilities can be improved 
through “full public provision of basic infrastructure; transparent, independent and rigorous 
regulation of any contracts for service provision given to non-state agencies” (ibid, iii).  
Finally, Fuest and Haffner’s (2007) article, “PPP – Policies, Practices and Problems in 
Ghana’s Urban Water Supply” focus on the generality of PPP policies that have been imposed 
on developing countries without consideration to local context thus, failing to achieve 
expected results. They contend that, the various modes of PPP that have over the years been 
implemented in the water sector failed to achieve desired impact due to flaws in the design 
and implementation structures, one of which is weak legislation and regulatory frameworks 
specifically with regards to consumer protection and general oversight functioning. In their 
final comment, they state that “within Ghana and internationally, more (comparative) research 
is required to highlight the conditions of “success stories” in PPP from which lessons can be 
learnt for the design and implementation of policies at country, district and community levels” 
(Fuest & Haffner, 2007:190).  
In all these publications, a common understanding is made that the institutional frameworks 
most notably the regulatory structures that have been established for the implementation of 
PPPs is not as effective as expected. Fuest and Haffner (2007) for instance mentioned that, the 
PURC which has the mandate of regulating the utility sector (water and electricity) does not 
possess the necessary financial and human capacity to perform its function. This problem is 
further exacerbated by the interference of politicians which threatens the institution’s role as 
an independent regulatory body (ibid, 184). The major challenge in the implementation of 
PPPs in Ghana therefore lies in the difficulty of replacing an existing system of service 
provision (public provision) with a supposed more strategic arrangement (PPP) that requires 
an adjustment in policy design, implementation structure and oversight responsibilities.        
4.3 THE CASE OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTRICITY 
PROVISION 
Ghana’s over reliance on hydro (water) for electricity generation and the paucity of 
maintenance in the existing infrastructure has for over two decades created a situation of 
unreliable power supply in the country. In 1983, the attention of government was drawn to the 
need to diversify electricity generation sources due to a severe drought that reduced the water 
level in the Akosombo Dam on which the country solely relied for electricity (Malgas, 2008). 
Aside the dwindling water level and obsolete infrastructure, the dynamics of a developing 
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country with such issues as rapid population growth and emerging industrial sector with its 
attendant need for increased electricity further motivated the urge to re-organise the power 
sector. The challenge of government since 1983 has therefore been the ability to expand 
generation capacity to meet increasing electricity demand which grows at about 10% every 
year. A World Bank report has specified the challenges of the Ghanaian power sector in two 
folds; “the lack of adequate and secure quantities of reasonably priced fuel for power 
generation, and the lack of adequate public funds to finance the sector’s investment 
requirements” (World Bank, 2013:viii). In this regard, government’s policy response has been 
to reform the power sector to make it more attractive for private investment as government is 
unable to solely provide the required finance for a more productive sector. The reform which 
is backed by the World Bank involves strategic restructuring of the power sector to liberalise 
the sector, thus, opening up the sector to private investment to induce the needed capital for 
the expansion of power supply infrastructure. Malgas (2008) discusses that, the sponsorship 
by the World Bank was in line with Ghana’s implementation of the ERP which had the 
overall aim of creating a favourable environment for private sector participation. Indeed, 
various publications that aim to highlight the challenges of the Ghanaian power sector and its 
associated solutions often conclude with the need for private investment if government aims 
to attain electricity security. Such publications have called for a robust regulatory framework 
that would invariably attract the needed private finance into the sector (Ashong, 2010; 
Malgas, 2008; UNECA, 2011; World Bank, 2013).   
Prior to the implementation of the reform, Ghana’s electricity industry was a purely vertical 
integrated system, with state agency the VRA responsible for generating at the same time 
transmitting electricity. This vertical integration system was a hindrance to private 
participation as it is purported that, VRA which was the sole generator at the same time in 
charge of transmission would not provide equal opportunity to new entrants (power 
generators) in the industry. One aim of the reform was therefore to separate the generation 
and transmission functions of VRA by creating an independent transmission body that would 
ensure an open and equal access to the national grid. This resulted in the unbundling of VRA 
to create separate organisations to have clearly defined functions, thus, the establishment of 
the GRIDCo for transmission of power from generators to distributors and bulk consumers 
and the creation of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) for power 
distribution to the Northern part of Ghana. The creation of GRIDCo meant both public and 
private entities in the power industry would have equal access to the transmission system 
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without fear of being discriminated. Another important feature of the reform was the setting 
up of two regulatory bodies to perform supervisory roles such as licenses issuance and setting 
comprehensive tariffs to introduce competition in the sector (Opam, 1995).  
 Structure of the Power Sector (Institutions and Roles)  4.3.1
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the Ghanaian Power Sector 
Source: Developed by researcher from field data 
a) Ministry of Energy: The power sector of Ghana is governed by the Ministry of Energy 
which has the mandate of formulating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating general 
policies concerning the power sub-sector and the energy sector in general. The ministry is 
assisted by the works of two independent agencies, the Energy Commission and PURC 
which were both set up by acts of parliament with the responsibility of regulating the 
power sector. 
b) Energy Commission: It is responsible for granting licences to power generators, 
transmitters and suppliers and serves as a supervisory body that oversees to the 
performance standards of these various electricity utilities. The Energy Commission also 
acts as an advisory body to the ministry by proposing general policy guidelines and 
recommendations. It also makes various endorsements for incentives such as tax 
exemptions and duty-free imports to IPPs to mitigate their high costs of production. 
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c) Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC): It has the duty to oversee to the 
provision of quality and affordable service by utility providers. The commission’s 
mandate includes among others; “approving rates chargeable for provision of utility 
services and protecting the interests of consumers and providers of utility services” 
(PURC, 2008:5). In its discharge of duty, the commission establishes a tariff scheme that 
it deems appropriate to protect the interest of both utility providers and consumers.  
d) Volta River Authority: It is the state owned electricity generator and operates the 
country’s largest generation stations made up of both hydro and thermal plants. It is also a 
minority partner in the Takoradi International Company (TICO), an IPP joint venture with 
the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA).    
e) Independent Power Producers: IPPs are private business entities that have been invited 
by the Government of Ghana to generate additional megawatts of electricity with the 
pledge of providing lands, natural gas, ready market and a secured business environment. 
The investment by these private entities is of vital importance because of the high cost of 
thermal power generation, which if ventured into wholly by government would over 
burden its budget. These IPPs solely finance their generation stations and are responsible 
for its daily operations and maintenance. By signing a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) 
with an off-taker (sole purchaser), IPPs are guaranteed a ready market for their power by 
which they recoup their investment. Two major IPPs that are currently augmenting power 
generation in Ghana and the focus of this research are Sunon Asogli Power Plant and 
CENIT Energy.  
i. Sunon Asogli started operations in 2010 and is wholly owned by Shenzhen Energy 
Investment Ltd of China. It has an installed capacity of 200MW and uses natural 
gas from the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) for generating electricity. The 
company contributes about 6% of thermal power generation which represents a 
total of 14% of the power distributed by ECG (GRIDCo, 2013)  
ii. CENIT Energy is a Ghanaian company funded by the Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)
1
. It started operations in 2012 and has an 
installed capacity of 126MW which represents about 5% of thermal electricity 
generation (Energy Commission, 2014). 
                                                          
1
 SSNIT is a statutory body that administers the Ghana National Pension Scheme. It invests the funds of its 
members in various sectors of the economy to yield returns 
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f) Electricity Company of Ghana: It is wholly owned by the Government of Ghana. It is 
responsible for distributing electricity for both domestic and commercial purposes in the 
Southern part of the country which consists of six regions, constituting 72% of total 
electricity demand in Ghana. With its largest distribution network, ECG functions as an 
off-taker that guarantees the purchase of generated power by IPPs.  
g) The Northern Distribution Company: It is responsible for electricity distribution in the 
Northern part of Ghana. With the implementation of the power sector reform, NEDCo was 
detached from VRA to function as an autonomous entity solely in charge of electricity 
distribution.   
h) Ghana Grid Company Limited: GRIDCo is wholly owned by the Government of Ghana 
and functions as a transmission utility that takes delivery of generated electricity from 
various generation stations (both national generator and IPPs) to the distributors and bulk 
customers. It thus functions as the link between which power produced by IPPs is 
transmitted to ECG for distribution. GRIDCo has a goal to ensure equal opportunity to 
both public and private power generators in its transmission obligations. 
 Integration of IPPs in the Power Sector and PPP Arrangement 4.3.2
Despite being partially implemented, the reform has so far achieved some strides with the 
entry of IPPs in the generation side to add to the existing installed capacity (i.e. capacity of all 
the generation stations in the country). In 2000, the Takoradi International Company (TICO) 
which is a joint venture between the VRA and the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company 
(TAQA) was the first IPP to start operations (Malgas, 2008). With the Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) arrangement entered into by partners, TICO would be reverted to VRA after 
the contract period of 25 years, unless there is an agreement to further extend the contract. 
VRA, aside being a stakeholder in TICO is also the sole off-taker of the power produced by 
TICO. With this arrangement therefore, TICO does not engage directly with the electricity 
transmitter and distributors, as VRA has the sole responsibility of off-loading the power from 
TICO to the other organisations in the electricity supply chain. 
The other two major IPPs to enter the sector (Sunon Asogli Power and CENIT Energy) are 
however independent of the VRA (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2013). This is because the VRA 
has not been willing to sign on new IPPs after TICO since it considers them as competitors 
(World Bank, 2013). This leaves IPPs with very limited options of off-takers. As such, ECG 
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currently remains the only viable off-taker even though there are other potential buyers of 
electricity in the country (large scale industries and institutions with very high electricity 
consumption). The World Bank (2013:15) has acknowledged that, “only ECG, and no other 
potential buyer, has signed a PPA to offtake power from any of the IPPs….the IPPs that have 
attempted to enter the Ghanaian market have reported difficulties in securing PPAs with other 
organisations”. These organisations would rather buy from the VRA due to its lower tariff and 
more flexible contract terms compared to that of IPPs (ibid). In such an unreliable electricity 
market, IPPs ultimately enter into an agreement with a government utility, which in this case 
is ECG to secure a guaranteed market for their power. As already mentioned, one basic 
requirements for the operations of IPPs especially in developing countries is the existence of a 
PPA preferably with a government entity, as this guarantees them a ready market as well as 
some incentives from the government. The PPA is the main contract agreement that contains 
the conditions of operations within which responsibilities, risks and rewards are outlined. 
Succinctly put by Bayliss (2002:609), “in power generation projects, private investors often 
will not invest without a power purchase agreement (PPA) in place, under which the publicly 
owned utility agrees to purchase all the output of the plant at a price fixed in foreign exchange 
for a period of 20 to 30 years”. Signing the PPA with a government entity often also requires 
that the government provides a sovereign guarantee sometimes in the form of letters of credit 
to shield IPPs from financial loss in the event its agency (the off-taker) defaults in payments. 
However, the Government of Ghana has not been very keen in granting sovereign guarantees 
to IPPs and this has been argued as one of the hindrances to IPPs entering the power sector 
(World Bank, 2013; ECG, 2013).  
Nonetheless, ECG being the major electricity distributor in Ghana and the point of contact for 
majority of electricity consumers has acknowledged the importance of IPPs in its obligation 
of providing quality service to the end user. According to an ECG Tariff Proposal (2013:38), 
the need to contract the services of various IPPs became a necessary strategy to reduce the 
negative impact that generation shortage caused on its service delivery, and accordingly 
acknowledged that the introduction of these IPPs would contribute to an efficient electricity 
supply in Ghana. It has in this regard engaged the services of about eight IPPs including; 
Sunon Asogli Power Plant, CENIT Energy Limited, GENSER Power, CENPOWER 
Generation Company Limited and Jacobsen Elektro As (ECG, 2013). Of these IPPs, Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy have started full operations and are generating a considerable 
percentage of electricity currently being supplied. IPPs signing PPAs with ECG inherently 
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means signing an Interconnection Agreement with GRIDCo for the evacuation of their power 
to ECG. Therefore, GRIDCo plays a third party role as it is not directly involved in the PPA 
but functions as a link between IPPs and ECG, and its actions and inactions affects the overall 
success of the partnership. Below is a basic structure of the PPP arrangement with ECG as the 
main off-taker: 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s development from field data 
 Contribution of IPPs to Electricity Generation  4.3.3
Certainly, government’s objective for inviting IPPs was to add to the country’s total 
generation capacity and as it stands, IPPs have so far added a considerable amount to the 
existing capacity. Since the problem of the power sector has been named as generation deficit, 
a level of success can be measured by the amount of capacity that has been added. By the 
statistics given by Energy Commission in its supply and demand outlook for 2014, total 
installed capacity (i.e. capacity of all the generation stations in the country) was at 2,851MW 
of which Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy together contribute 326MW representing about 
11.4%. However, because demand for electricity which currently stands at about 2300MW is 
increasing every year, there has to be an expansion in generation facilities either by existing 
IPPs or by newly contracted ones to ensure security in electricity supply. Consequently, as 
gathered from the field, the operating IPPs currently have different plans to expand their 
generation capacities. Sunon Asogli plans to expand but is yet to begin due to fuel uncertainty 
and CENIT Energy does not have plans yet to expand. Newly contracted IPPs are also not 
able to start generation because of government’s reluctance in granting sovereign guarantees. 
The goal set by government thus to achieve 5000MW by 2015 remains unrealistic. A report 
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Figure 4: Structure of PPP arrangement between IPPs and ECG 
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by UNECA (2011) in this regards holds that, even though government has established the 
required institutional framework for the implementation of PPP projects in the power sector, 
the sector has not attained the postulated inflow of private capital. Thus, there could be other 
reasons hindering the entrance of IPPs and not solely the institutional frameworks. It states 
that; 
[T]he flow of private sector capital into the various segments of the electricity 
sector has not happened as anticipated. For example, there are reports that a 
number of power plants were initially planned and contracted under PPA by ECG, 
but have not materialised. This suggests that there are other barriers that could be 
hindering the private sector from taking advantage of the investment opportunities 
opened in Ghana’s electricity sector (UNECA, 2011:57). 
Since it was initially assumed that reforming the power sector would introduce the needed 
private sector participation, institutional frameworks were implemented in this regard. 
However, as evidenced from the above discussion, private sector participation has not 
materialised as envisaged. Again, because government is unable to solely finance the 
expansion of electricity generation infrastructure, it becomes imperative that the existing PPPs 
in the power sector be effectively managed to ensure further expansion of resources in an 
effort to achieving the goal of the sector while government continues to seek to sign on more 
IPPs. This study would in this regard argue that, the prevailing working relationship between 
the public and private partners would influence the extent to which they are able to work 
towards expanding electricity generation to meet growing demand.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented a historical background to the introduction of private sector 
participation in public service delivery in Ghana and the strategies by government that finally 
resulted in the culmination of the PPP policy in 2011. With the power sector being the focus 
of this study, the chapter has also described the state of electricity delivery and government’s 
motive for introducing the private sector. Private investment has however not occurred as 
envisaged, thus government has not been able to meet its target of achieving 5000MW by 
2015. How then does the partnership between ECG and two IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy) be sustained to expand generation capacities in an effort to meet the stipulated 
5000MW? This is what the subsequent chapters endeavour to answer.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS  
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Findings and discussions of the study are presented in this chapter and the next. These two 
chapters analyse how the three independent variables of the study, that is; a) Formulation and 
working towards mutual goals, b) existence of partnership trust and c) mutual resource 
contribution in the partnership between actors at ECG and IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy) impact on their effort to improve electricity delivery. Drawing on data collected from 
the field and theoretical framework, these chapters examine if partners engage in collaborative 
processes and the extent to which it influences their ability to achieve substantial gains in 
expanding electricity generation. The overall purpose of these chapters would be to answer 
the central question; what kind of working processes do partners engage in and how does it 
impact on their effort to attain the goal of expanding electricity generation infrastructure? 
This present chapter however analyses how partners work towards congruent and shared goals 
with the assumption that; frequent communication and flexible relationship between partners 
may clarify individual differences and may enhance the achievement of mutual goals.  
5.1 PARTNERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONAL GOALS 
An overarching goal of government’s partnership with IPPs is to increase power generation 
infrastructure to meet growing demand. In describing the challenges and prospects of the 
power sector, the National Energy Policy explicitly states that, “the policy direction is to 
attract private investments to support the public sector to improve and expand the capacity of 
the existing infrastructure” (GoG, 2010:9). Government’s inability to finance more generation 
facilities means the operations of IPPs in the sector takes the form of a supporting role to 
increase the country’s generation capacity, which would consequently assist government’s 
goal of expanding infrastructure to enhance electricity provision. An important aspect of 
partnership functioning is the recognition by partners of the purpose of the partnership 
because it is for this reason why it was initiated in the first place. Since partnerships are made 
of different individuals and organisations it becomes imperative in the discussions to 
differentiate between the goals of the partnership and the goals of individual organisations 
involved and how the alignment of these goals influence their work. Huxham and Vangen 
(2004:75) have defined collaboration aims (goals) as “statements about what the collaborating 
organisations are aspiring to achieve together. They may be viewed as the public statement of 
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the joint purpose of the collaborating partners; a declaration of the sought after collaborative 
advantage”.  
As indicated earlier, the goal for introducing private entities in the power sector has been 
declared by the energy policy, thus, to expand capacity of electricity infrastructure. Vangen 
and Huxham (2010) in this sense contend that goals of PPPs are mostly the declarations by 
government on the reason for engaging the private sector. They argue that, “government is 
perhaps the most common organisational stakeholder exerting pressure on collaborations, and 
it frequently influences and shapes them. Whether collaborations are mandated or constrained 
by government, nationwide policies as well as local priorities and interest tend to have an 
effect on the aims of the collaboration” (ibid, 166).  One important point they make in this 
argument is that, even though government may be the prime decision maker, individual 
aspirations of organisations in the partnership may influence the level of agreement on the 
goal as well as processes for achieving them. Thus, an essential factor in supporting the goal 
of the partnership is that partners know the aim of the partnership and agree to work towards 
it. Partners’ alignment to or recognition of the overall goal would ultimately determine the 
effort they put into its realisation as it sets the pace for collaborative practices. Huxham and 
Vangen (2004:76) have in this regard asserted that, “organisation aims thus sometimes have 
an important effect on organisational commitment to the collaboration”. Findings from the 
study revealed that, by virtue of the declaration by the Energy policy, partners are aware of 
the overall objective of the partnership. A senior official at Sunon Asogli (IPP) commented 
that: 
Actually, we know the objective from the paper [policy]. The goal of the 
government or the power sector is our goal. Nobody has said it is our duty but we 
it treat as one part of our objective. I don’t think there is any direct integration [of 
goals] but what we are doing also contributes to it. Because of the goal, there 
would be more power plants, so if we have built one, we are also contributing to 
it. 
Backing this assertion is a remark made by an administration officer at ECG. He affirmed 
that: 
Our main objective is to meet Ghana’s demand. That is the main objective. They 
[IPPs] are supply side and our customers are the demand side. So our aim is to 
contract as much IPPs to generate power to meet the demand. 
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A top official from the Electricity Company of Ghana while initially refuting IPPs alignment 
with mutual goal concluded that indeed there is harmonisation of goals after negotiation of 
contract. He said:  
No, IPPs are business people who are coming in to do business. I [ECG] need so 
much power by 2015. So once you declare that, it sends a signal to the IPPs and 
they come. Once they come in, we sit with them to talk and we look at what best 
we can get from them. So from the onset no we don’t have the same goal, but 
when we have concluded negotiations, yes. My aim is also to secure generation, 
so the exercise of harmonising now brings us together and then we have 
equilibrium of goals. 
However, aside the overall goal of the partnership, the study also established that individual 
organisational objectives also influence the extent to which they are willing to strive for its 
achievement especially for IPPs since they are private entities with profit motives. 
Distinguishing between collaboration aims and organisational aims, Huxham and Vangen 
(2004:75) are of the view that, collaboration aim is what the partners seek to achieve together 
while organisational aims are what individual organisations aim to gain from the partnership. 
Of course public and private organisations in principle have different reasons for providing 
services. Whereas the public partner would see it as its social and political responsibility, the 
private party would do it solely for profit. Thus, there is a limit to which IPPs would go to 
ensure uninterrupted electricity supply contrary to what their public sector counterparts would 
do. An official at CENIT Energy (IPP) recognised the general goal of making electricity 
available but also drew a very sharp contrast in his organisation’s interest with that of the 
public agency (ECG). He said: 
ECG is essentially a public utility that provides services. Their number one aim is 
not profit driven but we [CENIT] have to make money for our shareholders, give 
them interest on their investment and so yes the most important goal for each of 
us is to make sure that there is light available, but we will not do that at a loss. 
Because of the market, our responsibility is different from theirs, we are private 
and ECG is public and then with interaction, sometimes we discuss policies what 
we think is in the best interest of each party and ECG also looks at the interest of 
the consumer. 
A senior official at Sunon Asogli also stressed on their shareholders by stating that: 
Actually, we have our shareholders in energy. We are also an electricity company 
in China. We concentrate on power producing and that is our business. We also 
wish by working together with the government we can produce more electricity 
for the country. 
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A top official at ECG while emphasising the need to meet their customers (Citizen’s) need for 
electricity had this to say on his company's interest in the partnership: 
Our interest is to make sure you [IPP] give me power. That’s what my customers 
want and that’s what I am supposed to give them. 
From the above responses, it is evident that while the private partner mentioned their 
shareholders, the public actors concentrated on meeting consumers’ need. Vangen and 
Huxham (2010:166) have again in this regard argued that, “the identification of specific aims 
for each of the parties involved as well as the joint purpose is acknowledged as important if 
the collaboration is to succeed”. The differences in aim thus ought not be a barrier to pursuing 
the overall objective of the partnership but instead by incorporating certain managerial 
practices which Huxham and Vangen (2004) have termed process aims, partners can align and 
work along their individual goals while supporting the partnership goal. They contend that, 
“process aims are commonly seen as a means of achieving substantive ends and, in that sense, 
they are usually perceived as subordinate to the substantive collaboration aims. They can 
relate to any aspect of collaborative processes so might, for example, relate to modes of 
communicating, to the kind of relationship between members” (ibid, 80-81). Hence, the 
process aim should be the achievement of collaborative practices through such measures as 
mode of communication and relational quality which would result in partners’ ability to 
achieve substantive gains (expansion in electricity generation).  Similarly, two parameters by 
which Weihe (2008) also measured the collaboration level in the partnership he studied were 
the intensity and pattern of interaction and the relational quality that existed. How regular do 
partners communicate about their interests, challenges and prospects of the partnership? And 
are they willing to go the extra mile even if it is not in their individual organisations’ interest? 
5.2 ESTABLISHING COMMITMENT TO ATTAIN PARTNERSHIP GOAL: 
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES IN WORKING TOWARDS MUTUAL 
OBJECTIVE 
 Communication and Interaction  5.2.1
Communication is one fundamental way by which actors within a partnership get their 
concerns across and make each other aware of their intentions. As indicated above, 
government and private organisations have different motives for providing services. Hence, if 
they are working together towards expanding electricity infrastructure, then there should be 
some form of process incorporated in the practice of the partnership to enhance commitment 
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towards achieving stated goals. Two parameters of communication used in the study is the 
frequency and levels of communication between public and private actors which would 
demonstrate that, “effective communication strategies and mechanisms to coordinate partners' 
activities are needed to facilitate synergic thinking and actions” (Lasker et al., 2001:194).  
 Levels and Frequency of Communication 5.2.2
Findings from the study suggest that, even though the partnership is actively between the IPPs 
and ECG there is constant interaction between these partners as well as other stakeholders in 
the power sector. As a result, there is an existence of multiple level of communication in the 
partnership. On the one hand is communication between actors of partnering organisations 
(micro level) and on the other hand is communication between partners and other stakeholders 
in the power sector (national level) which has authoritative figures (actors) from government 
who tend to steer the affairs of the partnering organisations.  
a. National Level Communication: Leadership Matters 
At the national level, since the main goal of the partnership is spelt out by the Energy Policy, 
it is in the interest of the Ministry of Energy to act as a monitoring body to oversee to the 
operations of the partnership. The sector minister therefore plays an overall leadership role at 
the national level in steering the affairs of the sector in general. In line with this practice, 
Vangen and Huxham (2003:62) conceptualise leadership as “the mechanisms that make 
things happen in a collaboration”. With communication at this level, national executives 
clarify what is expected of the various partnering organisation as well as other key sector 
players. Government officials act more like facilitators of such meetings and with concerns 
raised by representatives of the various organisations, they together deliberate on the way 
forward. A top official at the Power Department of the Ministry of Energy had this to say on 
meetings between government officials and private parties: 
It depends on which target you want these IPPs to meet. But to meet, yes we do 
have meetings. We have bi-weekly Chief Executive meeting with the Minister and 
ministries top officials to deliberate on the supply situation, the current supply, 
the outlook for the following weeks. And at this meetings, it is both state owned 
generator (VRA, Bui) and the IPPs (TICO, Sunon Asogli, and CENIT), so yeah 
they come for some of these meetings. These meetings tend to look at their 
availability and their schedule. If for some reason Asogli is down, an IPP cannot 
produce because collectively they define the generation capacity for the country, 
the Ministry of Energy is interested to know what the challenges are, how are they 
mitigated, the way forward and planning. 
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Reiterating the above response, a technical officer at the Energy Commission also recognised 
the integration of IPPs in the processes leading to the passing of legislations to govern 
operations in the sector. He remarked that: 
Before we come out with a particular legislation, we meet all of them. So there is 
interaction with all of them together at least every year. Apart from that, within 
the year there could be a lot of interaction with separate actors of the sector. And 
also energy commission has what we call the technical committee and on it is 
represented all the various utilities. The technical committee has the VRA, ECG, 
all IPPs.  So before we come out with a document the technical committee deals 
with the stakeholders.  
Vangen and Huxham (2003) are of the opinion that these kinds of meetings make the actors 
especially from IPPs feel empowered as they are considered part of the process to resolving 
the electricity challenges in the country. With these forms of discussions, IPPs are also able to 
channel any grievances they may have concerning their operations, which mostly have to do 
with electricity pricing and fuel unavailability. Meeting at the national level with all the 
authoritative actors in essence boosts the morale of IPPs and reinforces their optimism as they 
feel they are listened to and their input sought for. To back this assertion is a comment by a 
senior official at Sunon Asogli. He revealed that:  
We have meetings and the Ministry of Energy arranges them. At the meetings we 
have representatives from Ministry of Energy, Energy Commission, VRA, BUI, 
ECG, TICO.  For instance I went to Takoradi for a meeting and from the 
discussions. I know they [government officials] are very serious and they want to 
solve the problem of electricity delivery. It is not easy but we are working on it. 
Because we talk with them, we know the situation and we are working together. 
They [government officials] are very kind. I am not a very big man but the few 
times I went for meetings on behalf of Sunon Asogli, the minister took part  
himself and he talked to me. He will talk to you because he knows you are here at 
the meetings and he understands our challenges. So he will ask about how Sunon 
Asogli’s operation is going and if everything is okay. 
b. Partnership Level Communication: 
At the level of the partnership however, communication between partners appears to be more 
in tune with exchange practices than collaborative processes. Contractually, there is an 
amount of generated power that individual IPPs are to make available to ECG and in return 
there is a price at which ECG pays. IPPs have to meet production obligation to satisfy ECG’s 
interest of providing reliable services to citizens and on the other hand, ECG has to 
remunerate IPPs to enable them meet their cost of production and profitability. If for some 
reason, partners cannot meet their obligation which would affect other parties’ interests, it is 
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communicated. Communication in this instance takes the form of a formal channel with 
official notifications. This does not in any way negatively affect the morale of the partners as 
there is an understanding that the PPA is a buying and selling agreement. The role of the 
government agencies at the national level thus is of significant importance in creating and 
maintaining an all-encompassing collaborative process in deliberating issues of the sector and 
invariably of the partnership, which as observed above is practised. With regards to the mode 
of communication between IPPs and ECG, an official from CENIT Energy stated: 
Our agreement is a PPA. It spells out the interaction, the mode of communication, 
all we expect. Now if there are differences, there are notices that we must send out 
at specific times. Let's say something happened in the plant, we need to shut down, 
we need to do a maintenance, then periodically every month we are supposed to 
reconcile to find out what on whatever figures we have projected.  
A top official at ECG also emphasized the formal procedures in communicating with IPPs. He 
remarked that: 
It’s a contract and normally there are some principles that cover the contract. The 
contract spells how information will be transmitted. Yes it’s straight forward. The 
only thing is that, normally because it’s a two party contract, outsiders are not 
allowed. And then with the confidentiality clause in the contract you don’t 
disclose too much unless both parties think that it’s of interest to. 
Communication between actors of partnering institution is crucial as they are the primary 
parties in the contract and thus become the first point of contact. Inconsistencies that arise in 
meeting each other's interest (ECG’s interest of providing reliable services and IPPs interest 
of meeting production cost and profitability) is officially communicated between the two 
parties first. However because actions and inactions of partnering organisations affect the 
whole of the sector, such deliberations on production and payment obligations are eventually 
carried out at the national level with government officials. Highlighting how they get 
grievances resolved with ECG, a senior official at Sunon Asogli commented that: 
Because Ministry of Energy leads the power sector, they organise meetings when 
you have a problem or difficulty. They like to talk to you when everyone is there. 
So maybe if we [Sunon Asogli] have some problem with ECG, we would be there 
as well as ECG and then we talk. And at these meetings, the minister takes part 
himself as well as all the big men. 
In describing the nature and pattern of interaction between public and private actors in his 
study Weihe (2008:155) identified that:  
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Intensity and pattern of interaction ranged from low to high. The involvement of 
different institutional actors also varied from case to case. In some cases, 
interaction was only between the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the public 
sector counterpart; in other cases, the main interaction was between prime 
subcontractors and the local public sector partnership managers. In yet other 
cases, a significant amount of the interaction took place between public sector 
advisors (consultants) and private sector representatives from various levels, while 
the public sector partners maintained a more hands’-off approach (i.e. avoided 
becoming too involved in the project during the implementation stage). 
Findings from the study show that contrary to the findings by Weihe (2008),  public actors in 
the power sector of Ghana are actively involved in the operations of the partnership and 
render needed assistance to partnering organisations. Therefore, collaborative process actually 
emanate from the activities of government officials at the Ministry and the Regulatory 
Agencies. Consequently, sector meetings are very frequent to make various actors abreast 
with demand and supply situation, thus, any hindrance to attaining the main goal of the sector 
in general is detected and addressed. Especially at the national level, since the country is 
currently facing severe shortage of generation stations, the absence of any IPP due to 
inadequate gas supply would mean further reduction in generation capacity resulting in 
frequent power outages in the country. In such instances, the government implements 
austerity measures to make gas available to IPPs to ensure adequate electricity generation. In 
March 2014 for instance, President John Mahama dispatched the Minister of Energy to 
Nigeria to implore management of the West African Gas Pipeline Company to improve on 
gas delivery to Ghana. This was because expected quantity of gas contracted by the 
government was not being delivered thus, impeding on the ability of thermal generation 
stations to operate. Since IPPs have invested in thermal generation, the unavailability of gas to 
power their generation stations affects them largely.  As observed by a top official from the 
Power Department of the Ministry of Energy: 
We have had erratic supply of gas from Nigeria for some time now and because 
these IPPs run on gas, when the gas is unavailable we have deficit in generation 
capacity. We are supposed to be getting about 120 million cubic feet each day, 
per day but we are not getting this level. 
Consequently, through such multilevel communication structures and the frequency with 
which actors meet, there is coordination of activities to address challenges of partners and the 
sector as a whole. In the instance of the President imploring his minister to address challenges 
of gas supply, IPPs are further motivated to keep up operations to meet electricity demand. A 
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senior official at Sunon Asogli described how the commitment of the Minister enhanced his 
organisation’s motivation. He commented that: 
This year, the minister went to China and I was there at our parent company 
Shenzhen Energy. We finished signing an MOU in the morning at 1 o’clock am 
and at 4 o’clock he left for another province. Our chairman observed that he [the 
minister] is working really hard. He slept less than four hours. That gave us a 
very deep consideration.      
 Relational Quality 5.2.3
Another managerial practice that influences the extent to which partners are able to meet their 
objective is the kind of relationship they develop in the process of collaboration and how far 
they are willing to support each other towards the attainment of their mutual goal.  
 Structure of Relationship: Rigidity and Flexibility 5.2.4
In examining the type of relationship that exist between partners, the study focused on 
determining if partners had a more relaxed form of relationship or if it was based on strict 
formal dictates of their contract. In the partnerships Weihe (2008:155) studied, he established 
that, “while some cases displayed close-knit and collaborative operational relationships, 
others displayed rather distanced and formalised relationships…While some partnership 
managers stressed the importance of working together, acknowledging each other’s 
differences and being flexible, others focused primarily on contract”. Extending this assertion 
to the study, partners were asked how they related in daily and routine operations and if every 
action they took were specified by their contract. Some of these assertions already stated in 
the preceding section (communication and interaction) confirm that relationship between 
partners is mostly based on contract. Respondents frequently made reference to their contracts 
in dealing with other partners. They constantly made reference to the Power Purchase 
Agreement as primarily what governs their relationship. A senior official at Sunon Asogli 
commenting on his organisation's relationship with ECG remarked that ‘we just do as the 
contract says, that’s all’.  
An official at CENIT Energy also made reference to the contract with regards to the 
responsibility of each party and how they would not take liability for anyone’s inefficiency.   
In the agreement we are the supplier and ECG is the buyer. What we do is we 
generate the electricity and based on the agreement we expect to get paid. And if 
we are available to generate and for any reason which is not our fault we are not 
able to supply to the grid we won't take liability for anybody's inefficiency. 
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Reiterating the above responses is a statement by an administrative officer at ECG in regards 
to contractual relationships with IPPs. He said: 
Because CENIT and Sunon Asogli are IPPs, we have a power purchase 
agreement with them and all parties adhere to this power purchase agreement. 
There are commercial and technical terms and there are financial terms which we 
all adhere to. 
The relationship between the partners thus is more of the formalised relationship as described 
by Weihe (2008). Generally, there is adherence to the PPA and partners operate according to 
the terms and dictates of the contract. However, this is because the PPA exists as a regulation 
for the conduct of the partnering organisations. Each party expects partners to do as specified 
by the PPA to meet individual interests as well as overall partnership objective. This is also 
because the PPA is an exchange contract and there are risks associated with such transactions. 
Partners thus adherence to it is to ensure commitment to obligations, since it spells out 
sanctions and compensations. As explained in the theoretical section, partnership agreements 
are by nature formal and Rousseau et al. (1998) would argue here that such formalised 
detailed agreement come in the way of effective collaboration as relationships are formally 
structured and easily monitored hence making partners not develop trust. In contrast to this, 
they also believe that partners would cooperate and meet their part of the agreement because 
of the fear of being sanctioned (ibid). Responses from the study indeed reveal that, even 
though relationship among partners is formal, it is to ensure that each commits to its 
obligation, but this also has an effect on trust building which would be discussed in a 
subsequent section. As each party endeavours to meet its obligation as dictated by the PPA, to 
what extent in effect are they willing to compromise to meet each other's interest? Does the 
strict dictate of their commercial and financial agreement restrict them in assisting each other 
when the need arises? 
 Empathy and Reciprocity  5.2.5
From the beginning of this discussion, partners made clear the specific interest each had for 
engaging in the partnership while still recognising the overall objective of the partnership. 
While ECG would like to be more socially responsive to the needs of customers, CENIT 
Energy and Sunon Asogli would like to stay profitable to meet shareholders expectations. 
Based on the questions posed above, the study established that even though partners have a 
formal relationship, there have been instances where they (especially IPPs) have gone beyond 
their organisation’s specific interest to reach the overall objective of meeting the electricity 
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demand of the country. Thus, there is a general feeling of concern by actors at Sunon Asogli 
and CENIT Energy to make lights available to Ghanaians despite not being specified in their 
contracts with ECG. An official at CENIT Energy had this to say on his organisation's 
commitment to making electricity available to Ghanaians: 
Yes, our relationship is guided by an agreement but sometimes, for goodwill we 
provide services just to make sure the lights are on. Yes, our responsibilities are 
much more different from that of ECG. ECG is socially oriented, we are 
commercially oriented and because ECG is government owned, it is not a profit 
oriented company. They are just supposed to make sure that there is light for the 
whole of Ghana. But we as an IPP are profit oriented so our responsibility goes 
as far as our profit would allow us. However we go the extra mile to make sure 
services are provided even when they are not contractual. Also, they [ECG] 
organise workshops where they bring people even though it is a relationship of 
buying and selling. So it is like you [ECG] say I want to buy power from you 
[IPP], what else can I [ECG] do to help you [IPP] give me that power and get 
good value for money. 
His point of argument here is that, even though their partnering relationship is that of buying 
and selling, ECG still holds information and capacity building workshops to train employees 
of CENIT. This move is to enhance the ability of CENIT to meet production obligation which 
in turn influences their efficiency and profitability and ultimately feeds into the interest of 
ECG meeting customers’ electricity demand. Similar to this instance, a top official at ECG 
acknowledged that ECG arranged a discussion platform with the management of Sunon 
Asogli to educate them on the Ghanaian culture with regards to staff service condition. Sunon 
Asogli, even though a Chinese company has a considerable number of Ghanaian personnel, 
hence, understanding what motivates this group of workers was important to the company's 
operation. The official remarked that:  
What we do with IPPs, for example with Asogli, when they started operations, 
they had challenges understanding our culture and all. So we engaged their 
management on how to deal with conditions of service for the Ghanaian worker 
and it was very helpful. 
A motivated staff would naturally work towards achievement of organisational goals which 
consequently impacts on the attainment of partnership goals. ECG being a Ghanaian company 
and experienced in the Ghanaian conditions of service therefore supported Sunon Asogli in 
this regard. Sunon Asogli learning from ECG what motivates the Ghanaian worker even 
though facilitates achieving the organisational goal of Sunon Asogli in the long run supports 
ECG itself as it depends on Sunon Asogli's efficiency to meet its (ECG) customers' electricity 
demand. A senior official at Sunon Asogli also made reference to the period of the World Cup 
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(in 2014) where they were implored by the Minister to make lights available to Ghanaians 
irrespective of the state of their plants and grievances they might have. He remarked that: 
Before world cup I took part in a meeting, he [the minister] said everybody knows 
we like football so please, please operate well. For any power plant, it can 
encounter some accidents when operating and that is why we have our special 
coordinating departments just for complimenting effort for that time, that special 
period. You know football is the most popular game here and the world cup 
happens once in four years once. 
Thus, because of the importance of football and the significance of the World Cup to 
Ghanaians, particularly because Ghana was taking part in the games, Sunon Asogli made it 
their responsibility to ensure consistent supply of electricity. This they did by putting in extra 
effort by making sure all their plants were running and had more technicians who worked 
around the clock to forestall any major failure of their generation plants. This initiative by 
Sunon Asogli would thus create extra cost on the operations of the plant for that period which 
may not have been captured by the PPA. But for the importance of the world cup to 
Ghanaians, they provided special services to make lights available to watch the games.  
Findings from the study suggest, such demonstration of solidarity among partners enhances 
teamwork (cooperation) to meet overall partnership objective. From the responses, it is 
revealed that there is the general expression of concern by partners to assist each other in 
meeting individual organisational objectives (interests). These are success indicators that 
demonstrate that partners are making progress. Vangen and Huxham  (2010:181) would in 
this regard argue that, such ‘emergent milestones’ are not planned events but achieved in the 
course of collaboration and are indications that the partnership is actually achieving some 
strides. Therefore, even though the actual target of meeting 5000MW set by government has 
not been met, such joint activities should be encouraged towards attainment of the major goal. 
Such joint activities are “often good trigger-points for helping the collaboration to move on to 
greater things” (Vangen and Huxham, 2010:181). 
5.3 MAJOR FINDINGS  
 By virtue of the declaration by the Energy Policy of attracting private investors to 
attain a robust power generation infrastructure, actors in the power sector including 
those of partnering organisations align with this goal as their main objective. IPPs 
being private entities even though recognise this goal still have an interest in meeting 
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shareholders’ needs. ECG's specific interests go as far as meeting the electricity needs 
of Ghanaians thus proclaiming its social responsiveness. 
 Even though the partnership is primarily between IPPs and ECG, the communication 
pattern towards meeting partnership goals transcends them to include other sector 
actors and as a result, there is an existence of multiple level and very frequent 
communication pattern when emerging issues need to be addressed. This makes 
deviations detected and addressed as well as the coordination of activities to address 
emerging eventualities. Meetings with ministerial executives as well as government 
representatives and being integrated in decision making at the regulatory level has a 
positive influence on IPPs commitment and motivation towards meeting the 
sector/partnership goals and reinforces their optimism.  
 IPPs and ECG display a relationship that is very formal and based on contracts, and as 
explained, this is to ensure adherence to obligations. But as revealed, collaborative 
practices emanate from their effort to organise joint workshops and management 
programmes essentially for capacity building to assist each other in the attainment of 
individual organisational interests. Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy’s demonstration 
of solidarity in terms of going the extra mile to provide services to ECG even though 
was not contractual indicates the perception of teamwork to attain partnership goal. 
This as explained is a worthy success indicator that the partnership is making progress 
in achieving long term goals. 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY ON FORMULATION AND WORKING TOWARDS MUTUAL 
GOALS 
 
 
Goal of  
Expanding 
Electricity 
Generation 
Infrastructure 
 
Managerial practices 
in achieving goal 
As practised in the partnership  Influence on collaboration and 
partnership goal 
Communication: 
 
Levels and frequency 
of communication  
 
 
 Multilevel pattern level of 
communication and regular 
sector meetings 
 Integration of IPPs in special 
committees of regulatory 
agencies 
 Coordination and planning 
of sector activities to 
ensure adequate generation 
capacity at all times 
 Enhanced motivation and 
commitment to provide 
services  
Relational Quality: 
 
Rigid or Flexible 
working relationship  
 
Empathy and  
reciprocity  
 Formal relationship based 
on contract  
 Move beyond organisational 
interest to provide services 
 Joint workshops and training 
programs 
 Ensures adherence to 
contractual obligations 
 Existence of goodwill to 
achieve partnership goals   
 Perception of being a team 
and enhances cooperation 
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Source: Researcher’s Development (2015) 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed the managerial practices adopted by ECG and IPPs as well as the 
government as a whole in working towards their goal of improving electricity delivery. 
Discussion in the chapter supports the hypothesis, frequent communication and flexible 
relationship between partners may clarify individual differences and may enhance the 
achievement of mutual goals. It has revealed the multi-level pattern of communication in 
getting concerns of partners across, as well as the integration of IPPs in decision making at the 
national level which in all enables proper coordination and planning of sector activities. Thus, 
even though the goal of the partnership is the main objective of government, both private and 
public partners identify and work towards it with a mutual feeling of commitment and 
motivation. Partners at ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy also demonstrated a mutual 
feeling of concern for achieving individual organisational interests and have the perception of 
being a team to solving the challenges of electricity delivery in the country. The next chapter 
discusses the presence of trust and the power relations between partners with regards to 
resource contribution and its influence on partnership success. 
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CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses how the level of trust between partners and the power relation resulting 
from strategic resource contribution affect their working relationship and its resultant effect 
meeting partnership goal.  
6.1 EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSHIP TRUST AND PROSPECTS OF RESOURCE 
EXPANSION TO ATTAIN PARTNERSHIP GOAL 
The study sought to examine the level of trust between actors from the IPPs and ECG and 
how it influences their work. Officials from these organisations were asked the degree to 
which they had confidence in their partners’ commitment to perform as required by their PPA. 
Lasker et al. (2001:192) have indicated that, “to work closely together, the people and 
organisations involved in a partnership need to be confident that other partners will follow 
through on their responsibilities and obligations and will not take advantage of them”. 
Generally, it is when a partner has confidence in others that he also avails himself to other 
parties for a mutual venture irrespective of the risks involved. The presence of trust in the 
partnership is thus very crucial due to the high economic stakes faced especially by IPPs 
(since they solely finance their operations without sovereign guarantee from government) and 
which would determine if they would expand their generation capacities to meet the stated 
goal. Huxham and Vangen (2004) have in this regards opined that, even though trust is a 
necessary condition for successful collaborations, the situation that often exists between 
partners is that of mistrust. There is therefore the need to manage trust in collaborations. Two 
conditions that are essential in initiating and maintaining trust in a collaboration are; a) 
formation of expectation about the future of the collaboration and b) risk involved in the 
partnership, by which partners can commence operations with very modest goals and move on 
to more ambitious goals as trust is built (Huxham & Vangen, 2004). The hypothesis 
established in this regard thus is, consistent meeting of expectations reinforces trusting 
attitudes and enables partners to move from low risk ventures to more ambitious ones 
 Formation of Expectations  6.1.1
As explained in the previous section on formulation of goals, IPPs and ECG enter into the 
Power Purchase Agreement with interests and expectations they anticipate to be met. These 
expectations therefore are based on what the contract states on the responsibility of each 
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partner. Since each partner’s responsibility is unique and affects the functioning of others, 
partners expressed that they expect each of them to abide by what the contract states to allow 
for successful collaboration. Due to the confidentiality clauses of the PPA, respondents were 
hesitant to go into details of their contractual obligations other than asserting that they had 
expectations they anticipate to be met. A senior official at Sunon Asogli substantiated this by 
stating that: 
This is our commercial security. We have the contract and we just do as it says. 
There is confidentiality and so I can’t say anything about the duty of others. 
However generally, actors from ECG have the expectation that partners from IPPs would 
generate the pledged megawatts of electricity for which they agreed whereas IPPs also expect 
to be accordingly remunerated for their efforts. Commenting on his expectation of his partners 
at ECG, an official at CENIT Energy had this to say: 
You know like every contract, that everybody keeps to his commitment and 
obligation, enforce the contract as much as possible and then abide by the 
contract so it is simple. 
A top official at ECG also had the expectation that ‘they [IPPs] will perform their role as 
mandated’. 
Now, based on their contract, each partner expects the other to commit to its side of the 
agreement and according to Huxham and Vangen (2004), the consistent meeting of these 
expectation is a building block to a trusting relationship, where partners move from relatively 
modest aims to more ambitious ones. The government has an ambitious goal to increase 
generation capacity of the country to about 5000 megawatts in the short term (by 2015) with 
the help of IPPs. However, the modest goal that partners are working towards currently is to 
provide reliable electricity for daily consumption from which there could be an expansion to 
meet the set target. With IPPs’ considerable percentage of the megawatts being supplied, 
ECG’s consistency in meeting payment obligation and government’s fulfilment of ensuring 
guaranteed supply of gas may motivate IPPs already in operations to expand their generation 
facilities to meet this goal. On the other hand IPPs’ consistent meeting of ECG’s electricity 
demand may also motivate ECG to sign on more power from them as electricity demand 
grows. The next section explains the extent to which meetings of expectations affect partners’ 
collaborative effort in achieving the goal of expanding electricity generation infrastructure.    
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 Meeting of Expectations and Effects on Trust   6.1.2
Findings from the study showed that even though partners have expectations to be met, there 
are challenges they encounter with each other in fulfilling such expectations. For IPPs, their 
biggest challenge is non-payment by ECG, and that they depend on the regulatory agencies to 
hold ECG accountable. Comments by an official at CENIT Energy concerning ECG meetings 
its obligation shows that he derives his confidence in the partnership through the work of 
regulatory agencies and not from his counterparts at ECG. He remarked that: 
When you deal with public companies especially in this part of the world, they are 
notorious for defaulting in agreement so yes I think there are a few challenges 
with ECG as regards the execution of the contract but we are making them do it 
somehow because we have a regulator that steps in whether the Energy 
Commission or the PURC to make sure that everybody abides by the contract as 
long as they will not affect the efficiency of the plant or the consumer. So yes we 
have a contract, we have parties to the contract, the regulator that oversees it so 
yes public utilities can be notorious but there are ways of mitigating defaults. 
Efforts to the get the respondent from Sunon Asogli to comment on ECG’s payment 
obligation proved futile. He would not disclose his confidence in partners’ at ECG because as 
he claimed, he did not have the right to speak on behalf of Sunon Asogli on such issues. He 
remarked that:   
Whether satisfied or not I cannot tell you that. Even if I told you I am not satisfied 
it is not on behalf of Sunon Asogli. Who am I? Who gave me the right to say 
Sunon Asogli is not satisfied? 
The study thus made efforts to gather such information from other respondents based on their 
research and knowledge of the partnership. An energy expert from the Africa Centre for 
Energy Policy (ACEP) for instance had this to say on the payment defaults by ECG: 
The last information I had was that Sunon Asogli has not been paid by ECG for 
several months and they are just there operating because they have their plants in 
here already and they cannot shut down completely as well, so they are operating 
and they are not getting their money.  That is the problem, ECG sells power and 
they are unable to raise revenue to pay. So ECG has to put things together to be 
able to prove to the IPPs that they are a credible off taker so that such confidence 
will exist for people to come into the system. 
On the contrary, partners from ECG have their expectations met and are generally satisfied 
with their IPP partners as they mostly meet their responsibility of generating the required 
megawatts of electricity except in situations of fuel unavailability. A senior official at ECG 
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also had this to say about his satisfaction level of his partners at CENIT Energy and Sunon 
Asogli: 
Yes I am satisfied, the IPPs are performing. The only thing is that demand [for 
electricity] is still growing.  
Backing the above assertion an administrative officer at ECG also had this to say about the 
performance of their IPP partners: 
Sunon Asogli has proven itself, CENIT is doing well although they are expensive, 
they are doing what they are supposed to do in my personal opinion. They are not 
giving us energy in our requirement because if there is no fuel they are not able to 
meet the contracted energy but when there is fuel they do well. 
These responses show that partners from IPPs keep to their side of the agreement and partners 
from ECG are so far satisfied with their performance. The only challenge here is the fuel 
unavailability that disrupts generation by IPPs. However, confidence in partners at ECG’s by 
IPPs is rather low because of the poor financial credibility of ECG. Even though the official 
from CENIT Energy had mentioned the role of regulatory agencies in holding ECG 
accountable, there is a limit to what regulatory actors can also do as ECG remains a monopoly 
in electricity distribution, thus, sanctioning them becomes a challenge. Here is what a 
technical officer at the Energy Commission had to say about holding ECG accountable to its 
payment obligations: 
ECG has its own challenges where IPPs are complaining that they are not been 
paid properly what they have given them. And if you don't pay them they cannot 
buy fuel and meet their overheads and all that. Like I said you cannot sanction 
one and ECG is the only one, in the south here. Now when ECG doesn't perform 
and you sanction them what can you do? You cannot suspend their license so you 
can only penalise. And when they pay penalty it is not coming from their own 
pocket you know so it even goes to make them worse. 
The study having established these varied confidence levels by partners then sought to 
determine the risks they bear in the venture and if they would expand resources to meet 
partnership goal. In line with this, Rousseau et al. (1998:399) have reasoned that, consistent 
meeting of expectations between partners reinforces trusting attitude in their relationship 
where there would be the willingness to expand resources as there is a sense of risk reduction. 
Huxham and Vangen (2004) have also asserted that partners can only achieve collaborative 
advantage (in this case, partnership goal of meeting 5000MW of generation capacity) if 
partners expand their resources and move from low risk ventures to higher ones.  
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 Risks Taking by Partners 6.1.3
As mentioned in previous sections, risk sharing is one of the peculiar characteristics of PPP 
that is non-existent in the other forms of private participation. In PPPs, partners apportion 
risks to the party best able to manage it. Responses from the partners established that indeed 
each organisation in the partnership faces a number of risks. From the interviews, the general 
risks that are associated with the partnership in the power sector are; financial risks (non-
payment), fuel risks (shortage or high price), unavailability of transmission network, and force 
majeure (natural causes). Some of these risks the partners bear together such as force majeure 
and the others are borne by who best can manage them. For IPPs, the primary risks they face 
are fuel and financial risks. An official at CENIT Energy had this to say about his 
organisation’s risks: 
Yes, there are risks. The risks we have identified are non-payment from the off 
taker [ECG], and a few other risks but I think for us the major risk is non-
payment by ECG. 
As commercial entities, non-payment for services rendered would have a negative 
consequence on operational capacities of IPPs as they need money to purchase fuel, to meet 
staff settlements, to service their loans and overall to meet shareholders expectations. For 
ECG, one major risk it bears lies with IPPs unavailability to generate electricity because 
ultimately ECG depends on them to provide electricity to consumers. Once IPPs are unable to 
generate, there would be a shortage in total available megawatts which may result in 
disruptions in power supply to consumers. It is therefore the responsibility of IPPs to ensure 
regular maintenance and efficiency of their facilities to generate the required electricity as 
contracted by ECG to reduce the risk of inability to provide consumers’ electricity demand. 
Again, if by no fault of theirs (such as unavailability of gas) IPPs are not able to generate 
electricity, ECG still has to pay for capacity (equipment) that IPPs have invested in. 
Therefore, despite fuel unavailability being a risk for IPPs, it is also a risk for ECG because it 
still pays IPPs for capacity even if they do not generate electricity. In this instance, the risk of 
fuel unavailability is shared by both parties in the sense that IPPs become redundant for that 
period and only paid for their equipment and ECG on the other hand also pays for capacity 
even though it would not receive electricity from IPPs. It is in government’s interest thus to 
make gas available at all times as its agency (ECG) would ultimately be affected. Citing an 
instance of a period of fuel unavailability, an administrative officer at ECG observed that: 
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You heard of Sunon Asogli shutting down right? Why did they shut down? 
Because there was no gas. Why was there no gas? Because there were pirates on 
the sea who ruptured the West African Gas Pipeline so Sunon Asogli had to shut 
down for a while and that is a risk. 
Another risk for ECG is for the grid or transmission lines not to be available. Since electricity 
is consumed once it is produced, IPPs expect to be paid once they produce even if it does not 
get to ECG’s network. When IPPs generate and GRIDCo is unable to transmit, the risk lies 
with ECG essentially because of a ‘take or pay’ clause in the PPA. With the ‘take or pay’ 
clause, IPPs expect to be paid when they generate electricity regardless of the transmission 
operator’s ability to evacuate the power to ECG. Thus, the absence of the transmission line 
means ECG would incur costs that they would not get revenue for.  
Findings from the study revealed that, in line with the risks of non-payment by ECG, potential 
IPPs often seek government (sovereign) guarantees, therefore it cannot be said that Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy were oblivious of ECG’s financial difficulty before signing the 
PPA. But as revealed by a senior official at the Power Department of the Ministry of Energy, 
Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy were given enough assurances of fuel supply and not 
financial guarantee and by implication this exposes them to financial risks in the event of non-
payment by ECG. The official remarked that: 
I don't think Sunon Asogli has sovereign guarantee and CENIT, certainly no. 
Sunon Asogli needed a number of guarantees and I think it was given enough 
guarantees by government in the allocation of the gas that comes from Nigeria. 
This gas was negotiated and actually contracted to VRA which is the foundation 
customer on behalf of the government of Ghana so it was supposed to be 
consigned to VRA. But as part of Sunon Asogli coming in at a time where there 
was an acute power shortage and government needed IPPs, they were promised 
gas. Yes they need to buy the fuel but they needed to be guaranteed that they 
would have fuel for their operation which was in return going to ensure that they 
would operate. So yes government gave them that guarantee that the gas that is 
coming from Nigeria is actually going to be given to them. So they are more than 
adequately assured or guaranteed. And you know CENIT is SSNIT [Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust]. SSNIT used its money to invest and you 
know the money is Ghana's money. CENIT has also been given a lot of guarantees 
and help. First of all where they set up their plant, they also share and use the 
same crude that VRA buys. VRA buys crude for two of its generating stations and 
it shares it with CENIT. Yes, so whatever comes there is actually shared by VRA 
and CENIT. 
Thus, the guarantee CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli obtained from government was the 
surety of fuel supply and not financial guarantee. CENIT Energy in particular even though 
operates as a private company is regarded as quasi-IPP due to it being established by public 
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funds (Eberhard & Gratwick, 2013). Evident from the above response, CENIT is considered 
the property of Ghanaians hence no strict adherence to the provision of sovereign (financial) 
guarantee with its partnership with a government agency (ECG). The reluctance of 
government in most cases to sign these financial guarantees has been the hindrance to IPPs 
entering the power sector due to the uncertainty of payment by ECG. Subsequently, once 
partners acknowledged these risks, agreement to work together means that there is a degree of 
confidence that these risks would be mitigated. Here, confidence that partners have may be 
due to sanctions incorporated in their contracts or because they genuinely trust each other not 
to be exploitative, which in turn also illustrates the level of trust that partners have. The next 
section describes the risks management approach adopted by ECG and its partners at Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy and its influence on trust building and consequent effect on 
attaining the goal of the partnership.    
 Risks Management and Prospects of Resource Expansion 6.1.4
With Huxham and Vangen’s (2004) ‘small-wins’ approach, partners often commence with 
low risk ventures and advance to higher ones as expectations are met consistently. They have 
however gone on to clarify that in practice, partners often have to be ambitious and take 
higher risks to attain the collaborative advantage sought for, such as the need to respond to 
urgent social issues. Partners in this situation may not have the opportunity of gradual trust 
building instead, could consider a comprehensive approach where through negotiations, 
partners gain enough trust to collaborate and should not be bothered with guarding against 
opportunist behaviour (ibid, 147). Relating to this assertion thus, the risk management 
approach adopted by partners does not fit clearly into any of the above approaches. First 
because IPPs' investment is a high risk venture in itself thus, they cannot render themselves to 
gradual trust building without any surety. This leaves them the option of a comprehensive risk 
approach. However, the comprehensive risk approach also does not give room for sanctions as 
its aim is to build trust and as already explained, sanctions have been spelt out in the PPA 
which is overseen by a regulator. The risk management approach adopted by IPPs and ECG 
relates more with the deterrence-based trust as propounded by Rousseau et al. (1998) where 
IPPs and ECG face financial penalties (sanctions) for non-performance.  
Findings from the study show that, IPPs constantly meet their obligation of electricity 
generation and have proven to be trust-worthy as confirmed by the officials of ECG. This 
reduces ECG’s risk of not meeting consumers’ demand for electricity, thus barely do IPPs 
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have to be penalised for non-performance. The major risk that ECG faces currently is with the 
transmission system operated by GRIDCo which is obsolete and sometimes unable to transmit 
power from the generators resulting in financial loss to ECG. Explaining how they deal with 
this risk, a top official from ECG commented that:  
We have another agreement with GRIDCo so we offload those risks that are 
possible to offload to them. But those that are not possible, for now we are 
carrying it and this means that we should also revamp our network and make sure 
that it is always available to supply power customers, both ECG and GRIDCO’s 
network and that is why the collaboration must be there on all parties. 
As evidenced from the above response, risks of ECG rather has to do with its own obsolete 
distribution system as well as that of GRIDCo’s, which need revamping to efficiently supply 
electricity. Since partners at IPPs remain very sceptical of their counterparts at ECG with 
regards to payment obligations, they would tread cautiously with any additional investment 
they may make to their existing facilities because of the uncertainty of payment, and more 
especially because regulatory bodies are handicapped in holding ECG accountable. Penalising 
ECG financially barely occurs as remarked by the respondent from Energy Commission since 
it becomes an additional cost to the state and disconnecting their network means 
unavailability of electricity to the majority of Ghanaians since ECG is a monopoly. For now, 
IPPs continue to generate as specified by their contracts as failure on their part to do so would 
also attract penalties, as observed by an official at CENIT Energy: 
Like every other contract, ECG would penalise us if we don’t meet their target of 
generation so the best is we look forward to the contract to help us fulfil 
obligations. 
Thus, sanctions in this situation is promoting cooperation even though trust is low as 
described by Rousseau et al (1998). Another factor that keeps IPPs in operation is the 
involvement of the sector ministry as examined in an above section where they often resort to 
government officials to resolve issues with ECG. Therefore, even though trust they have for 
ECG is relatively low, assurances from government through its officials serve as a motivating 
factor for IPPs to continue power generation as required. In their present contract therefore, 
IPPs are generating to meet the demands of Ghanaians when natural gas and Light Crude Oil 
are available, however as asserted by a respondent from CENIT Energy, future investment is 
what they are not sure about if there is no improvement in ECG’s payment credibility. He 
remarked that: 
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Ultimately we would want to expand our capacity not because of the off-taker. It 
has nothing to do with ECG. We want to expand mainly because our plant for 
example is currently a single cycle plant and we would want to expand to a 
combine cycle so that we can do more with the fuel that we have. That is what 
practically it means. We can generate additional energy with the same quantity of 
fuel that gives us additional revenues. So yes we would expand but it has nothing 
to do with ECG. But if you say expanding on a single cycle level, no not until we 
are sure of an off-taker that guarantees us payment. But for efficiency of this 
present power plant we would expand to a combine-cycle. 
Now, because IPPs have proven themselves and shielded ECG from generation risk, partners 
from ECG have relatively higher trust than their IPP counterparts, and the study would argue 
here that trust in the partnership is a one-sided phenomenon. What in effect does this have on 
attaining the goal of the partnership? In answering this question, findings from the study 
support the hypothesis, consistent meeting of expectations reinforces trusting attitudes and 
enables partners to move from low risk ventures to more ambitious ones. The consequence of 
non-meeting of expectation by ECG therefore is that, IPPs are reluctant to expand their 
facilities to meet growing demand because of the uncertainty of costs they may incur in 
continuously pressing upon regulatory bodies to hold ECG accountable. As already indicated 
from the beginning of this research, the demand for electricity is growing at 10% every year 
and there is the need for more private investment in the sector to meet this growing demand. 
However, partners from the IPPs have not demonstrated enough confidence in ECG to 
warrant future expansion unless partners at ECG show more commitment to their contracts. 
Thus, there is a limit to what IPPs would do if there should be the need to increase production 
to meet this growing electricity demand. Vangen and Huxham’s (2010) conceptualisation of 
trust illustrates that partners build trust over time as they continue to work together, starting 
with modest aims (expectations) with low levels of risk and as trust builds,  partners can move 
on to aim for riskier ventures together to achieve the collaborative advantage they seek. This, 
partners would only do because the level of uncertainty with regards to risks is generally low.  
However, contrary to the opinion of non-expansion as asserted by the respondent from 
CENIT Energy, information gathered from documents (Power Generation Concept Paper, 
2012) suggests that Sunon Asogli plans to expand its generation facilities but has not 
commenced because of uncertainty of gas. It states that “lack of confidence in availability of 
gas will delay implementation of some generation projects. Sunon Asogli is delaying an 
expansion project until it is certain of allocation of gas”, a promise which was made by the 
Government of Ghana before Sunon Asogli commenced operations (Ghana Millennium 
Challenge Account Program-Compact II, 2012:4). Thus, apart from the non-payment by ECG, 
 96 
 
another challenge to IPPs wishing to expand generation capacity is the uncertainty of 
resources (natural gas). The study would however argue here that, the difference in the 
expansion plans of CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli is due to the difference in the degree of 
transaction cost that each bears. For CENIT Energy, it operates with Light Crude Oil which is 
expensive than the natural gas used by Sunon Asogli, therefore, non-payment by ECG has a 
higher toll on CENIT Energy than on Sunon Asogli. CENIT Energy would hence only expand 
when ECG shows more financial commitment as their cost of production is much higher. 
What this means for the collaborative effort of government and IPPs is that, in the short term, 
Ghanaians would enjoy reliable power so far as there is gas to fuel generation stations. But as 
demand grows, ECG would have to boost its credibility to gain the trust of IPPs, and 
government would also have to ensure fuel security to enable IPPs invest more resources into 
expanding to meet growing electricity demand.      
6.2 MAJOR FINDINGS ON TRUST 
 Partners from ECG, CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli have expectations they anticipate to 
be met as indicated by their Power Purchase Agreement. While actors from ECG expect 
IPP partners to generate the pledged megawatts of electricity,  IPPs on the other hand 
expect to be remunerated as agreed. The study however found that, while partners at ECG 
are generally satisfied with the performance of their partners at Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy, these IPPs have not had their expectations of being adequately remunerated met, 
which has resulted in the varied level of trust in the partnership. Because IPPs have 
continually performed to meet the dictates of the PPA, partners at ECG have a higher 
level of confidence in their partner IPPs to perform as expected. IPPs do not however have 
the same level of confidence as demonstrated by their partners at ECG, thus, they mostly 
resort to the regulatory agencies to hold ECG accountable. 
  As characteristic of Public Private Partnerships, ECG and its partner IPPs bear some risks 
in their venture. However, because IPPs solely finance their operations without financial 
guarantees, their major risk is non-payment by ECG and the study has revealed that ECG 
fails in mitigating this risk faced by Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy. Thus, these IPPs 
are constantly exposed to commercial risks such as inability to meet production costs. 
Since Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy have shielded ECG from electricity generation 
risk (unavailability of electricity) by constantly meeting production obligation, ECG has 
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the obligation to demonstrate more financial credibility to warrant expansion of generation 
facilities by these IPPs to meet growing demand for electricity.       
 The study also revealed that, because IPPs do not have financial guarantee from 
government in the event of non-payment by ECG, partners from Sunon Asogli and 
CENIT Energy often rely on the regulatory agencies (PURC and Energy Commission) to 
hold partners at ECG accountable. The regulatory agencies in this regard are also limited 
in performing their sanctioning role because of the monopoly that ECG enjoys in 
electricity distribution. Therefore, sanctions that ought to serve as risk mitigation 
measures in the partnership are not being effectively implemented hence increasing the 
transaction costs especially for IPPs. The study in this vein established that because the 
two conditions necessary for trust building (meeting of expectation and effective risks 
management) are generally absent, partners from the IPPs are wary of further resource 
expansion to meet target goal, unless ECG proves financial credibility. Again, because 
fuel unavailability is one major challenge facing operational IPPs, government would also 
have to ensure security of fuel to shield IPPs from fuel unavailability risks. 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY ON PARTNERSHIP TRUST 
 
 
Trust Building Factors 
                                        Partners   
 
Trust level of partners 
 
               IPPs                                            ECG 
Formation and meeting of 
expectation 
Expectation of ECG to make 
prompt payment.  
Expectation is not met as 
ECG mostly defaults  
Expectation of IPPs to 
generate required power to 
meet consumers demand. 
Expectation is met as IPPs 
meet production obligation   
Partners from ECG are 
satisfied and would want 
IPPs to invest more to meet 
increasing electricity 
demand.  
Partners from IPPs are 
sceptical of future 
investment and generate just 
to meet current demand with 
hope that ECG proves 
financial credibility to 
warrant expansion of 
generation capacity. 
 
Risk taking and 
management approaches  
IPP partners face risks 
(production overheads and 
shareholders dividend) 
because of non-payment by 
ECG is shielded from risks 
of generation as partners 
from IPPs meet generation 
obligation to enable ECG 
IPPs rely on regulatory 
bodies to sanction ECG but 
sanctions are not 
implemented as expected 
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ECG.  meet electricity demand  because of ECG’s monopoly 
in the electricity industry  
Effect on collaboration and 
attainment of partnership 
goal 
The two conditions necessary for trust building (meeting of expectation and effective risk 
management) is absent, thus the partnership is devoid of trusting attitudes especially on the 
side of IPPs since they are exposed to greater risks. Therefore there is low confidence that 
expectations would be met and that risks would be mitigated hence IPPs generate as the 
contract dictates while relying on sanctions and assurances from government. To warrant 
expansion of generation capacity to meet the target goal of government however, ECG 
would have to prove financial credibility and government would also have to ensure fuel 
security to shield IPPs from financial and operational risks.  
Source: Researcher’s Development (2015) 
6.3 MUTUAL RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION AND PARTNERSHIP 
CONTINUITY TO ATTAIN PARTNERSHIP GOAL 
“Organisations often collaborate if they are unable to achieve their objectives with their own 
resources. Sometimes this simply means pooling financial or human resources, but more often 
it implies the bringing together of different resources including technology or expertise…in 
simple terms, one company provides the product while the other provides the access to the 
market” (Huxham and Vangen, 2004:4). In the partnership, ECG and IPPs have unique 
resources that they contribute towards achieving improved electricity delivery. While IPPs 
provide finances to build and operate power generation stations, ECG has the electricity 
market as well as distribution lines which would be unavailable to each of them unless they 
collaborate. It is the combination of these resources that make partnerships achieve what 
ordinarily they could not achieve individually. Furthermore, because ECG is a public entity 
and backed by the government, the government through its sector agencies provides certain 
incentives to IPPs by way of motivation to facilitate their operations as their operation is 
capital intensive. As stated in an earlier section, another independent government entity 
(GRIDCo) transmits power from IPPs to ECG and its creation was part of the reform to attract 
private investors into the power sector. There is thus dependence by IPPs and government 
(and its agencies) as they contribute complementary resources to realise the goal of the sector. 
But as to whether the dependence is mutual or asymmetric and with its consequent effect on 
partnership performance would be examined in the subsequent sections. The theory of 
resource dependence holds that, for organisations to reduce uncertainties due to resource 
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inaccessibility, they join force with organisations that poses these resources and as a partner 
contributes more than the other, the partnership becomes less stable (Hillman et al., 2009).  
6.4 UNIQUE RESOURCE AVAILABLE TO EACH PARTNER 
 IPPs Resource Contribution 6.4.1
As has been mentioned in previous sections of this research, one fundamental reason for the 
introduction of IPPs in Ghana is due to government’s inability to invest in the power sector 
single-handed. Part of the energy reform that Ghana embarked on sought to diversify the 
mode of electricity generation from solely hydro (water) to include thermal generation (crude 
oil and natural gas). The investment in thermal generation is however a huge investment that 
if government invested alone could stall the development of other sectors of the economy. 
IPPs have thus been introduced in the power sector to build more thermal generation stations 
with their own resources to forestall electricity supply deficit in the country. An official at 
CENIT Energy had this to say about his organisation’s investment in the partnership: 
IPPs were encouraged to come in because government could not continue to 
finance power projects, they couldn’t do that. For our operations we need fuel, 
and because our operation is a high skilled one we need to source for the best 
hands [staff] which is also very expensive. In our operations also, there is a lot of 
cash flow because a lot of equipment to be bought, staff trainings and motivation 
because you cannot go to the street and pick just anybody for this kind of job. So it 
is huge investment for us and our shareholders expect returns at certain times. 
A technical officer at the Energy Commission also commenting on the investment by IPPs in 
Ghana remarked that: 
Like I said, government could no more continue to invest or government has 
decided not to invest in the power sector because it can let someone come and 
operate efficiently. Because a private business person would operate efficiently 
and ensure that he gets his return back. So the IPPs are here to provide the 
private investment so much needed to ensure that the capacity is added to the 
generation that government cannot provide, so they are here to ensure that. 
From the above responses, the point is made that it is mainly financial resource that IPPs 
make available to the partnership. IPPs through their financiers (investors) make funds 
available for the establishment of power generation stations and expect returns at the end of 
every business period. IPPs are also solely responsible for setting up and maintaining their 
generation stations, as well as purchasing fuel for power generation. Government and its 
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agencies including ECG do not make financial contribution to the building and operations of 
the generation stations.  
 ECG’s Contribution 6.4.2
If IPPs solely provide finances, what then does ECG contribute towards the overall goal of the 
partnership? ECG is currently the only viable off-taker in Ghana for IPPs. The Volta River 
Authority (Ghana’s largest generator of electricity) could however also be a possible off-taker 
but has reportedly refused to do so as it considers IPPs as competitors (World Bank, 2013). 
IPPs therefore have the option to choose between ECG and other potential buyers of 
electricity in the country (large scale industries and institutions with very high electricity 
consumption such as mining companies). Now, if IPPs want to make reasonable returns on 
their investments, the justification would be to evacuate their power to ECG since the other 
customers have been considered financially unfit for such a venture. ECG has the largest 
electricity consumers (over 70%) in the country and operates the largest distribution network. 
IPPs’ contract with ECG inherently means a ready market for IPPs’ power especially in the 
current state of generation deficit in the country. In their line of work, ECG purchases the 
power generated by IPPs and remunerates them according to consented arrangement in the 
Power Purchase Agreement. What ECG thus contributes to the partnership is its distribution 
network and its largest electricity market without which IPPs operations in Ghana would be 
challenging. Commenting on their partnership with ECG, an official at CENIT Energy had 
this to say:  
It is the only off taker we have, the viable off taker in Ghana. There are 
opportunities to go elsewhere but there are a lot of complexities around any other 
off taker especially in our side of Ghana and that is why we have a contract with 
ECG. 
Even though ECG has been criticised constantly for its inefficiencies, it remains the only 
viable electricity distribution company in Ghana as it owns the largest electricity market. This 
makes it economically unwise for new entrants into electricity distribution as there would be 
duplication of distribution lines. Talking about the relevance of ECG to IPPs, an 
administrative officer commented that: 
We have the largest clients. All the lines running around, all the distribution lines 
are for ECG so if you [other distribution companies] want to come and do yours 
we are waiting for you. Our operations make electricity cheaper in the sense that 
we built our lines some 50 years ago and they have been amortized over the years, 
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so I am just doing maintenance, you [new distributor] are going to buy all your 
lines and it will make it so expensive. 
ECG has however undoubtedly recognised the contribution of IPPs in meeting the electricity 
demand of Ghana. In its 2013 tariff proposal ECG acknowledged that, “given the current 
power generation challenge prevailing in the country, there was the need for ECG to contract 
IPPs as a strategy to mitigate the impact of the generation shortage on ECG’s service 
delivery…the introduction of these IPPs into the generation mix would undoubtedly 
contribute to electricity supply in recent times” (ECG, 2013:38). In consequence, because 
VRA is no longer able to generate to meet ECG’s demand, ECG is in dire need of additional 
megawatts of electricity to ensure reliable electricity supply to consumers. Respondents from 
the interviews unanimously agreed on the usefulness of IPPs to the current power supply in 
Ghana. A senior official from GRIDCo for instance remarked that: 
The electricity situation would have been way worse. Sunon Asogli had a problem 
last week and they had to fly down people from China to try to fix it because every 
megawatt is so crucial for us. So you can imagine that sometimes during peak 
times we shed about 200 to 300 megawatts. Now CENIT together with Asogli are 
supplying 300 megawatts so without them we would have shed about 600 
megawatts. So they have added to the generation portfolio and it has helped the 
system. So we have been in negotiations with a number of IPPs because we 
believe that VRA alone cannot do it and we need these IPPs to augment the power 
supply in the country.   
To this end, IPPs investment in generation is considered very crucial for attaining 
government’s goal of expanding generation capacity. Nonetheless, IPPs also benefit from the 
partnership with ECG as there is a guaranteed electricity market and a fixed tariff system 
which reduces uncertainties of profitability. In addition, as would be discussed thoroughly in 
the subsequent sections, government through its sector ministry and the regulatory agencies 
provides operational support and incentives to IPPs to facilitate their operations.    
 Other Government Agencies  6.4.3
a) Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo) (Transmission Lines) 
Aside being the purchaser of power through its agency (ECG), the government plays various 
roles in ensuring a conducive business environment for IPPs. As explained in a previous 
section, the creation of GRIDCo was part of government’s reform policy to attract private 
investment. GRIDCo operates the National Interconnected Transmission System which 
wheels electricity from all generation stations (both private and government) to the 
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distribution network. In its line of work, it provides equal and fair access to all the electricity 
market participants to its transmission network. Prior to the creation of GRIDCo, VRA was in 
charge of both generation and transmission which was a disincentive to IPPs because of the 
fear of being discriminated in respect to access to the transmission grid. The creation of 
GRIDCo was thus an assurance from government to provide equal access to all generators 
regardless of being public or privately owned. Again, because IPPs are private entities, their 
electricity tariff is usually higher than that of VRA, hence, the creation of GRIDCo is to 
ensure that private and public generators are given equal opportunity to sell their services 
once they have signed a bilateral agreement (PPA) with the off taker (ECG) regardless of their 
electricity tariff. Commenting on his organisation’s obligation in granting equal access to 
generators of electricity, a senior official at GRIDCo had this to say: 
So what is happening is that the energy does not belong to GRIDCO we just 
facilitate the transport of the energy from the wholesale suppliers [IPPs] to the 
bulk customers [ECG] and we in that sense ensure that their agreement, that is 
the agreement between the suppliers and the bulk customers are managed. So 
what they do is that they even lodge their PPAs with us because we have to know 
how much they want from the wholesale suppliers so that we also make our 
equipment or facilities capable to wheel that power to them. And our mandate is 
to grant open access to wholesale suppliers. So once you want to come on line by 
our procedures we will request that you apply for connection. 
By virtue of an Act of Parliament for its creation, GRIDCo grants equal access to all 
participants in the power sector irrespective of being private or public. It is one of the 
organisations in the power sector that has been commended for its consistency in delivering 
on its mandate. The Energy Sector report by the World Bank revealed that GRIDCo is the 
only credit worthy public utility in the country which consequently impacts on its workings as 
a credible operator (World Bank, 2013: 21-22). 
b) The Ministry and Regulatory Agencies 
The Ministry of Energy, the Energy Commission and the PURC also perform a number of 
activities that impact on the functioning of the partnership. The government through the 
Ministry of Energy provides a number of incentives to IPPs to encourage them to invest. The 
incentives include; assistance in land acquisition for setting up power generation stations, five 
years tax holiday from start of production and assistance in fuel procurement. The Energy 
Commission provides licenses and other technical assistance to IPPs entering the sector. The 
PURC on the other hand also sets tariffs in consultation with the IPPs and ECG. Commenting 
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on government’s assistance to IPPs with regards to land acquisition a senior official from the 
Power Department at the Ministry of Energy observed that: 
With the acquisition of lands, you know because lands are vested in traditional 
authorities, they are mainly those who actually own and lease them out. Yes, 
government’s assistance with some of these land owners has been part of the 
negotiation with IPPs for them to acquire lands at better terms. That is without 
involving the government they [IPPs] would have gotten them at more higher or 
onerous terms than they are getting now. 
An interesting finding from the study is that, aside government’s assistance in fuel 
procurement for Sunon Asogli, part of the negotiations requires that gas is made available to 
Sunon Asogli even before the government’s main power generator (VRA). The senior official 
from the Power Department of the Ministry of Energy made this revelation while commenting 
on government’s guarantees for Sunon Asogli. He indicated that: 
When the gas comes, it is actually given to Sunon Asogli first, when there is any 
left then we look at government's own power plant, even when we are getting low 
volumes they get it before VRA. 
Efforts to get the respondent from Sunon Asogli to comment on this assertion proved futile as 
he would not disclose details of his organisation’s negotiations due its commercial security. 
However, stressing on the preferential treatment being given to IPPs, a technical officer at the 
Energy Commission also remarked that: 
In fact for now I can say that we are rather pampering the IPPs. Currently the gas 
is not sufficient for the VRA plants and we have given the option for Sunon Asogli 
to use, is that not pampering? CENIT Energy is also sharing fuel tank with VRA 
and sometimes they have to go down for VRA to generate, they are riding on 
VRA’s back. So it is like the environment is there to ensure that anytime there is 
an issue we rather want to ensure that the IPPs are comfortable and to a large 
extent we have made them comfortable.  
The study also sought an insight from respondents from IPPs on government’s assistance that 
supports their operations.  An official at CENIT Energy in this regard commented that: 
First of all there are oversight functions for government institutions, by which 
unofficially they can come in to help to make sure that IPPs are not squeezed out 
because of the debt that is being owed to them.  Sometimes they play a role in 
helping to facilitate a few items. There is a policy to encourage IPPs so there is a 
lot of tax breaks from the government, there are accessibility for IPPs to 
government officials because of the need for energy and the conscious effort by 
the government to encourage IPPs, so I will say there are a few government 
policies that are turning towards helping sustain Independent Power Producers. 
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Incentives are crucial for the operations of IPPs because it is one of the main supporting 
factors that IPPs fall on to reduce what would have been a very high cost of production. For 
instance, with the acquisition of land, government’s assistance enables IPPs to obtain land at a 
reduced price than originally would have if they bargained on their own. Again, because bulk 
of the gas being used by thermal plants is produced in Nigeria and consigned to VRA on 
behalf of the Government of Ghana, IPPs depend on government to make gas available to 
power generation plants.  
                                                                                        
 
 
                                                  
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
               
 
 
Source: Researcher’s Development (2015) 
6.5 EFFICIENCY IN RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION 
Responses from the interviews show that, resource contribution from IPPs and ECG as well as 
incentives from the government is very crucial to the attaining the goal of expanding 
electricity generation. Without finances from IPPs, ECG cannot meet demand for electricity 
and without ECG’s electricity market, IPPs would face a challenge in Ghana with regards to 
market uncertainties. Electricity market is equally important to IPPs because they are private 
entities with profit motive, hence are in search of such markets opportunities to sell their 
services. There is therefore high interdependence between partners for the achievement of 
individual objectives as well as the goal of the partnership. However, the efficiency with 
which ECG and IPPs make their resources available and the power relations resulting from 
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resource contribution is equally important in realising the goal of the partnership. From the 
interviews, CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli in the best possible situation make their 
resources available to ECG. Indeed, responses from partners and other stakeholders in the 
power sector sought to commend IPPs for their work and indicated that Ghana would have 
been in severe power crises if not for the work of these IPPs. CENIT Energy and Sunon 
Asogli have an installed capacity of 120 and 200 megawatts respectively which represents 
about 11% of the total installed capacity in the country (Energy Commission, 2014). 
Commenting on the significance of IPPs to electricity supply in Ghana, an energy expert from 
the Africa Centre for Energy Policy observed that: 
We have Sunon Asogli providing an efficient factor of 180% so that means that 
they are putting about 180 megawatts into the grid which is quite significant. 180 
megawatts of power can power about three regions in the country. And that is 
quite significant, so without them you can quantify the shortfall and the agitation 
that will go on. So without them of course we would have a worse situation than 
we have now. 
A senior official at the Power Department of the Ministry of Energy also had this to say about 
the efficiency of IPPs in electricity generation: 
We have done some uniting audit that showed that more often the saying that the 
private sector always has the most efficiency tends to be true when compared to 
the recent audit or survey of the plants in the country. It was realised that the 
IPPs availability was relatively higher compared to some of the state owned 
generation, not the hydro but thermal. So yes when compared the IPPs are 
performing to a level playing field.  
Generally, the opinions from the interviews indicate that IPPs are meeting their obligation of 
generating electricity to augment the supply by the national generator (VRA). However, due 
to fuel challenges, the ability of IPPs to produce is sometimes inhibited. The supply of gas for 
power generation is an external determining factor of the availability of IPPs to produce. IPPs 
have no control of the flow of gas for power generation. IPPs started operations in Ghana 
because of government’s promise to make fuel available through the West African Gas 
Pipeline. However, due to political instability in Nigeria where the gas is supposed to come 
from, supply of gas to IPPs has been erratic. Other factors that have caused the unreliable 
supply of gas to IPPs have been damages to the gas pipeline. For instance, in August 2012, 
Sunon Asogli had to shut down completely because of a damage to the West African Gas 
Pipeline. The company resumed operations in July 2013 when gas was restored to the 
pipeline. Within the period of non-operation by Sunon Asogli, the country experienced a 
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severe load shedding program (electricity rationing) which negatively affected both domestic 
and commercial users of electricity. An argument is made here that, since IPPs are private 
entities who want to be efficient and stay profitable, they in the best possible situations ensure 
availability of their facilities to generate electricity. However, external challenges (fuel 
unavailability) impact on their ability to meet their contractual obligations.  
On the other hand, ECG has over the years been criticised for high level of inefficiency in its 
distribution responsibilities. The challenges ECG faces have been outlined as commercial and 
technical losses (which they can fix) and unrealistic tariff (which should be fixed by the 
regulatory agencies) (World Bank, 2013). Commercial losses faced by ECG mostly emanate 
from non-payment for electricity consumption and illegal connections to the distribution 
network by customers. Technical losses have also been as a result of obsolete equipment that 
needs constant face-lifting and retrofitting. Since the distribution network is aged, electricity 
is lost in the process of distribution as the voltages keep reducing from the distribution point 
to the end user. Therefore, as the World Bank Report (2013:25) would put it, “ECG does not 
earn any revenue for this “lost” energy, but has to pay to buy it”. These challenges 
(commercial and technical) make ECG unable to pay for services rendered by its IPPs 
partners (CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli). Summing up on the challenge of ECG, a report 
by the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER, 2005:41) remarks that, 
“in general, the technical and financial performance of ECG continues to deteriorate as the 
company does not generate enough financial resources to address the issues of technical and 
non-technical losses that impede the increase in access to electricity and improvements in the 
quality of service such that ECG is no longer servicing its current debt obligations”. Also 
commenting on the challenge of ECG, an energy expert at the Africa Centre for Energy 
Policy remarked that: 
Yes I think the challenge we have in the power sector if you want to rank it, you 
would want to put distribution ahead of generation. Because if you generate 
power and a chunk of it goes waste because of the systems inefficiency, obviously 
you are not going to be able to tackle the upstream end where people need to 
come in and generate power because it doesn’t even make economic sense for 
somebody to put his money in there. And I think that’s where the biggest 
challenge is. 
 Power Relations Resulting from Strategic Resource Contribution  6.5.1
Consequently, even though ECG and IPPs are interdependent, the inefficiency of ECG has a 
negative influence on their objective of expanding electricity generation infrastructure. On the 
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one hand, they default in making prompt payments to Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy 
which strains their relationship with regards to possible future investments to meet growing 
electricity demand. On the other hand, ECG’s distribution system inefficiency as indicated by 
the response above disrupts electricity supply as power from IPPs sometimes does not get to 
the consumer because of its obsolete distribution network. Therefore even if IPPs expand 
power generation and ECG does not revamp its network, electricity delivery will still witness 
disruptions. The two regulatory agencies (Energy Commission and PURC) in this 
circumstance wield power to hold ECG accountable to its payment obligation and 
performance standards. “The exercise of power is often referred to as influence 
strategies…these influences typically involves threats, punishment, rewards, and assistance” 
(Cao & Zhang, 2012:21). The nature of electricity as a public good necessitates public 
institutions to regulate electricity utilities to ensure performance standards, but as 
demonstrated in the previous sections, this control measure is curtailed ultimately because of 
ECG’s monopoly in the power sector. Findings from the study support the hypothesis 
strategic resource contribution influences the level of interdependence between partners 
which in turn influences power relations and its impact on partnership stability and success.  
ECG’s source of advantage in the partnership is its ownership of the largest electricity 
consumers and because CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli do not have financial guarantees 
from government, they remain at a disadvantage in the events of non-payment by ECG. 
Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy thus pose little threat to ECG especially because the 
Regulatory Agencies are unable to sanction ECG. In relating this situation to the resource 
dependence theory, the relationship between IPPs and ECG is that of dependence asymmetry 
in which as argued by Gulati and Sytch (2007:36) “an actor possessing a dependence 
advantage-and hence the more powerful actor in a relationship-will increase its use of 
adversarial tactics because of decreased fear of retaliation, thereby positioning itself to capture 
greater value in the relationship at the expense of the weaker or dependence-disadvantaged 
actor”. In the partnership, even though ECG is inefficient and ought to be sanctioned, its 
advantageous position as a monopoly in the power sector renders it untouchable by the 
regulatory authorities. CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli thus appear to have very limited 
options in holding ECG to meet its contractual obligation which exposes them to financial 
risks. Because of this financial uncertainty, IPP actors have relatively low trust in their 
partners at ECG. Therefore, IPPs resource contribution goes as far as their contract dictates 
and limits the willingness to contribute more resources to the partnership to meet growing 
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electricity demand. This consequently jeopardizes the stability of the partnership because 
given the opportunity, IPPs would rather partner with other profitable organisations than 
being in a partnership with ECG. Responses from the study therefore show that ultimately, if 
there were other distribution companies, preferably private ones, IPPs would partner them 
instead of ECG. A technical officer from the Energy Commission remarked that: 
IPPs would have been better off if there were a lot more options of private 
distribution companies or let's say semi-autonomous companies. IPPs generate 
power and ECG uses the power and it is not paying. If there was an option, IPPs 
will send the power to these other options to distribute or use. So the generator 
[IPP] just wants to sell to somebody that it will be able to get the money 
immediately but because they don't have any option they still have to continue to 
generate because the plant is sitting down already and they have some overheads 
to meet so they have to continue to generate and debts keep piling up. So if there 
were a lot more competition, when IPPs negotiate with ECG and they are not 
getting a fair price they will go to the next distributor and negotiate. But now it is 
only ECG, and IPPs have nowhere to go so they have to ‘fight’ with ECG. 
From this response, it is evident that ECG enjoys monopoly and utilises it as an advantage 
over CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli who already have invested in the partnership and need 
to recoup their profits. The best option for these IPPs would have been the ability to choose 
between alternative off takers which is very limited in Ghana currently. Reiterating the above 
response is a comment from an official from CENIT Energy: 
I think if there is a private company that distributes, IPPs would prefer that 
because then it would be business oriented. If they don’t pay they don’t get 
energy, if they don’t get energy, they can’t meet their obligations to whoever is 
investing so we would prefer that. Private businesses are more efficient especially 
in this part of the world so yes we would prefer that. Sometimes the public 
organisations tend to allow private management but still ultimately when there 
are issues and the private partner goes to complain to the government, the 
government’s first obligation is to think of what is best in the interest of its 
citizenry and just goes ahead to arbitrarily enforce certain rules. 
Therefore, despite having high interdependence, the monopolistic nature of ECG affects 
relational quality especially as ECG utilises its advantageous position to withhold more 
resources from its partnership with CENIT Energy and Sunon Asogli (generated power and 
finances). Illustrating the amount of debt owed by ECG to its suppliers, statistics by the World 
Bank showed that at the beginning of the year 2012, ECG owed Sunon Asogli 20 Million 
Ghanaian Cedis
2
 however, by the end of June that same year (in a matter of six months), the 
debt had risen to 51 Million Ghanaian Cedis (World Bank, 2013:25). In such a situation, 
                                                          
2
 As at the time of research, currency conversion rate: US$ 1 = GH₵ 4 
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resource dependence theorists Gulati and Sytch (2007) suggest that the relationship becomes 
less stable and shows more characteristics of exchange than collaborative partnership with 
more conflicts, reliance on more punitive actions and very limited opportunity for continuity 
which have undoubtedly been evidenced throughout this study. The consequence of such a 
situation to the goal of expanding generation infrastructure is that, because the partnership is 
conflict ridden, prospects for future investment cannot be adequately predicted rendering 
government’s goal of 5000MW too ambitious and unattainable in the short term. 
6.6 MAJOR FINDINGS ON RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION 
 ECG’s monopoly in electricity distribution serves as its strategic contribution to the 
partnership as IPPs have limited options in selling their services. Unthreatened by 
sanctions due to its monopoly, ECG withholds more resources from IPPs (generated 
power and finance), thus creates a situation of dependence asymmetry in which IPPs 
contribute more than they gain. Consequently, even though ECG has not been 
forthcoming with meeting partnership obligations, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy have 
very limited options in holding ECG accountable as they (IPPs) pose little or no threat to 
ECG and the termination of contract would result in their (IPPs) financial loss due to 
absence of financial guarantee from government to back ECG.  
 The incentive packages (assistance in land acquisition for setting up generation stations, 5 
years tax holidays from start of production and assistance in fuel procurement) made 
available by government through the Ministry of Energy encouraged these IPPs to invest. 
Inefficiencies of ECG which often results in non-payment for services however constantly 
exposes IPPs to financial risks placing them at a disadvantage essentially because of 
absence of financial guarantee from government.    
 As demonstrated in the section on trust, this situation renders partners an inability to 
develop better collaborative interaction as relationship is reduced to buying and selling 
with high alertness on guarding against opportunistic behaviour. With this, IPPs especially 
since they are at a disadvantage are cautious of more resource commitment to the 
partnership. Thus, what they do at best is to commit as required by current contractual 
agreement and hope to be paid accordingly. The study has argued in this regard that, 
government’s goal of achieving 5000MW is not guaranteed as prospect of the partnership 
remains volatile. Indeed partners from IPPs expressed that if there were private 
distribution companies, they would partner them instead of ECG. 
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6.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has analysed the varied confidence level by partners and reliance on sanctions to 
meet contractual obligations. It has also demonstrated how the monopoly of ECG places IPPs 
at a disadvantaged position because of lack of financial guarantees. The resultant effect is a 
strained relationship between partners with particular attention to strict adherence to contracts 
where IPPs generate to meet current demand but wary of additional resource contribution to 
meet stipulated expansion of generation infrastructure. This renders the prospects of achieving 
5000MW in the short term unpredictable   
The next chapter summarises the findings of this research in relation to the advanced 
theoretical framework as well as assess the implication for future studies on PPP in the power 
sector of Ghana.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter presents an overview of the research. It recapitulates key findings of the 
study in relation to the research questions and discusses implications of the findings to the 
theoretical framework. The chapter also highlights significant policy implication of the study 
as well as the study limitations which subsequently suggest further research on the topic of 
PPP in the power sector of Ghana.  
7.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY PROBLEM AND STUDY OBJECTIVE 
Electricity demand in Ghana is growing at a rate of 10% annually and the Government of 
Ghana has an ambitious goal of expanding electricity generation capacity to 5000MW by 
2015. But as it stands the country currently has about 2589MW made up of both private and 
public generation stations. As the government is unable to invest more to reach the proposed 
5000MW, it needs other sectors especially the private sector to play a supporting role in 
assisting government attain this goal. Even though reforms have been implemented in the 
power sector to facilitate the role of the private sector, the expected flow of investment has 
not materialised. It has thus been suggested that there could be other reasons apart from the 
institutional framework that is inhibiting the private sector from taking advantage of the 
liberalised power sector. So far, there are three operational Independent Power Producers of 
which two (Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) do not have government guarantees and have 
been confronted with the challenge of fuel unavailability and non-payment by their public 
partner (Electricity Company of Ghana). The study in this sense reasoned that since 
government is unable to solely finance the expansion of generation infrastructure and also 
because the anticipated influx of IPPs has not occurred, it is essential that the existing PPPs be 
effectively managed to ensure further expansion of resources in an effort to achieving the goal 
of the sector while government continues to seek additional private investment.  
Regardless of the absence of financial guarantee from government and faced with persistent 
problem of fuel supply and non-payment by their principal partner (ECG), Sunon Asogli and 
CENIT Energy continue to generate as required by the Power Purchase Agreement in order to 
meet the current electricity demand of about 2300MW. However, further investment by these 
organisations to meet the projected 5000MW is contingent on the type of working relationship 
they have developed in their operations with public partners. That is, whether they have a 
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‘collaborative’ or ‘exchange’ partnership, which would subsequently determine additional 
investment in expanding electricity generation facilities in the face of the prevailing 
challenges. As the Theory of Collaborative Advantage (Vangen and Huxham, 2010) suggests, 
there should be more than mere exchange in a partnership to achieve stated goals. Therefore, 
the aim of this study has been to examine the interplay between partnership agreement and 
collaborative practices, that is, how public actors and their private counterparts engage with 
each other aside the formal dictates of their contracts and how this impacts on their effort at 
expanding electricity generation infrastructure.  
7.2 METHODS IN ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Unlike other studies that have focused on the established institutional frameworks and 
economic viability of PPP projects, this study concentrated on the behavioural traits of 
partners (what partners do) in the course of their operations and its subsequent impact on their 
success. In this regard, the study relied on an assertion by Weihe (2008:154) that, “indeed, 
operational practice has been more or less black-boxed. So we do not know very much about 
how the public and private actors in PPPs co-operate in practice and how this affects 
performance”. This study’s aim of seeking to examine the type of partnership relationship that 
public and private partners have developed thus focused on answering the main research 
question; what kind of working processes do partners engage in and how does it impact on 
their effort to attain the goal of expanding electricity generation infrastructure?  
To answer this question, the study adopted a qualitative approach with a case study strategy 
within which there were in-depth discussions with both public and private actors engaged in 
the PPP projects. These actors included; the primary partners (actors from ECG, Sunon Asogli 
and CENIT Energy) and public actors in other governmental institutions who have 
interactions with the IPPs and also influence the operations of the partnership. The study then 
corroborated their responses with written documents (both theoretical and empirical evidence) 
to appropriately answer the research questions.   
7.3 KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 How do partners formulate and work towards partnership goals? 7.3.1
As characteristic of most PPP projects, the goal of the partnership is a declaration by the 
Government of Ghana made through the National Energy Policy, which is to achieve 
5000MW of electricity generation. Even though the goal of the partnership has been stated by 
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the government, private actors at Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy attest to it and work 
towards it regardless of the individual interests of their organisations. In working towards this 
goal, partners have adopted a multilevel form of communication (national and partnership 
level) and have also engaged in frequent interaction (both scheduled and unplanned 
meetings). At the national level, actors from IPPs have been integrated in decision making 
with government actors from the Ministry of Energy and the two Regulatory Agencies (PURC 
and Energy Commission). Grievances of primary partners especially the issue of non-payment 
by partners at ECG are also mostly resolved at the national level. This has impacted positively 
on the commitment and motivation of IPPs towards meeting the sector/partnership goals.  
However, actors from Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy and their partners at ECG showed a 
formal relationship based on their Power Purchase Agreement and the study here argues this 
is because of the transactional nature of such contracts. This, even though comes in the way 
effective collaboration also ensures adherence to contractual obligation to meet partnership 
goals. Nonetheless, partners still organise joint capacity building programs to engage their 
management and staff on achieving better electricity service delivery. Thus, there is show of 
solidarity which indicates the perception of teamwork to attain partnership goal, which as 
explained, is a worthy success indicator that the partnership is making progress. Therefore, 
even though the target goal has not been met, this is a good indication that with sufficient trust 
and mutual relational power, the partnership would be stable and consequently realise their 
goal of expanding electricity generation.   
 How do partners build and maintain trust in working towards partnership 7.3.2
goals?  
By virtue of their Power Purchase Agreement, partners from ECG, CENIT Energy and Sunon 
Asogli have expectations they anticipate to be met and also bear some risks they expect to be 
mitigated. Findings from the study show that, while partners at ECG are generally satisfied 
with the performance of their partners at Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy, these IPPs have 
not had their expectations met, that is, of being adequately remunerated. Because these IPPs 
solely finance their operations without financial guarantees, non-payment by ECG remains 
their major risk and the study has revealed that ECG fails in mitigating this risk. The 
regulatory agencies who are supposed to also hold ECG accountable have expressed an 
inability to do so because of ECG’ monopoly in the electricity industry thus, Sunon Asogli 
and CENIT Energy are constantly exposed to commercial risks.  
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The study in this vein found that because the two necessary elements of trust building 
(meeting of expectation and effective risks management) are generally absent, partners from 
the IPPs are wary of further resource expansion because of their low confidence in their ECG 
partners. Consequently, confronted by uncertainty of the additional cost they may incur in 
pressing regulatory agencies to sanction ECG, these IPPs have expressed the willingness to 
expand generation capacities only if partners at ECG commit to their payment obligations and 
prove financial credibility, and if government also fulfils its promise of providing guaranteed 
supply of natural gas for consistent power generation. 
 How efficiently do partners make their complementary resources available to 7.3.3
meet partnership goal? 
While Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy solely finance their operations to generate the 
contracted quantity of electricity, ECG being the current viable off-taker in Ghana provides 
the electricity market by virtue of owning the largest distribution network. There is thus 
interdependence to meet individual organisational and partnership objectives (profitability for 
IPPs with access to electricity market and ECG meets electricity demand with access to power 
generation from IPPs). However, the prevailing relationship between partners at ECG and 
their counterparts at Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy demonstrates a dependence asymmetry 
as ECG uses its monopoly as a source of advantage to withhold more resources from these 
IPPs (in the events of persistent non-payments for services).  
It was also found that even though the government through its ministry and regulatory 
agencies makes certain incentives available to these IPPs to ease their cost of operations, 
Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy do not have financial guarantees from government. As ECG 
retains monopoly in electricity distribution, the unavailability of financial guarantee to Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy places them at a disadvantage as they (IPPs) pose little or no threat 
to ECG in the events ECG defaults in payment. This situation is further aggravated because 
the regulatory agencies are handicapped in holding ECG accountable. Thus, the partnership is 
characterised by high alertness on guarding against opportunistic behaviour especially by 
Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy, and what they do at best is to commit as required by 
contractual agreement and hope to be paid accordingly. IPP actors expressed that if there were 
other efficient companies willing to buy their services, they would partner them instead of 
ECG, therefore, the stability of the current partnership to meet the targeted 5000MW by 
government cannot be guaranteed.   
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7.4 RELATING STUDY FINDINGS TO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The study was conducted on the argument that the working relationship that partners develop 
would define them as either ‘collaborative’ or ‘exchange’ and consequently demonstrate their 
ability to reach stated goals. The Theory of Collaborative Advantage by Vangen and Huxham 
(2010) which postulates that there should be more than just exchange in a partnership to 
achieve stated goals therefore guided the conduct of this study. The study in this regard 
adopted the Theory of Collaborative Advantage as it describes how the relationship between 
partners influences the extent to which they attain their objectives. Another justification for 
the use of the theory is because of the perceived benefits that accrue from partnerships that 
individual organisations cannot achieve without joining forces with others. The elements of 
partnership functioning adopted from the theory that define the characteristics of the 
partnership understudy include; formulation and working towards mutual goals, existence of 
partnership trust and mutual resource contribution (adopted from the Resource Dependence 
Theory). From these elements, an effective partnership (with collaborative features) would 
exhibit partners who are committed to stated goal through the type of managerial practices 
they adopt in working together, high level of partnership trust to enhance resource expansion 
and mutual relational power to ensure partnership stability.  
 Formulation and Working Towards Mutual Goals 7.4.1
Findings from the study supported the assumption that, frequent communication and flexible 
relationship between partners may clarify individual differences and may enhance the 
achievement of mutual goals. The multi-level strategy of communication and the regularity 
with which meetings occur between principal partners at ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy, as well as other public actors from the Ministry of Energy, the PURC and the Energy 
Commission ensures familiarity with stated goal. The formal relationship between ECG and 
IPPs however emanates from the dictates of the Power Purchase Agreement and ensures 
adherence to contractual obligations. Nonetheless, the support shown by both public and 
private actors (the partnership and the national levels) in the attainment of individual 
organisational goals enhances their commitment to achieve partnership goals as they identify 
with the goal and work towards it.  
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 Existence of Partnership Trust 7.4.2
Despite the show of commitment by private partners (Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) to 
achieve partnership goals, their low confidence in their principal partners at ECG makes them 
uncertain of future investment to expand electricity generation capacities to meet stated goals. 
Currently, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy bear financial risks due to payment inconsistency 
by ECG. In this regard, findings from the study affirmed the assumption that, consistent 
meeting of expectations reinforces trusting attitudes and enables partners to move from low 
risk ventures to more ambitious ones. To warrant further resource contribution by IPPs to 
attain the stipulated goal of 5000MW therefore, partners at ECG must consistently meet 
financial expectations to enhance trust. To reiterate a comment by an official at CENIT 
Energy, his organisation would not expand ‘…not until we are sure of an off-taker that 
guarantees us payment…’  
 Mutual Resource Contribution  7.4.3
Apart from the low level of trust by partners at Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy which is 
inhibiting the expansion of their generation facilities, the unequal relational power that exists 
in their partnership with ECG threatens the stability of their venture. The monopolistic nature 
of ECG serves as its main strategic advantage in the partnership thus, unthreatened by 
retaliations in the failure of meeting payment obligations. More so, without financial 
guarantees from the government, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy remain at a disadvantage 
because they have invested in power generation and need to recoup their profits, hence, they 
constantly endure the non-fulfilment of payment obligation by ECG. The assumption that 
strategic resource contribution influences the level of interdependence between partners 
which in turn influences power relations and its impact on partnership stability and success is 
therefore supported by the study findings. This is to mean that, in the absence of other viable 
off-takers (potential buyers of electricity) in the power sector, ECG’s largest market remains 
its strategic resource contribution to the partnership and utilises it as its source of advantage to 
retain more resources (generated power and finances) from these IPPs. Findings therefore 
suggest that, if these private partners had an option, they would be in other profitable 
partnerships other than with ECG, thus the stability of the partnership to meet target goal 
cannot be guaranteed. 
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Table 6: SUMMARY ON PARTNERSHIP PRACTICES AND EFFECT ON 
ATTAINMENT OF PARTNERSHIP GOAL 
The Theory of Collaborative 
Advantage (Themes) 
Variables Major Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
Formulation and Working Towards 
Mutual Goals 
Network approach (involvement of 
both public and private actors) to 
decision making at the national level 
enables better coordination of sector 
activities (such as information on fuel 
availability for generation stations by 
which actors take prompt actions to 
forestall unanticipated power outages) 
and enhances commitment of partners 
to achieve government’s goal of 
improved electricity delivery   
 
 
 
 
 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
Existence of Partnership Trust 
Trust by IPPs in their partners at ECG 
is low due to the latter’s inconsistency 
in meeting payment obligation for 
services provided. In the absence of 
effective risk mitigation measures to 
secure IPPs investment, further 
resource contribution by IPPs to meet 
the 5000MW target of government is 
contingent on the enhanced credibility 
of ECG in making prompt payment for 
services provided      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource Dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual Resource Contribution 
ECG’s monopoly in electricity 
distribution serves as its strategic 
contribution to the partnership as IPPs 
have limited options in selling their 
services. Unthreatened by sanctions 
due to its monopoly, ECG withholds 
more resources from IPPs (generated 
power and finance), thus creates a 
situation of dependence asymmetry in 
which IPPs contribute more than they 
gain. This ultimately jeopardises the 
stability of the partnership in attaining 
the 5000MW goal of government  
Source: Researcher’s Design (2015) 
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7.5 POLICY IMPLICATION OF STUDY FINDINGS 
This study from the beginning made an assertion that, the current state of electricity deficit 
(challenges) in Ghana has created an appropriate time for rigorous research to identify 
relevant policy areas that need to be given attention. This study consequently focused on 
examining the working relationship between IPPs and their public partners and how it 
enhances the achievement of the target goal of 5000MW of generation infrastructure. 
Findings from the study suggest that, even though there is commitment by partners by virtue 
of the involvement of various sector actors in decision making, the low level of trust and 
unequal relational power between ECG and IPPs impedes on the attainment of this goal. In 
the absence of such collaborative features as enhanced trust and mutual relational power 
therefore, the partnership demonstrates characteristics of ‘exchange partnership’ with traits of 
high alertness on guarding against opportunistic behaviour and the uncertainty of transactional 
costs. Consequently, the goal of government to achieve 5000MW remains unrealistic and 
unpredictable as current IPPs are unwilling to expand generation capacities, and also because 
potential IPPs are unable to start production due to the prevailing financial challenges of 
ECG.  
The contribution of this study to the discussion of PPP in the power sector of Ghana therefore 
is that, it has highlighted the major threat to the partnership as the nonfulfillment of 
contractual obligation by ECG which severs trust with existing IPP partners. Another 
challenge of the partnership is the unavailability of gas for operations by IPPs. However, the 
study opines that, since government is making efforts to ensure adequate gas supply 
especially with the discovery of oil and gas reserves in Ghana, the relational challenge of 
partners remains the major threat to the attainment of goals. Overall, this study accentuates a 
remark by a concept paper of the Ghana Millennium Challenge Account Program-Compact II 
(2012:1) that, “investment in infrastructure alone will not produce the desired improvement in 
reliability of electricity supply, without measures to increase the operational efficiency of the 
operating entities in the power sector, in particular ECG, to increase the creditworthiness of 
these entities, and thereby attract private capital to the power sector”. In other words, even 
though the problem of the sector has been named as power generation deficit, which 
necessitates the operations of IPPs, a chunk of the challenge is the inefficiency of the 
distribution system operator (ECG). Thus, as government fashions strategies (regulatory 
frameworks and incentives) to attract private investment, there ought to be equal attention to 
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strengthening the institutional capacities of its agencies (especially ECG) to complement the 
efforts by IPPs. 
The study has underscored the significance of the ‘network approach’ in decision making 
comprising both public and private actors at the national level, which is in consonance with 
effective partnership practices. This, the study argues consolidates commitment to work 
towards target goal. However, to translate this positive attribute into achieving substantive 
gains in expanding power generation, the practice of collaborative partnership requires 
partners at ECG to consistently meet payment expectations by IPPs to gradually gain their 
trust, and consequently, contribute more resources into expanding their power generation 
facilities. In the presence of trust, ECG’s monopoly in the power industry may not be a threat 
to the partnership as there is mutual fulfillment of expectation, thus, reduced sense of 
investment risks for IPPs.          
7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
One major challenge of the study is that the partnership between ECG and its partner IPPs is 
relatively young considering that Sunon Asogli commenced operations in 2010 and CENIT 
Energy started in 2012, thus, examining collaborative efforts is somewhat untimely. This is 
especially because collaboration (particularly with trust) takes a longer time to develop in 
high economic ventures as observed by Weihe (2008). Nonetheless, the study has highlighted 
potential challenges of the partnership that could be addressed as it matures. Future studies 
may therefore build on this study by adopting similar theories and methodology to examine if 
partners made progress with collaborative efforts (enhanced trust and mutual relational 
power) to meet stated goals.  
Another limitation of the study is that, it was unable to examine the other type of PPP in the 
power sector, which is a joint venture between government agency (VRA) and the Abu Dhabi 
National Energy Company (TAQA) and secured with financial guarantee from government. 
This would have enabled a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of two types of PPPs 
(Joint Venture and Public Finance Initiative) being practised in the power sector of Ghana. 
More importantly because this study observed that partners at ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT 
Energy do not regard themselves as partners as they do not invest in each other’s operations, 
which could also imply why they perceive themselves as different entities working towards a 
common goal. Future studies could thus endeavour to analyse how the perception of being 
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partners influences the relational quality of partners and its subsequent influence on their 
collaborative effort in achieving the goal of the sector.  
7.7 CONCLUSION 
The study concludes that, even though the power sector reform has achieved some strides in 
the introduction of Independent Power Producers to support government in attaining a robust 
generation infrastructure, it has not been able to effectively achieve its stated 5000MW of 
generation capacity by 2015 essentially because the goal is overly ambitious. The existing 
partnership between ECG and IPPs (Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) has not attained the 
characteristics of a collaborative partnership that would enable them move from the current 
venture (326MW representing about 11.4% of generation capacity) to a higher one in an effort 
to realise the goal of government. On the one hand, the regular interaction between public 
actors from the Ministry of Energy, Energy Commission and PURC with the primary partners 
(ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) is beneficial for the overall planning and 
coordination of sector activities as well as enhancing the commitment of all sector players to 
meet government’s goal.  On the other hand, the poor relational quality between partners at 
ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy due to absence of trust and unequal relational power 
limits the extent to which they are able to effectively work in expanding generation capacities 
towards achieving the overall objective of the sector.  
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 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 Introductory Questions for all respondents 
1. How would you describe the electricity situation in Ghana currently?  
 Questions for primary partners (ECG, Sunon Asogli and CENIT Energy) 
 Communication and Interaction  
1. What kind of agreement or contract exists between ECG and IPPs? 
2. What is the nature of responsibility of each party in the contract? 
3. How would you describe your organisation’s interest in the contract? 
4. Would you say you have mutual goals with other parties in the contract? Do you think 
all partners work towards the overall objective of the partnership? 
5. How easy is it to share and access information from other parties? 
6. Does your organisation have scheduled meetings with partners and other sector 
players to deliberate on your interests and objectives? 
7. Does your organisation go beyond contractual obligation or interest to achieve 
partnership goals? 
8. Do you decide together how much power to produce and reserve? If there is any 
reserve, is there a compensation for the reserved power? 
9. Would you say there is consensus among partners and other stakeholders in the power 
sector on the challenges of the sector and the ways forward? 
 Resources 
10. What resources are needed for your organisation’s operations? 
11. Does your organisation have enough resources (both human and financial) to ensure 
effective performance?  
12. What are the resources you make available to complement resources provided by other 
partners? 
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13. How would you describe your partners’ promptness in making their resources 
available?  
14. How does the ability or inability of partners to make resources available to you affect 
your organisations operations? 
15. What role does government play to facilitate the investment of IPPs between signing 
of contracts and commissioning of projects? 
a. Does government help with acquisition of land and licenses? 
b. Does government provide tax incentives to IPPs? 
c. Does government contribute financially? 
d. Does government assist in procuring fuel for IPPs  
 Trust 
16. What are the risks your organisation faces in the partnership? 
17. What management practices are put in place by the partnership to ensure mitigation of 
these risks?  
18. What are your expectations of other partners? How would you describe your 
confidence in other partners in meeting these expectations? 
19. Would your organisation expand resources to meet the growing demand for 
electricity? 
Questions for Third Party (GRIDCo) 
1. How would you describe you contract agreement with ECG and IPPs?  
2. How would you describe the nature of responsibility of each party in the contract? 
3. Does GRIDCo have meetings with other sector actors to discuss goals of the power 
sector and how to achieve them? 
4. What are the terms for the transmission of power? Is there an open and equal access to 
all power generators (both public and private entities)? Is it based on first come first 
served or on which costs less?  
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Questions for the Ministry of Energy 
1. What is the main goal or objective of the Ministry of Energy regarding the power 
sector? 
2. What are some of the challenges of the sector? What are the measures put in place 
to mitigate these challenges? 
3. How would you describe the role of IPPs in Ghana currently? 
4. Does the government have policies that ensure effective operations by the IPPs? 
5. How frequent does the Ministry engage with IPPs (especially) and other sector 
actors regarding achieving the goal of the sector? 
6. What role does government play to facilitate the investment of IPPs between 
signing of contracts and commissioning of projects? 
a. Does government help with acquisition of land and licenses? 
b. Does government provide tax incentives to IPPs? 
c. Does government contribute financially? 
7. Do you decide together with IPPs how much power to produce and reserve?  
Questions for Regulatory Actors (PURC and ENERGY COMMISSION) 
1. What is the main role of the PURC/EC in the power sector? 
2. Why is it necessary to have the PURC/EC? Or, why should the sector be regulated? 
3. What are some of the challenges of the sector? What are the measures put in place by 
the PURC/EC to mitigate these challenges? 
4. How would you describe the role of IPPs in Ghana currently? 
5. Does the work of PURC/EC facilitate the operations of IPPs? 
6. How would you describe your working relationship with actors from IPPs? 
7. How frequent does the PURC/EC have scheduled meetings with IPPs and other actors 
in the power sector to discuss goals of the sector and how to achieve them? 
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8. What are some of the regulatory activities of PURC that ensure efficient operations of 
IPPs? 
9. Does the PURC/EC consult power utilities (both public and private) especially actors 
from IPPs when taking decisions on tariffs and legislations?  
Questions for Major Electricity Generator (VRA) 
1. How would you describe VRA’s contribution to the goal of providing improved 
electricity delivery? 
2. How would you describe VRA’s Joint Venture partnership with TICO? Is the 
partnership yielding its purported benefits? 
3. Does the VRA engage other sector actors in deliberating on the goals of the sector and 
ways of attaining them? 
4. How different is your partnership from the one other type engaged in by ECG, Sunon 
Asogli and CENIT Energy? Which one in your opinion do partners collaborate more? 
Questions for Energy Expert (ACEP) 
1. How would you describe the role of IPPs in Ghana currently 
2. How would you describe government’s attitude towards IPPs? Is it doing enough to 
accommodate them and to ensure their effective performance? 
3. Would you say there is enough collaborative effort by both IPPs and government 
agencies in solving the power crises? 
 Concluding Questions for all Respondents 
1. In what ways does government’s partnership with Independent Power Producers a 
better option to either of them working separately?  
2. How would the current electricity situation be without IPPs? 
3. How would you describe electricity supply currently? Does the country have the 
required generation capacity to meet demand? How consistent (reliable) is electricity 
supply? 
4. How would you describe the prospects of the IPPs in Ghana in the long term?  
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 APPENDIX 2: CLEARANCE LETTERS 
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